Court Filings

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed Lewis Carl Hunt’s appeal of his conviction for murder because the trial court certified that the case was resolved by a plea bargain and that Hunt waived his right to appeal. Under Texas appellate rules, when a defendant pleads guilty or no contest pursuant to a plea agreement and the trial court certifies no right to appeal (or the defendant waives appeal), the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The court therefore dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Frank Estrada III’s conviction for one count of violating a protective order. Estrada was tried on three counts (two assault counts and one protective-order violation); the jury acquitted or deadlocked on the assault counts (mistrial and later dismissal) but convicted on the protective-order violation. Estrada challenged the admission of a 911 recording and EMS medical records and the trial court’s granting of the State’s challenge for cause to Juror 53. The court held the evidentiary rulings were not reversible error and that, although the trial court abused its discretion in excusing Juror 53 for cause, that mistake did not harm Estrada’s substantial rights, so the conviction stands.

The Texas Sixth Court of Appeals denied Brian Keith Melton’s petition for a writ of mandamus asking the Hunt County trial judge to rule on his motion to dismiss counsel. The court explained that mandamus requires showing no adequate remedy at law, a ministerial duty by the trial court, and a sufficient record. Melton failed to provide certified copies of his motion or a request for a ruling as required by the appellate rules, and he offered no authority showing that the trial court’s roughly thirty-day delay was unreasonable. For those reasons the petition was denied.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s judgment that had adjudicated Debrah Elizabeth East guilty of possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine after she violated terms of deferred adjudication community supervision. The State proved she used controlled substances and failed to complete restitution; after a hearing the trial court imposed a nine-month state jail sentence. Appellate counsel found no nonfrivolous issues and filed an Anders brief; the appeals court independently reviewed the record, concluded the appeal was frivolous, and affirmed, granting counsel permission to withdraw.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Appellate District of Texas dismissed this appeal because the parties filed a joint notice that they resolved their disputes and moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and entered dismissal. The decision is procedural: no merits ruling was made because the parties voluntarily ended the litigation by settlement and asked the court to close the appeal.

A Lamar County jury convicted Andrew McCarty of indecency with a child by sexual contact. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment and the written judgment also included a $50 payment to the Children’s Advocacy Center and listed the offense as a second-degree felony. The Court of Appeals held the oral sentence—life imprisonment with no fine—controls, so the $50.00 entry must be deleted from the written judgment. The court also corrected the degree entry to reflect that the second-degree conviction was enhanced to first degree. The judgment was affirmed as modified.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Trimen Enterprises, Inc.'s appeal seeking review of the trial court's refusal to allow an amended answer and the entry of default judgment against Trimen. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because the case remains pending below as other claims against a co-defendant were unresolved, and the trial court did not enter a certificate under OCGA § 9-11-54(b). Because Trimen did not follow the interlocutory-appeal procedures in OCGA § 5-6-34(b), including obtaining a certificate of immediate review, the appeal was premature and must be dismissed.

The Court of Appeals ordered that the defendant Curtis Tyner’s direct appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate sentence in a murder and related convictions case be transferred to the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Court concluded it lacks jurisdiction because the Georgia Constitution and state law give the Supreme Court jurisdiction over cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, and that jurisdiction extends to post-judgment motions in murder cases. The transfer was granted so the Supreme Court can decide the appeal and any issues raised by Tyner.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting defendant Tonya Newberry a new trial after a jury convicted her of furnishing contraband and crossing a guard line. The State argued the grant was premature because no judgment had been entered, that the trial court misapplied the thirteenth-juror standard, and that the judge should have been recused. The court held the premature order was not void, found no abuse of discretion in granting a new trial on weight-of-the-evidence grounds given conflicting witness credibility and lack of video, and declined to review the recusal denial because it was entered after the State’s appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed James Fields's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the trial court record lacks a written disposition as to Count 2 (a firearm charge). Fields was convicted on Count 5 (attempted armed robbery) and Count 6 (firearm during a felony) and acquitted on Count 1, while Count 3 resulted in a mistrial and Counts 3 and 4 were dead-docketed. Under Georgia law, an appeal from a multi-count indictment is only ripe when each count has a written judgment; because Count 2 remains unresolved in the record, Fields needed to seek interlocutory review and did not, so the appeal was dismissed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed a pro se appeal by Crandall Postell from a probate court order approving sale of estate real property because Postell remained represented by counsel when he filed the notice of appeal. The record contained no probate-court order allowing attorney Daniel Wilder to withdraw, and Georgia precedent bars a party from simultaneously being represented and proceeding pro se. Because a pro se notice filed while represented is a legal nullity, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal by homeowner Chinh Vo challenging the denial of his motion to set aside a May 2025 final judgment in favor of Bellmoore Park Homeowners Association. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because appeals from denials of motions to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60(d) must proceed by discretionary appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(8),(b). Because compliance with the discretionary-appeal procedure is jurisdictional, the court dismissed the direct appeal for failure to follow the required procedure.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted James Lampru's application for discretionary appeal on April 17, 2026. The court allowed the appellant to file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the order and directed the Superior Court clerk to include this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals. The order is procedural: it accepts review and sets steps for the appeal record and filing, without addressing the merits of the underlying case.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Ed Hunter's appeal from the City of South Fulton because the appellant failed to comply with docketing notice and Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) by not filing an enumeration of errors and brief within the required time. The court had previously ordered those filings by April 6, 2026; they were still not filed as of the April 17, 2026 order. Relying on its procedural rules, the court deemed the appeal abandoned and entered dismissal.

The Ohio Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court's denial of Raymond Warren’s application for postconviction DNA testing of three shell casings. Warren had sought testing for touch DNA after his 1995 murder conviction; the trial court initially denied testing, this court remanded for further factfinding about whether the casings remained suitable for testing, and on remand the trial court again denied the application. The appeals court found no abuse of discretion because testing authorities concluded the casings were at substantial risk of contamination and the record did not show the parent samples remained scientifically suitable for testing.

The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the Greene County Common Pleas judgment. William J. Sawyer, bound over from juvenile court, pleaded guilty to rape and related sexual-offense charges and received a four-to-six year prison term and Tier III sex-offender classification. On appeal he argued the juvenile court erred by transferring him for adult prosecution and the trial court erred by denying suppression motions. The court held Sawyer waived suppression challenges by pleading guilty and concluded the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding him not amenable to juvenile rehabilitation based on the statutory factors and expert testimony.

The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s restitution order requiring Jermaine Reynolds to pay $3,067 to his domestic-violence victim for medical expenses. Reynolds had pleaded guilty to misdemeanor domestic violence; the felony strangulation count was dismissed. The trial court relied on the presentence investigation report (which included the victim’s impact statement and three medical bills showing $3,067.54 owed) when ordering restitution. Because Reynolds did not object below, the appeals court reviewed only for plain error and concluded the PSI provided competent, sufficient evidence to support the restitution award.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of a misdemeanor charge against Nathan Hake for illegally disposing of construction and demolition debris and remanded the case for further proceedings. The trial court had dismissed the charge as unconstitutionally vague, focusing on terms like “disposal,” “storage,” “temporary period,” and “substantially unchanged.” The appellate court held that the statutory and regulatory definitions give fair notice and are not impermissibly vague as applied to Hake’s alleged conduct (digging a pit, burying construction debris and household waste), so the dismissal was improper.

The Ohio Court of Appeals reviewed a final divorce decree after the wife filed for annulment and the husband counterclaimed for divorce. The court reversed the trial court only to the extent it awarded $3,000 in attorney’s fees to the husband, and affirmed the remainder of the decree. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s finding that the wife engaged in financial misconduct — transferring and spending the husband’s premarital funds during the parties’ cohabitation — and approved a $58,827.40 distributive award to compensate the husband and an unequal allocation of marital debts reflecting the wife’s misconduct.

The appellate court affirmed the domestic relations trial court's dismissal of a husband's objections to a civil protection order (DVCPO) as moot. The husband challenged the trial court's finding that two alleged lasting harms — loss of a military housing entitlement and revocation of Global Entry — were not proven collateral consequences of the DVCPO. The appeals court held the husband provided only speculative testimony and no documentation linking the DVCPO to those consequences, so the collateral-consequences exception to mootness did not apply and the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The Ohio Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s August 6, 2025 judgment awarding permanent custody of three children to the Clark County Department of Job and Family Services (JFS) and denying the maternal aunt’s request for legal custody. The children were removed after deplorable home conditions and prior dependency adjudications; parents made minimal progress on case plans and mother admitted ongoing drug use. The appellate court found no reversible error in notice to the father, held the mother lacked standing to challenge denial of the aunt’s motion, and concluded the record supported that permanent custody was in the children’s best interest.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Dennis Crowley's motion to suppress evidence found during a traffic stop. Officer Webb stopped Crowley on May 7, 2025 for a loud muffler in violation of Ohio law, and an inventory search of the towed vehicle uncovered powdered cocaine. The appellate court held the stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion because Officer Webb observed and the body-camera recorded an audible rumble from the exhaust consistent with R.C. 4513.22(A). The conviction (no contest plea) and community-control sentence were left intact.

The State of Ohio appealed two Lucas County trial-court judgments that allowed cash seized in investigations to be applied toward fines imposed on defendant Shakur Ishmail Shabaa. The appellate court reversed and remanded. It held that (1) $122 forfeited through a civil forfeiture consent judgment could not be used to pay criminal fines because R.C. 2981.12(G) expressly forbids using forfeited property to pay fines; and (2) $4,460 that Shabaa forfeited by plea agreement could not be applied to his fines because the trial court lacked authority to alter the parties’ negotiated plea terms that specified disbursement to the State and Sylvania Township Police.

The court affirmed the Sandusky Municipal Court’s August 20, 2025 judgment denying Shardaye Smith’s motion for relief from judgment under Ohio Civil Rule 60(B). LVNV Funding obtained summary judgment in a small-claims-style collection action after serving process by certified mail to the address on Smith’s account. Smith later sought relief, claiming defective service, lack of jurisdiction, and invalid evidentiary foundation; the magistrate and trial court found she was properly served, had notice (as shown by an earlier filing contesting jurisdiction), failed to show a meritorious defense, and filed her motion untimely. The appellate court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief and affirmed.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals denied Frederick Mundt’s application for reconsideration and request for en banc review of its prior opinion affirming the trial court’s dismissal of his postconviction petition under Ohio’s serious mental illness (SMI) statute. The court reaffirmed that Mundt had clinical diagnoses of Bipolar Disorder and Schizoaffective Disorder but found the record lacked sufficient evidence that those conditions significantly impaired his capacity to make rational judgments at the time of the offense. Because the trial court reasonably credited the state expert’s interpretation of Mundt’s conduct, the panel found no basis to overturn or rehear the decision.

The Ohio Supreme Court accepted the resignation of attorney David Paul Greulich Jr. under the rule for resignation when disciplinary action is pending. The court treated the filing as a resignation with disciplinary action pending and ordered that Greulich be immediately prohibited from practicing law in Ohio, surrender his admission certificate, and have his name stricken from the roll. The court also imposed post-resignation obligations: notify clients and opposing counsel, deliver client files, refund unearned fees, refrain from handling client funds, reimburse the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection if applicable, and file proof of compliance with the court and disciplinary counsel.

The Superior Court vacated a April 29, 2025 revocation-of-probation sentence imposed on Leroy Kenneth Thomas and remanded to re-impose his earlier October 25, 2021 revocation-of-probation sentence. The PCRA court had entertained an untimely collateral petition and resentenced Thomas without jurisdiction because the petition did not satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or an exception. Because the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction, its resentencing was void ab initio. The court therefore vacated the 2025 sentence and ordered reinstatement of the 2021 sentence, leaving any discretionary-sentencing challenges unreviewed.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a Philadelphia County PCRA court order granting Jamal R. Sanders a new trial. Sanders had been convicted in 1998 of third-degree murder and related offenses based largely on testimony that he had access to the gun later used by a co-defendant. After decades in custody, a witness (Shawn Clark) submitted an affidavit recanting trial testimony and stating detectives coerced him; Clark later died. The PCRA court found the recantation admissible under the statement-against-interest exception and likely to produce a different verdict; the Superior Court agreed and affirmed.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the convictions and sentences of Kylen Pratt, who was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, possession of an instrument of crime, abuse of a corpse, and tampering with evidence for the death and burning of Naasire Johnson. The court rejected challenges to (1) admission of a detective’s chart summarizing voluminous cell-phone timing data, finding the summary met the rules for admissibility; (2) admission of appellant’s Google searches, finding they were relevant to his state of mind and not unduly prejudicial; and (3) the discretionary imposition of consecutive sentences, finding no abuse of sentencing discretion.

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the circuit court’s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition by Angel Navarro and remanded for second-stage proceedings. Navarro had been convicted of first-degree murder in 2004 based primarily on three eyewitness identifications and police testimony; he later obtained Chicago Police Department records via FOIA that included officer Meer’s professional complaints. The court held Navarro’s petition raised newly discovered, noncumulative evidence that could materially affect officer credibility and thus created a colorable claim of actual innocence. The court declined to reassign the case sua sponte on remand.