Court Filings

The Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed Derwin Dewayne Bell’s convictions for three counts of possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver (methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine) after a jury trial. The court reviewed sufficiency-of-the-evidence and jury-charge complaints. It held the evidence — including controlled-substance testing, large quantities and packaging consistent with distribution, scales, guns, cash, matching bags found in a vehicle and a residence linked to Bell, social-media and mail evidence, and his gang leadership — provided affirmative links supporting possession and intent. The court also held the trial court properly omitted a DEA-registration instruction because Bell bore the burden to produce any exemption evidence and did not do so or request such an instruction.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals granted a joint motion by AusPro Enterprises, L.P. and MMK Holdings, L.P. (doing business as Planet K) and the City of Cedar Park to abate (pause) the appeal for 30 days so the parties can finalize a settlement that requires city council approval. The court ordered the parties to file either a motion to dismiss, a motion to reinstate, or a status report (or a motion to extend the abatement) by May 8, 2026. The appeal remains abated until further court order.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Stephen Kay Thorp Jr.’s criminal appeal because the trial-court certification states this was a plea-bargain case and the defendant has no right to appeal. The clerk’s record confirms the sentence did not exceed the prosecutor’s recommendation and there is no written pretrial motion, trial-court permission to appeal, or statute authorizing the appeal. The court gave Thorp an opportunity to supply an amended certification but none was filed, so the court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d).

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Samantha Ann Marie Vargas's appeal challenging a December 8, 2025 order that modified her community supervision to include a 30-day jail sanction (with credit for time served). The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from an order that alters conditions of community supervision, relying on controlling precedent. The panel ordered dismissal after Vargas failed to show a basis for continuing the appeal when asked to show cause.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of appellants' request for a second temporary injunction seeking to stop the homeowners association's election to amend its declaration to allow sale of a subdivision park. Appellants (residents) had a prior temporary injunction preventing sale of Thrush Ridge Park and sued for declaratory and injunctive relief; the Association held an election and appellants sought to enjoin it. The appeals court concluded the record lacked the evidentiary exhibits from the injunction hearing, so the appellants failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Ra Hermes Velthra’s appeal challenging a trial court’s finding that he could pay court costs. Velthra sought review under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(g) after a February 26, 2026 hearing, but the appellate court concluded Rule 145(g) does not permit a standalone interlocutory appeal. The court ordered Velthra to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed; he submitted the indigency order but no final judgment in the underlying case. Lacking jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal on April 8, 2026.

The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Progressive Direct Insurance Company’s special appearance and dismissed the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. The suit arose after a Washington resident insured by an Ohio-based, non-Texas-licensed insurer was injured in San Antonio and sued in Texas over denial of underinsured motorist benefits. The court held Progressive Direct lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Texas for either specific or general jurisdiction and that exercising jurisdiction would violate fair play and substantial justice, so Texas courts cannot constitutionally adjudicate the contract dispute.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Kenisha Sharron Simms's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Simms had been placed on deferred community supervision after a plea; the State later moved to adjudicate guilt, and the trial court modified the supervision conditions. The appellate court held that appeals from modifications to deferred adjudication supervision are not authorized by the legislature, cited controlling precedent, gave Simms an opportunity to show cause, received no response, and dismissed the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s May 2024 order terminating Mother C.A.’s parental rights to infant G.M.L. The Department of Family and Protective Services had removed the children after repeated concerns about Mother’s substance use, hazardous home conditions, and a domestic-violence incident. The appeals court held that the Department gave fair notice and presented clear-and-convincing evidence that it made reasonable reunification efforts and that a continuing danger remained in Mother’s home, supporting termination and appointment of the Department as permanent managing conservator.

The Fourth Court of Appeals, San Antonio, denied Shawn L. Sanders's petition seeking either a writ of mandamus or, alternatively, a writ of prohibition. Sanders filed the petition on March 23, 2026, asking the appellate court to intervene in underlying criminal case No. 2023-CR-3165 in Bexar County. After reviewing the petition and record, the court concluded Sanders did not establish entitlement to the extraordinary relief requested and therefore denied both the mandamus and prohibition petitions without publishing an opinion.

The Fourth Court of Appeals, San Antonio, denied Joy Cherie Kilgore’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking relief related to an underlying case in Bexar County District Court. The court considered Kilgore’s petition and an incorporated emergency motion for temporary relief filed April 6, 2026, and concluded she was not entitled to mandamus relief under the Texas appellate rules. Because the requested extraordinary relief was denied, the court also denied the emergency motion as moot. No written opinion explaining detailed reasoning was issued—this is a brief disposition under the appellate rules.

The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Goliath Building Services, Inc. and Joshua N. Marsalis challenging proceedings in a Bexar County court. The relators had also sought emergency temporary relief; the court found they had not shown entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief and therefore denied the mandamus petition. Because the mandamus petition was denied, the court also denied the emergency temporary relief motions as moot. The decision is a short per curiam memorandum opinion.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's civil commitment of Jose Arredondo, Jr. after a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he is a sexually violent predator. Arredondo appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by refusing a jury instruction telling jurors to treat expert testimony "just like any other testimony." The appellate court held the requested instruction would effectively single out the State's sole expert and thus improperly comment on the weight of the evidence, contrary to Davidson v. Wallingford and Texas procedural rules, so the refusal was not an abuse of discretion.

The Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio) denied Camoray Wathen-Escobar’s original petitions for a writ of mandamus and a writ of habeas corpus and denied as moot her emergency motion for temporary relief. The court explained mandamus requires showing a clear abuse of discretion and lack of an adequate appellate remedy, and that the intermediate appellate court lacks jurisdiction over family-code habeas petitions regarding return of a child. After reviewing the petition and record, the court concluded the relator did not meet the standards for relief and therefore denied the petitions.

The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio considered Alton Crain Jr.'s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking extraordinary relief related to a pending county court case. After reviewing the petition and record, the court concluded Crain did not show entitlement to the requested relief under the appellate rules and denied the petition. The opinion is brief and delivers the disposition without extended analysis or citation to underlying facts or legal authorities.

The court dismissed Gil Rojas III’s appeal because his conviction and thirty-year sentence resulted from a plea-bargain in which the trial court certified he had no right to appeal. The appellate clerk’s record contained the Rule 25.2(a)(2) certification and the written plea agreement showing the sentence did not exceed the agreed recommendation. Because the record contained no pretrial written motion preserved for appeal, no trial-court permission to appeal, and no amended certification granting appeal rights, the court concluded it must dismiss the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d).

The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment and remanded the case. The Lalondes sued to enforce a 2021 written agreement to buy a tract of land; Tortuga Ranch counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment that the agreement was void or unenforceable. The appellate court held Tortuga Ranch could not obtain summary declaratory relief because its counterclaim was a mirror-image challenge duplicating the pending breach-of-contract suit, so Tortuga Ranch failed to show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The court also reversed the award of conditional appellate attorney’s fees and declined to render partial summary judgment for the Lalondes because that relief would be interlocutory.

The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default divorce judgment that resolved conservatorship, possession and access to the parties’ child, child and spousal support, property division, and attorney’s fees. Christopher Carpenter filed a motion for new trial (or to reform the judgment) supported by his and his attorney’s affidavits explaining that an email of the petition failed to reach counsel, causing the missed answer. The court held that Christopher met the Craddock elements (excusable failure to answer, meritorious defense, and no unfair delay or prejudice) and concluded the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Bryan Keith Gutierrez's filing for lack of jurisdiction. Gutierrez filed a "Motion for Bond Relief" that appeared to challenge bail and seek to quash multiple indictments. The appellate court treated the filing as a notice of appeal but found no final judgment of conviction in the record and noted that courts of appeals lack statutory authority to hear interlocutory appeals on excessive bail or motions to quash indictments. Because the appellant did not respond to an order to show cause, the appeal was dismissed.

The court dismissed Bianca Fox's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Fox, pro se, filed a notice of appeal purporting to challenge a January 30, 2026 turnover order, but the clerk’s record contains only two interlocutory orders from that date — denial of her motion for protection and an order to comply with a subpoena — neither of which is an appealable final judgment or an authorized interlocutory appeal. The court gave Fox an opportunity to show cause why the appeal should proceed; she did not respond, so the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were denied as moot.

The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of co-defendants Hakeem Neal and Lokari Boyd for home invasion and armed robbery following a joint jury trial. Neal argued the evidence was insufficient and his motion for directed verdict and new trial should have been granted; Boyd argued ineffective assistance of counsel and Confrontation Clause error. The court held the evidence was sufficient (including corroboration of an accomplice) and that Boyd’s challenges failed because the contested testimony was intrinsic or invited by defense, and counsel’s choices were strategic. Both appeals were affirmed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Jacqueline Wilbourn’s appeal from a superior-court judgment in favor of Galadriel Enterprises because the court lacked jurisdiction. Wilbourn had appealed to the superior court from a magistrate-court judgment and then appealed the superior-court judgment to this Court, but she did not use the required discretionary-appeal procedures. The Court explained that de novo reviews of magistrate rulings and appeals in damage actions where the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by discretionary application, and noncompliance is jurisdictional, so the appeal was dismissed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the appellant's motion to withdraw the appeal in the case Jonathan Blanton v. Eric Spinks et al. The court released jurisdiction back to the trial court upon issuance of the order. No substantive ruling on the merits was made; the action simply ends the appellate proceeding and restores control of the case to the lower court.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that GEICO was entitled to judgment on the pleadings for breach of a settlement agreement. The case arose after Abdel-Rahman made a pre-suit motor vehicle tort settlement offer that included the five statutory material terms required by OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021) plus additional nonstatutory terms. GEICO sent a written acceptance agreeing to the material terms while rejecting the offeror’s attempt to make the statute inapplicable. The court followed prior appellate decisions holding that acceptance of the statutory material terms alone forms an enforceable settlement under OCGA § 9-11-67.1, so GEICO proved a breach and entitlement to specific performance.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in Aslam Gilani and Peak Amusement, LLC v. Epic Amusement, LLC for failure to file the required appellate brief and enumeration of errors. The appeal was docketed March 5, 2026; appellants requested and received an extension to April 7, 2026, with a warning that failure to file by 4:30 p.m. would result in dismissal. Because the appellants did not file the brief by the extended deadline, the court dismissed the appeal pursuant to its rules and controlling precedent.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Shawn Davart Lockhart Jr.'s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Lockhart had pled guilty in 2009 and in 2025 sought an out-of-time appeal under OCGA § 5-6-39.1; the trial court denied that motion on 2026-02-19. Lockhart filed a notice of appeal on 2026-03-24, but the Court of Appeals held the notice was untimely because it was filed 33 days after entry of the order and thus did not satisfy the 30-day filing requirement. Because timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, the court dismissed the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted Kiran Kimbrough's application for discretionary appeal from a decision involving the City of Atlanta. The court ordered that the appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the April 8, 2026 order and directed the Clerk of Superior Court to include this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals. The order formally accepts discretionary review and initiates the appellate filing deadline and record transmission procedures.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an application for discretionary appeal in a child-related case styled In the Interest of M. B. (Mother). After review, the court denied the application for discretionary appeal, meaning it declined to hear the matter on appeal. The order is ministerial and contains no additional reasoning or discussion of the underlying juvenile or parental rights proceedings.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Cedric Herbert’s original mandamus petition seeking an order requiring a trial judge to refer his recusal motion to another judge. The court explained that mandamus in the appellate courts is reserved for extremely rare cases because superior courts generally have authority to grant such extraordinary relief and the petitioner should first seek relief in the appropriate lower court. Because Herbert did not show he first petitioned the superior court and this case was not one of the rare exceptions, the Court of Appeals declined to exercise original jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.

The Court of Appeals granted Ardalan Karbasyoun's application for discretionary appeal from a final judgment in favor of Foamworks Alpharetta, LLC. The court concluded the trial-court order disposed of the entire case and therefore was a final, appealable order under Georgia law. Because a right of direct appeal exists for such final judgments, the Court granted the application and instructed Karbasyoun to file a notice of appeal in the trial court within ten days. The trial-court clerk must include this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.