Court Filings

The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default divorce judgment that resolved conservatorship, possession and access to the parties’ child, child and spousal support, property division, and attorney’s fees. Christopher Carpenter filed a motion for new trial (or to reform the judgment) supported by his and his attorney’s affidavits explaining that an email of the petition failed to reach counsel, causing the missed answer. The court held that Christopher met the Craddock elements (excusable failure to answer, meritorious defense, and no unfair delay or prejudice) and concluded the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Bryan Keith Gutierrez's filing for lack of jurisdiction. Gutierrez filed a "Motion for Bond Relief" that appeared to challenge bail and seek to quash multiple indictments. The appellate court treated the filing as a notice of appeal but found no final judgment of conviction in the record and noted that courts of appeals lack statutory authority to hear interlocutory appeals on excessive bail or motions to quash indictments. Because the appellant did not respond to an order to show cause, the appeal was dismissed.

The court dismissed Bianca Fox's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Fox, pro se, filed a notice of appeal purporting to challenge a January 30, 2026 turnover order, but the clerk’s record contains only two interlocutory orders from that date — denial of her motion for protection and an order to comply with a subpoena — neither of which is an appealable final judgment or an authorized interlocutory appeal. The court gave Fox an opportunity to show cause why the appeal should proceed; she did not respond, so the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were denied as moot.

The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of co-defendants Hakeem Neal and Lokari Boyd for home invasion and armed robbery following a joint jury trial. Neal argued the evidence was insufficient and his motion for directed verdict and new trial should have been granted; Boyd argued ineffective assistance of counsel and Confrontation Clause error. The court held the evidence was sufficient (including corroboration of an accomplice) and that Boyd’s challenges failed because the contested testimony was intrinsic or invited by defense, and counsel’s choices were strategic. Both appeals were affirmed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Jacqueline Wilbourn’s appeal from a superior-court judgment in favor of Galadriel Enterprises because the court lacked jurisdiction. Wilbourn had appealed to the superior court from a magistrate-court judgment and then appealed the superior-court judgment to this Court, but she did not use the required discretionary-appeal procedures. The Court explained that de novo reviews of magistrate rulings and appeals in damage actions where the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by discretionary application, and noncompliance is jurisdictional, so the appeal was dismissed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the appellant's motion to withdraw the appeal in the case Jonathan Blanton v. Eric Spinks et al. The court released jurisdiction back to the trial court upon issuance of the order. No substantive ruling on the merits was made; the action simply ends the appellate proceeding and restores control of the case to the lower court.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that GEICO was entitled to judgment on the pleadings for breach of a settlement agreement. The case arose after Abdel-Rahman made a pre-suit motor vehicle tort settlement offer that included the five statutory material terms required by OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021) plus additional nonstatutory terms. GEICO sent a written acceptance agreeing to the material terms while rejecting the offeror’s attempt to make the statute inapplicable. The court followed prior appellate decisions holding that acceptance of the statutory material terms alone forms an enforceable settlement under OCGA § 9-11-67.1, so GEICO proved a breach and entitlement to specific performance.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in Aslam Gilani and Peak Amusement, LLC v. Epic Amusement, LLC for failure to file the required appellate brief and enumeration of errors. The appeal was docketed March 5, 2026; appellants requested and received an extension to April 7, 2026, with a warning that failure to file by 4:30 p.m. would result in dismissal. Because the appellants did not file the brief by the extended deadline, the court dismissed the appeal pursuant to its rules and controlling precedent.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Shawn Davart Lockhart Jr.'s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Lockhart had pled guilty in 2009 and in 2025 sought an out-of-time appeal under OCGA § 5-6-39.1; the trial court denied that motion on 2026-02-19. Lockhart filed a notice of appeal on 2026-03-24, but the Court of Appeals held the notice was untimely because it was filed 33 days after entry of the order and thus did not satisfy the 30-day filing requirement. Because timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, the court dismissed the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted Kiran Kimbrough's application for discretionary appeal from a decision involving the City of Atlanta. The court ordered that the appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the April 8, 2026 order and directed the Clerk of Superior Court to include this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals. The order formally accepts discretionary review and initiates the appellate filing deadline and record transmission procedures.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an application for discretionary appeal in a child-related case styled In the Interest of M. B. (Mother). After review, the court denied the application for discretionary appeal, meaning it declined to hear the matter on appeal. The order is ministerial and contains no additional reasoning or discussion of the underlying juvenile or parental rights proceedings.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Cedric Herbert’s original mandamus petition seeking an order requiring a trial judge to refer his recusal motion to another judge. The court explained that mandamus in the appellate courts is reserved for extremely rare cases because superior courts generally have authority to grant such extraordinary relief and the petitioner should first seek relief in the appropriate lower court. Because Herbert did not show he first petitioned the superior court and this case was not one of the rare exceptions, the Court of Appeals declined to exercise original jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.

The Court of Appeals granted Ardalan Karbasyoun's application for discretionary appeal from a final judgment in favor of Foamworks Alpharetta, LLC. The court concluded the trial-court order disposed of the entire case and therefore was a final, appealable order under Georgia law. Because a right of direct appeal exists for such final judgments, the Court granted the application and instructed Karbasyoun to file a notice of appeal in the trial court within ten days. The trial-court clerk must include this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.

The Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s March 10, 2025 judgment convicting Theodore Wilson of burglary, gross sexual imposition, and pandering obscenity and upholding concurrent prison terms with a seven-year minimum and a ten-and-one-half-year maximum for the burglary count. Wilson argued his sentence exceeded the agreed seven-year recommendation. The court held the plea agreement and related forms informed him that a second-degree felony carries an indefinite sentence under the Reagan Tokes law (minimum plus a maximum 50% longer), and because the State and Wilson jointly recommended the seven-year sentence which the court imposed (including the statutory maximum), the sentence was authorized and not subject to appellate modification.

The court affirmed the municipal-court judgment against Diane Unser. Unser was stopped for traffic violations, a K9 unit conducted a free-air sniff that alerted to narcotics, and a subsequent search uncovered two used syringes in her purse. The trial court denied her motion to suppress and she pled no contest to possessing drug abuse instruments. The appellate court held the dog sniff did not unlawfully prolong the stop, found the K9 was reliably trained and certified, and concluded the record (including counsel’s statements and hearing evidence) supplied the facts needed to convict her of a first-degree misdemeanor.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed Melissa Smith’s misdemeanor conviction for disorderly conduct (R.C. 2917.11(A)(1)) after a bench trial in Hamilton County Municipal Court. Smith had argued she acted in self-defense after the victim, D.J., knocked Smith’s phone from her hand, but the court found the state proved Smith engaged in fighting and turbulent behavior and recklessly caused inconvenience, alarm, and annoyance. The court credited the testimony of the victim and responding officers over Smith’s account and concluded the evidence was sufficient and not against the weight of the evidence.

The court reviewed Seandell McCrary’s appeal of convictions for fentanyl trafficking and possession after a jury trial where he represented himself. The court held the trial court erred by failing to conduct a sufficient on-the-record inquiry under Crim.R. 44 before allowing McCrary to waive counsel, so his waiver was not shown to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court nevertheless found the suppression ruling and the sufficiency of the evidence supported retrial: probable cause supported the arrest and evidence seized is admissible. The convictions are reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

The First District Court of Appeals reviewed two consolidated criminal appeals by Sparkle Jones after bench convictions in municipal court. The court affirmed Jones’s conviction for permitting drug abuse based on evidence found in her home (drug paraphernalia, cash, and firearms) but reversed and discharged her on two child-endangerment convictions because the State failed to show she had custody, control, or a parental role over her boyfriend’s children. The court therefore found sufficient evidence for the drug-related conviction but insufficient evidence to prove the required relationship/duty element for child endangerment.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed Paul Boddy’s convictions following no-contest pleas for illegal possession of a firearm in a liquor-permit premises, carrying a concealed weapon, using a weapon while intoxicated, and possessing a defaced firearm. Boddy argued the trial court erred by not obtaining oral no-contest pleas, by failing to inform him on the record of the effect of his no-contest pleas, and by denying his motion to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds. The court held Boddy properly tendered written no-contest pleas, any Rule 11 advisory defect did not require vacatur because he did not show prejudice, and he waived his constitutional dismissal argument by entering pleas without pursuing the motion.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s denial of a mother’s 2024 motion to regain legal custody of her two children, B.B. and R.W. The juvenile court and magistrate found the mother failed to prove changed circumstances since the 2018 legal-custody disposition to father. The court concluded the evidence (photos, medical summaries, and testimony) did not substantiate abuse or medical neglect by father nor show missed medical care produced harmful consequences sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption of permanency for juvenile-court custody orders.

The court of appeals affirmed the municipal-court judgments awarding Asbury Woods Senior Apartments $659.23 for unpaid rent, late fees, and a utility payment after defendant Gloria Render objected to the magistrate’s decision. The court found: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Render’s post-judgment motion for reconsideration because the court’s March 28, 2025 judgment was final; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a utility-transfer form despite Render’s claim the signature was forged, because the factfinder could compare signatures; and (3) Asbury’s damages claim was separate from the eviction claim, so dismissing the eviction did not require dismissal of the damages claim.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Summit County Common Pleas Court's denial of Jacky Robinson Jr.'s successive motion to withdraw his 2005 guilty plea to aggravated murder and aggravated burglary. Robinson argued sentencing errors, ineffective assistance of counsel, and breach of a plea agreement, but the appellate court held his claims were barred by res judicata because they could have been raised earlier or on direct appeal. The court explained that Robinson did not show the trial court lacked jurisdiction (which would render the sentence void) and therefore his motion was properly denied as successive and meritless.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court judgment awarding permanent custody of infant J.J. to Lucas County Children’s Services (LCCS). The agency filed an original permanent-custody complaint two days after J.J.’s birth based on parents’ extensive prior child-welfare history, unresolved substance-use, housing, and domestic-violence concerns, and prior involuntary termination of parental rights to siblings. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the parents had not rebutted the presumption in R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) and that awarding permanent custody to LCCS was in J.J.’s best interest, so parental rights were terminated.

The Court of Appeals granted a writ of mandamus directing Cuyahoga Common Pleas Judge Kevin J. Kelley to follow this court’s prior mandate in JTC Solutions I. Relator JTC Solutions had argued the trial court failed to conduct the additional factfinding and explain the evidence supporting its ruling after this court reversed the trial court’s initial voiding of an arbitration clause. The appellate court found the January 5, 2026 entry granting arbitration ignored the express remand instructions to (1) inquire whether the arbitration clause is enforceable and applies to each claim and (2) state findings and evidence. The court denied the judge’s motion to dismiss and ordered compliance.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed Jack L. Bookhamer Jr.’s conviction for domestic violence following a jury trial in Mount Vernon Municipal Court. Bookhamer argued his verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the State failed to disprove his claim of self-defense. The court reviewed competing witness accounts, assessed credibility, and found objective evidence (photographs and officer observations of injuries to the victim but not to appellant) supported the jury’s conclusion that Bookhamer was the aggressor. The court held the jury did not lose its way and affirmed the conviction and sentence.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Canton Municipal Court's judgment granting DNW Properties possession of rental premises and denying tenant David Tucker a jury trial in a forcible entry and detainer action. DNW served termination notices and filed the eviction complaint; Tucker was served and filed a jury demand after the statutory deadline. The appellate court held that R.C. 1923.09(A) — which requires a jury demand on or before the return day of the summons in forcible entry and detainer proceedings — is constitutional and that Tucker waived his jury right by failing to timely demand it.

The Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Ross County Common Pleas Court's judgment revoking community control and imposing a 36-month prison term for Kirby Smith after finding multiple violations. Smith argued the trial court wrongly denied his mid-hearing request to proceed pro se and denied a continuance to obtain private counsel. The appellate court held both rulings were within the trial court’s discretion: Smith's invocation of the right to self-representation was untimely and the court properly balanced disruption and prior opportunities, and the denial of a continuance was not an abuse of discretion under the Unger factors.

The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed two Washington County trial-court rulings involving David S. Wiggers, Sr. In Case No. 25CA5 the court upheld his bench conviction for fourth-degree domestic violence, finding the State proved he knowingly attempted to cause physical harm by swinging an axe handle at his brother. In Case No. 25CA10 the court affirmed revocation of Wiggers’s community control and the imposition of a 15-month prison term after he refused to sign community-control terms and admitted the violation. The court relied on witness testimony, medical records, appellant's inconsistent statements, and the sentencing record.

The Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed Richard Turner’s convictions for attempted murder (reduced charge), felonious assault, and breaking and entering following a jury trial. Turner argued insufficient evidence and that the verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court reviewed the record, testimony (including the deputy victim, medical witnesses, and Turner’s statement), and applicable Ohio law, concluding the jury reasonably found Turner lured the deputy into a swamp, resisted arrest, grabbed the deputy’s radio, and placed him in a chokehold that led to near-drowning and serious physical harm. The court found the convictions supported by the evidence and not a miscarriage of justice.

The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Adams County Court's February 5, 2025 judgment granting Joyce Mapes a forcible entry and detainer (eviction) against Ewing “Toby” Gibbs and denying Gibbs' counterclaim asserting ownership under a $45,000 land contract. Gibbs argued the county court lacked jurisdiction and the case should have been transferred to the common pleas court. The appellate court reviewed jurisdiction de novo, relied on statutes authorizing county courts to decide contract-based equitable remedies, and followed precedent holding such courts may adjudicate contract enforcement tied to a possession action, so no transfer was required.