Court Filings

The Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals reviewed a bench trial where Yangtze Railroad Fasteners sued Ohio Valley Trackwork (OVT) for breach of contract and unjust enrichment over about $40,000 for delivered railroad materials. The court found Yangtze proved the contract and delivery, but the trial court had concluded OVT was not liable because payment was misdirected to a third party after fraudulent email instructions. The appeals court held the trial court’s decision on breach of contract was against the manifest weight of the evidence, reversed that portion, and remanded for further proceedings while affirming the unjust enrichment judgment portion not appealed.

The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Twelfth District Court of Appeals’ dismissal of Ramone Wright’s mandamus petition asking the Madison County Municipal Court to vacate a prior traffic conviction. Wright argued he could not have committed the traffic offense because he was allegedly jailed on another matter at the time, and said his time to appeal had passed. The Supreme Court held Wright had an adequate remedy at law—direct appeal or postconviction procedures—and therefore mandamus was not available. The municipal court’s motion to dismiss the appeal was denied as procedurally improper but its brief was considered on the merits.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the jury verdict for Thomas Chevrolet in Scott Martin’s wrongful-termination suit. Martin alleged he was fired for refusing his supervisor’s instructions to commit insurance fraud. The jury found for the employer, and the trial court denied post-trial relief. On appeal Martin argued the court erred by (1) refusing a jury instruction on the “cat’s paw” theory, (2) denying a juror challenge for cause, and (3) excluding evidence and an email about other employees’ post-termination allegations against the supervisor. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the court’s jury instructions, juror inquiry, or relevancy and prejudice rulings on evidence, and affirmed judgment.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed (quashed) Ajani Posey’s appeal because the Commonwealth Court’s order was not final or immediately appealable. The court relied on Pennsylvania appellate procedure rules defining final orders and explaining limits on appeals from certain interlocutory orders, including transfer orders under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103. Because the challenged order did not meet the rules for an appeal as of right, the Supreme Court ended the case without addressing the underlying merits.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court quashed Ajani Posey’s notice of appeal on April 21, 2026, because the Commonwealth Court’s order was not final or immediately appealable. The court concluded the appealed order did not meet the state rules' definition of a final order and noted that certain interlocutory transfer orders are not appealable as of right. Consequently, the appeal cannot proceed in the Supreme Court at this time.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a per curiam order dated April 21, 2026, quashed a notice of appeal in a dispute between Paula Grapes (as executrix of an estate) and Linda J. Grapes. The Court concluded that the appealed order was not one of the types of final orders that may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court under 42 Pa.C.S. § 722 and the state appellate rules defining final orders. Because the appeal did not meet the statutory and rule-based criteria for direct review, the notice of appeal was dismissed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a per curiam order on April 21, 2026 quashing a Notice of Appeal in a dispute involving Paula Grapes (as executrix of an estate) and Linda J. Grapes. The Court concluded the appeal could not proceed because the challenged order was not one of the types of final orders that may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court under state statute and appellate rules. The Court relied on 42 Pa.C.S. § 722 and Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341(b) in finding the appeal improper and therefore quashed the filing.

The appellate court upheld the trial court’s finding that 11-year-old K.W. was neglected by his sole custodial parent, M.W., because K.W. suffered physical injuries (including a black eye) while in M.W.’s care and was exposed to an injurious home environment. The court also affirmed the dispositional order making K.W. a ward of the court and setting a 12‑month reunification goal, based largely on M.W.’s refusal to complete a court‑ordered substance abuse assessment despite admissions of recent drinking and past substance abuse and his failure to obtain timely physical and mental health care for K.W. The court credited school and DCFS testimony and found the rulings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Chancery Division's May 14, 2025 order denying the executors' motion to compel arbitration of will/trust disputes under Samuel Hekemian's 2002 will. The court held the will's arbitration clause is not a valid, enforceable waiver because interested parties did not mutually assent to arbitrate or knowingly relinquish their right to court adjudication. The court also held arbitration clauses in testamentary instruments that would displace statutory court supervision of estates conflict with New Jersey's Probate Code, so the disputes must remain subject to court proceedings.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court (Bronx County) and granted plaintiff Wilmington Savings Fund Society's motion to confirm a Referee's report and enter a judgment of foreclosure and sale. The court found the Referee's report was substantially supported by the affidavit of the plaintiff's corporate counsel for its loan servicer, which detailed the borrower's full payment history, established default as of October 1, 2008, and set forth the unpaid principal balance and accrued interest. The court relied on precedent permitting business records and servicer-calculated amounts when properly supported.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment to the Board of Managers of 388 West Broadway Condominium (388 West) in a slip-and-fall suit by Miguel Torres. The court held that 388 West did not meet its initial burden to show it bore no liability for a trip hazard formed where its sidewalk and an adjacent sidewalk met. Evidence showed 388 West or a prior owner had altered the sidewalk in 2002, creating a sloped ramp that encroached on the neighbor’s sidewalk, and the record did not eliminate the possibility that 388 West failed to keep the sidewalk abutting its property in a reasonably safe condition, making summary judgment inappropriate.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed two Supreme Court orders: one denying plaintiffs' motion to disqualify defendants' counsel, and the other granting defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. The court held that the business judgment rule prevented judicial review of the board's actions because the complaint lacked sufficient allegations showing the board majority was not independent. The court also found plaintiffs failed to show a conflict of interest warranting counsel disqualification, noting a written waiver from the organization's executive director. Because dismissal rested on the business judgment rule, the court did not decide standing or pleading sufficiency.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment to Consolidated Edison and Verizon in a personal-injury suit after plaintiff's motorcycle encountered low-hanging wires. The court held that Con Ed could be liable because, under the Joint Use Agreement, it was responsible for maintaining the pole and had actual notice of the hazard from a morning complaint but did not inspect until hours after the crash. Verizon likewise failed to show it had no responsibility or lacked notice because ownership of the offending wires was disputed and its claimed defenses were unpreserved or unsupported.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed three Supreme Court orders in a dispute over property damage and toxic dust infiltration between owners of adjoining townhomes. The court upheld (1) defendants' leave to amend their answer to add a counterclaim for setoff based on plaintiffs' alleged delays and increased remediation costs, (2) denial of plaintiffs' motion to compel additional discovery related to that new counterclaim, and (3) denial of plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment seeking payment under a license agreement. The court found the counterclaim not frivolous, the discovery requests unnecessary to the setoff theory, and that disputed factual terms in the license agreement precluded summary judgment.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Anzar Thompson's conviction and two-year sentence for attempted second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. Thompson challenged the stop-and-frisk as unsupported by reasonable suspicion based on a 911 caller's information; the court held the claim was unpreserved and declined review in the interest of justice, but alternatively rejected the challenge on the merits. The court found the 911 tip reliable because it included identifying details (partial name and callback number), a detailed description and location, and accurate vehicle information corroborated by the officer's observations, which together supplied reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk.

The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the judgment of the New York County Supreme Court in People v. Imbert. The appeals challenged a criminal conviction and sentence imposed on March 28, 2023. After briefing and oral argument, the appellate panel reviewed the record, considered counsel's arguments, and concluded the sentence was not excessive. The court therefore upheld the trial court's judgment and denied relief to the defendant, issuing a short unanimous order affirming the judgment on April 21, 2026.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Victor Jimenez Cespedes's conviction and eight-year sentence for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree. The court reviewed the jury verdict and found it was not against the weight of the evidence, crediting the jury's credibility determinations. Key facts supporting conviction were that defendant entered an undercover officer's car carrying a box containing over 6,000 fentanyl pills, acted as the courier in a negotiated $25,000 transaction, and admitted he would receive $2,000. The court held these facts supported an inference that he knew the box's contents and rejected his testimonial denial.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Supreme Court order denying defendant US Weatherseal Windows & Doors Operation Inc.'s motion to dismiss a negligence claim brought by condominium unit owners. The plaintiffs allege Weatherseal negligently designed, manufactured, installed, and attempted to repair windows, causing sash sealing failures and recurring water leaks that damaged interior property. The court held that, at this early stage, plaintiffs plausibly alleged an exception to the general rule barring third-party liability under contract because Weatherseal may have created or increased an unreasonable risk of harm, allowing the property-damage negligence claim to proceed.

The First Department affirmed a January 15, 2025 judgment granting Nationstar Mortgage LLC's motion to confirm a referee's report and for judgment of foreclosure and sale against Steve Vassi, and denying Vassi's cross-motion to toll interest. The court held that Vassi retained standing to challenge the foreclosure despite transferring the property because he remains liable on the note and potentially subject to a deficiency judgment. On the merits, the court found plaintiff complied with RPAPL 1304's notice and mailing requirements and that the referee's report was supported by admissible business-record evidence, so confirmation and foreclosure were proper.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed in part and modified in part the trial court's summary judgment order in a suit by Muslim maintenance workers who refused to shave their beards to pass N-95 fit tests. The court upheld dismissal of plaintiffs' selective-enforcement discrimination claims because the hospital showed a neutral safety-based reason applicable to all Building Services staff. The court reversed to reinstate plaintiffs' claims (including Brian Jones) for failure to accommodate and failure to engage in a cooperative dialogue, finding genuine issues of fact about feasibility of accommodation and whether the hospital cut off interactive discussions.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Family Court order finding that appellant Carlos M.-J. committed a family offense amounting to second-degree harassment by intentionally bumping into the petitioner, Pascal W. The court upheld the Family Court's credibility findings and sustained the six-month suspended judgment and corresponding six-month order of protection. The appeal was not moot despite the protection order's expiration because the underlying finding can have future legal consequences. The court concluded the evidence met the fair preponderance standard and the protection order was a proper exercise of discretion.

The Appellate Division reviewed a Family Court disposition that adjudicated 17-year-old Jesus G. a juvenile delinquent after he admitted to taking a car and driving it a short distance before abandoning it. The court affirmed the delinquency finding and 15-month probation but vacated the $1,000 restitution award. The panel held the victim's statements were sufficient to establish replacement cost, but vacated restitution because the juvenile's written admission did not include an agreement to pay restitution and restitution was not sought in the charging document prior to disposition.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Surrogate's Court order denying objectant Michael Marino’s motion for summary judgment challenging executor Janet Marino Gerlach’s accountings for two accounting periods. The court held objectants failed to prove, as a matter of law, that Gerlach’s decisions caused financial loss, that she overpaid herself fees, or that she failed to withhold estate tax to certain beneficiaries. The court found triable issues of fact based on Gerlach’s investment strategy, will provisions granting broad discretion, competing expert opinions on fees, and an attorney affidavit about tax withholding, so summary judgment was inappropriate.

The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s orders granting summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) claims against both defendants and granting conditional contractual indemnification to landlord Abeken against tenant Blended Family. The court held that the technician’s work — drilling two holes to run a cable between ceilings and rooms — did not constitute construction-related activity or an alteration that would trigger Labor Law § 240(1). The court also rejected the landlord’s argument that Public Service Law § 228 barred the claim, finding that the worker was a telecommunications, not cable television, installer. Questions of fact about the building ladder precluded summary judgment on common-law negligence, and the lease indemnity clause was enforceable but conditional.

The Appellate Division, First Department reviewed an appeal by husband Jerome Dewald from a post-trial family court order that denied him spousal maintenance and awarded the wife $5,500 in counsel fees. The appellate court affirmed the denial of maintenance, finding the trial court permissibly deviated from statutory guidelines after considering factors such as the husband’s age, assets, prior fraud conviction, pendente lite payments, and the short time the parties lived together. However, the court vacated the counsel-fee award because the trial court failed to provide the written findings and reasons required by court rules before imposing such fees.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed Supreme Court's order dismissing the remaining causes of action against several defendants in a fraud and contract dispute arising from a double sale of real property. The court held it lacked general jurisdiction over certain out-of-state defendants, applied New York's procedural law (including its six-year statute of limitations) to bar a statute-of-limitations defense based on Ohio law, but found the fraud, aiding-and-abetting, and certain contract-based claims were insufficiently pleaded or duplicative and thus properly dismissed. Because dismissal was proper on those grounds, other defenses were not reached.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Supreme Court order denying Sompo America Insurance Company's motion to dismiss a fire-damage complaint brought by 120 Main Hotel LLC. The insurer argued an exclusion for damage to vacant or unoccupied premises barred coverage. The appellate court held Sompo failed to prove the exclusion applied because factual disputes remain about the property's condition, whether covered hotel property adequate for operation was present, and whether the plaintiff was conducting customary business operations shortly before the fire. The court also struck new arguments raised for the first time in reply.

The Court of Appeals held that the three-year delay between the third and fourth trials of Travis Woods violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial and ordered dismissal of the murder and weapon-possession charges. The court found the prosecution offered only vague, unsubstantiated reasons for the long delay—internal meetings, reassignment, and reinvestigation—insufficient to justify more than three years of inaction during which a key eyewitness died. The court affirmed Woods's earlier drug convictions, rejecting his claim that lack of notice about two jury notes required reversal because the jury later sent the same request and counsel participated in the readback.

The Court of Appeals held that defendant's written speedy-trial motion under CPL 30.30(1)(b), filed on the day trial was to begin, was timely and provided reasonable notice to the People. The Appellate Division erred in affirming the trial court's summary refusal to consider the motion as untimely and for lack of notice. Because the motion complied with the specific statutory deadline in CPL 170.30(2) and included detailed calculations of chargeable days, the Court reversed and remitted the case for further proceedings on the motion so the People may be given a fair opportunity to respond and the trial court may exercise its discretion how to proceed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's reversal of Supreme Court's judgment in a CPLR article 78 challenge. Petitioner Bi-Coastal Properties had sought review of respondents' denial of a clerical error review application and claimed entitlement to J-51 tax exemption benefits beginning July 1, 2020. The Court held that the petitioner’s challenge—asserting an overassessment caused by failure to apply a change in physical value and an exemption after window replacement—was reviewable only under the Real Property Tax Law's article 7 procedures, not by CPLR article 78. The certified question was left unanswered as unnecessary.