Court Filings

The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Adams County Court's February 5, 2025 judgment granting Joyce Mapes a forcible entry and detainer (eviction) against Ewing “Toby” Gibbs and denying Gibbs' counterclaim asserting ownership under a $45,000 land contract. Gibbs argued the county court lacked jurisdiction and the case should have been transferred to the common pleas court. The appellate court reviewed jurisdiction de novo, relied on statutes authorizing county courts to decide contract-based equitable remedies, and followed precedent holding such courts may adjudicate contract enforcement tied to a possession action, so no transfer was required.

The Fourth District Court of Appeals reviewed Husband Darrell L. Nichols Jr.’s appeal from a Pike County domestic relations judgment resolving competing post-divorce motions. The court overruled Husband’s challenges to the denial of a continuance and to alleged improper service, finding service at the 2060 Schuster Road address and Husband’s participation made the hearing proper. However, the court concluded the trial court exceeded its authority by revaluing and redistributing two specific vehicles (a 2007 Toyota Tacoma and a 2005 Subaru Impreza) after the original decree had ordered all listed vehicles sold and proceeds divided. The judgment is therefore reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings on those vehicles.

The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth District Court of Appeals’ dismissal of inmate Lewis Leroy McIntyre Jr.’s habeas petition seeking immediate release. The appeals court had dismissed the petition sua sponte for noncompliance with R.C. 2969.25(A) because McIntyre’s affidavit listing prior civil actions omitted required details for one listed case. McIntyre argued the case need not have been listed, but the Supreme Court held he voluntarily included it and therefore cannot complain under the invited-error doctrine. The dismissal was affirmed for failure to strictly comply with the statute.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Eighth District Court of Appeals and held that the City of Cleveland retained political-subdivision immunity for the drowning death of William Johnson at a city pool. The executor sued claiming the use of a low folding chair instead of an elevated lifeguard chair amounted to a “physical defect” on pool grounds under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), which would remove immunity. The high court concluded that choosing one chair over another is not a tangible imperfection that impairs the function of pool grounds or equipment, so the statutory exception did not apply and summary judgment for the city must be entered.

The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed disciplinary proceedings against attorney Javier Horacio Armengau arising from his criminal convictions for rape, kidnapping, gross sexual imposition, sexual battery, and a misdemeanor public indecency. The Board of Professional Conduct had found those convictions established violations of professional-conduct rules and recommended permanent disbarment. The court rejected Armengau’s objections — including attempts to relitigate his criminal convictions, to introduce a polygraph, and to rely on character evidence — and held certified convictions are conclusive in disciplinary matters. The court adopted the board’s findings and permanently disbarred Armengau to protect the public and preserve professional integrity.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a per curiam order dated April 8, 2026, affirmed the Commonwealth Court's April 2, 2026 order in the appeal concerning Tony Dphax King's nomination petition as the Democratic candidate for the 188th Legislative District. The Supreme Court reviewed the lower court's decision and concluded no basis existed to disturb it, resulting in affirmation of the Commonwealth Court's ruling. No additional reasoning or opinion text is provided in the document.

The appellate court reviewed Michael Southall’s convictions for attempted residential arson and related domestic-violence offenses. Southall argued the Will County Sheriff’s Office violated his due process rights and Supreme Court Rule 412 by destroying a seized Kingsford charcoal lighter fluid container, and that the evidence was insufficient to prove intent or a substantial step toward arson. The court held the destruction did not violate due process because it was routine, not shown to be in bad faith, and the missing item was not shown to be clearly exculpatory. The court affirmed the arson and aggravated battery convictions but vacated two domestic-battery convictions under the one-act, one-crime rule.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of a preliminary injunction that would have enjoined a family planning provider from offering abortion services at a parcel subject to recorded CC&Rs. The CC&Rs were adopted and recorded in 1991 by the Tulare Local Hospital District and expressly prohibited abortion clinics within the Tulare Medical Center development. The court held the prohibition is unenforceable because (1) the District’s adoption and recording of the CC&Rs is government action that interferes with the fundamental right of reproductive choice under the California Constitution and (2) Civil Code section 53, read with section 531 and the Unruh Act, voids recorded covenants that indirectly limit property use because of a characteristic protected by the Unruh Act (the decision to have an abortion).

A jury convicted Jazz Bradley of multiple sexual offenses, including forcible rape of two victims (one aged 16) and unlawful sexual intercourse with another 16-year-old. The trial court imposed heavy sentences under California’s One Strike law, the Habitual Sexual Offender law, and Three Strikes, including consecutive life terms and determinate terms for robbery and unlawful intercourse. On appeal Bradley challenged several sentencing decisions. The court affirmed the judgment but modified it: it rejected the dual-use claim about the robbery upper term, but held that the trial court erred by imposing and staying additional sentences under the Habitual Sexual Offender statute and by imposing stayed additional One Strike terms on the same counts; those stayed/duplicative sentences were stricken.

The Court of Appeal reversed in part and remanded. The Gonzalez family sued a California mortuary after a Texas medical examiner misidentified a body, causing the family to bury the wrong person and have their loved one cremated. A jury found for the mortuary on negligence and contract claims, finding the mortuary proved the affirmative defense of impracticability. The court held the defense of impracticability is equitable and must be decided by a judge, not a jury, so the contract verdict is reversed and remanded for a bench determination of the defense and, if necessary, a damages trial. The court affirmed that only the decedent’s wife had standing to sue on the contract.

The Court of Appeal reversed the convictions of Pedro Thomas DeLeon Tzul for the murders of Martha and Antonio Garcia and directed a new trial. The trial court had excluded a handwritten note found at the scene—in which the author said he found the victim having sex with her brother and that this filled him with rage—during the People’s case under Evidence Code section 352, effectively forcing Tzul to testify to get the note admitted. The appellate court held the note was highly probative of provocation and should not have been excluded; admission during the People’s case likely would have produced a more favorable result for Tzul.

The First District Court of Appeals granted appellant Todd Colter’s motion for voluntary dismissal of his appeal against Ubican Global, Inc., because the parties settled. The court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and ordered that any other pending motions be dismissed as moot. No written opinion was issued; the panel issued a short per curiam memorandum disposing of the appeal on the agreed dismissal.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas considered a criminal appeal by Kevin Villatoro. The court previously paused the appeal so the trial court could hold a hearing about a missing exhibit. Villatoro then moved to reinstate and dismiss his appeal. The appellate court granted his motion, dismissed the appeal, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The opinion was issued April 7, 2026, and is unpublished.

The First District of Texas court grants the appellant's motion to reinstate and dismiss his criminal appeal. The court had previously paused the appeal for the trial court to hold a hearing about a missing exhibit. Because no opinion had issued and the appellant moved to dismiss, the court dismissed the appeal and any other pending motions as moot, citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The First District of Texas dismissed Kenneth Steven Isbell’s appeal from a Harris County district court because he failed to pay or arrange payment for the clerk’s record fee and did not respond to the court’s notice that the appeal was subject to dismissal. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring payment or arrangement and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution, also denying as moot any pending motions. The decision was issued as a brief memorandum opinion by a three-justice panel.

The First District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights to her nine-year-old twins and awarding sole managing conservatorship to the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS). The court reviewed an accelerated appeal from a bench trial and found the evidence legally and factually sufficient to show the mother knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in endangering conditions (unsanitary, no utilities, presence of feces and urine, reports of physical abuse) and that termination was in the children’s best interest. The court relied on the children’s improved stability and care in their foster home, the mother’s criminal history, repeated positive drug tests, failure to complete services, and prior dangerous living conditions to support its decision.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by Grant Allen Nelson from a final divorce decree entered July 7, 2025, after Nelson filed an unopposed motion stating he no longer wished to prosecute the appeal. Because no other party appealed and the motion complied with Texas appellate procedure, the court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The decision is procedural and does not address the merits of the underlying divorce decree.

The First Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed a trial court's modification of a 2016 custody order that named Carolyn Pena sole managing conservator and restricted George E. Saldana’s visitation. Saldana, representing himself, argued the trial was void because a recusal motion was pending, he lacked adequate notice of the trial, and his arrest and detention around trial made the proceedings unfair. The court held that a “tertiary recusal” statute allowed the trial judge to proceed, that the record shows Saldana had actual notice more than 45 days before trial, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial despite the arrest and security incidents.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's adjudication of guilt and 14-year sentence for Gaige Porter after a hearing on the State's motion to adjudicate his deferred-adjudication community supervision. Appellate counsel moved to withdraw under Anders, and the court independently reviewed the record, finding no reversible error. Because the trial court's written judgment did not match its oral findings, the appellate court reformed the judgment to reflect that Porter violated supervision by contacting the complainant, leaving the state without permission, and removing his ankle monitor, then affirmed as reformed and granted counsel's withdrawal.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas granted the appellant Erica Arnez Jackson's motion for voluntary dismissal of her appeal from a judgment of the County Court at Law No. 2, Galveston County (trial court case no. 25-FD-0597). Because no opinion had issued, the court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and dismissed any other pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a merits determination.

The First District of Texas dismissed Dominique Cunningham’s appeal of the trial court’s dismissal of her suit against Justice of the Peace Steve Duble because Cunningham repeatedly failed to file an appellate brief that complied with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court struck her noncompliant briefs, gave her opportunities and extensions to file a corrected brief, and found her March 16, 2026 submission still deficient in essential content and formatting. Because she failed to cure the briefing defects, the court struck the corrected brief and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution.

The First District of Texas affirmed the divorce decree in Ada U. Oguamanam v. Tony Oguamanam. Ada argued on appeal that she was harmed because the trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law that she did not receive notice of, preventing her from timely requesting additional findings. The court held that Ada failed to show the required injury — she could have requested additional findings after learning of them or sought abatement but did not — and that the proposed additional findings she identified were largely evidentiary or unnecessary to decide the controlling issues. The judgment is affirmed.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed Nikki Arnold’s appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Travis County because she failed to file her appellate brief. The brief was due February 11, 2026; the court notified Arnold on February 18 that she had until March 2 to respond or face dismissal for want of prosecution. No brief or extension motion was filed, so the appellate court dismissed the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed Jillian Warren’s appeal for want of prosecution because she failed to file her appellant brief, which was originally due March 2, 2026, and did not respond to the court’s notice requiring a satisfactory response by March 23, 2026. The court invoked Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(b) and entered dismissal on April 7, 2026. No substantive merits decision was reached because the appeal was dismissed for procedural noncompliance.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied Troy Nguyen's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the trial court's alleged failure to rule on his consolidated Rule 306a(4) and 306a(5) motion filed January 20, 2026. The appellate court explained that to obtain mandamus for failure to rule, a relator must show the trial court had a duty to rule, that a demand was made, and that the court failed to rule within a reasonable time. Because the record did not show an unreasonable delay, the court concluded extraordinary relief was not warranted and denied the petition.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed a direct appeal filed by Chuka Anene from a trial court’s final judgment and decree of divorce because appeals in divorce and other domestic relations matters require a discretionary-appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35. The court explained that compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional and cited precedent holding the same. Because the appellant did not follow that mandatory procedure, the Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal on April 7, 2026.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of Spectrum and its award of prejudgment interest, but vacated and remanded solely to recalculate the prejudgment interest start date. Spectrum demanded payment of the fixed arbitration award by letter on December 9, 2020, and later sought confirmation when Amendia did not pay. The court held Spectrum’s demand (and its later oral request at a 2022 hearing) sufficed as a timely request for prejudgment interest under Georgia law, so interest must be awarded; however, interest should run from the expiration of the payment deadline set in the demand letter, not from the letter date itself.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Tiffany Roseman's appeal from the superior court's dismissal of her petition for review because the court lacked jurisdiction. The case began in magistrate court, Roseman sought de novo review in superior court, and after the superior court dismissed her petition she appealed directly to this Court of Appeals. The Court held that appeals from superior-court de novo reviews of magistrate-court rulings require using the discretionary appeal procedures under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1), which Roseman did not follow, so the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an application for an interlocutory appeal in the case Arthur Sloman et al. v. Gwenetta Powers (LC No. ST22CV0118) and denied the application. The order is a brief ministerial ruling from the Court's Clerk dated April 7, 2026, and contains no further explanation of the court's reasoning or the underlying dispute. The denial means the moving party will not receive immediate appellate review of the trial court's interlocutory order and must proceed in the trial court or seek other appellate remedies allowed by law.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Joseph Michael Hirsch's appeal for failure to comply with the Court's docketing and briefing rules. The appellant did not file the required enumeration of errors and brief within the time ordered by the Court, despite a specific March 17, 2026 order giving a March 27, 2026 deadline. Because the filings were not received by the court, the appeal was deemed abandoned and dismissed under the Court of Appeals rules cited in the order.