Court Filings

The First District of Texas dismissed Dominique Cunningham’s appeal of the trial court’s dismissal of her suit against Justice of the Peace Steve Duble because Cunningham repeatedly failed to file an appellate brief that complied with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court struck her noncompliant briefs, gave her opportunities and extensions to file a corrected brief, and found her March 16, 2026 submission still deficient in essential content and formatting. Because she failed to cure the briefing defects, the court struck the corrected brief and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution.

The First District of Texas affirmed the divorce decree in Ada U. Oguamanam v. Tony Oguamanam. Ada argued on appeal that she was harmed because the trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law that she did not receive notice of, preventing her from timely requesting additional findings. The court held that Ada failed to show the required injury — she could have requested additional findings after learning of them or sought abatement but did not — and that the proposed additional findings she identified were largely evidentiary or unnecessary to decide the controlling issues. The judgment is affirmed.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed Nikki Arnold’s appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Travis County because she failed to file her appellate brief. The brief was due February 11, 2026; the court notified Arnold on February 18 that she had until March 2 to respond or face dismissal for want of prosecution. No brief or extension motion was filed, so the appellate court dismissed the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed Jillian Warren’s appeal for want of prosecution because she failed to file her appellant brief, which was originally due March 2, 2026, and did not respond to the court’s notice requiring a satisfactory response by March 23, 2026. The court invoked Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(b) and entered dismissal on April 7, 2026. No substantive merits decision was reached because the appeal was dismissed for procedural noncompliance.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied Troy Nguyen's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the trial court's alleged failure to rule on his consolidated Rule 306a(4) and 306a(5) motion filed January 20, 2026. The appellate court explained that to obtain mandamus for failure to rule, a relator must show the trial court had a duty to rule, that a demand was made, and that the court failed to rule within a reasonable time. Because the record did not show an unreasonable delay, the court concluded extraordinary relief was not warranted and denied the petition.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed a direct appeal filed by Chuka Anene from a trial court’s final judgment and decree of divorce because appeals in divorce and other domestic relations matters require a discretionary-appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35. The court explained that compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional and cited precedent holding the same. Because the appellant did not follow that mandatory procedure, the Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal on April 7, 2026.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of Spectrum and its award of prejudgment interest, but vacated and remanded solely to recalculate the prejudgment interest start date. Spectrum demanded payment of the fixed arbitration award by letter on December 9, 2020, and later sought confirmation when Amendia did not pay. The court held Spectrum’s demand (and its later oral request at a 2022 hearing) sufficed as a timely request for prejudgment interest under Georgia law, so interest must be awarded; however, interest should run from the expiration of the payment deadline set in the demand letter, not from the letter date itself.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Tiffany Roseman's appeal from the superior court's dismissal of her petition for review because the court lacked jurisdiction. The case began in magistrate court, Roseman sought de novo review in superior court, and after the superior court dismissed her petition she appealed directly to this Court of Appeals. The Court held that appeals from superior-court de novo reviews of magistrate-court rulings require using the discretionary appeal procedures under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1), which Roseman did not follow, so the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an application for an interlocutory appeal in the case Arthur Sloman et al. v. Gwenetta Powers (LC No. ST22CV0118) and denied the application. The order is a brief ministerial ruling from the Court's Clerk dated April 7, 2026, and contains no further explanation of the court's reasoning or the underlying dispute. The denial means the moving party will not receive immediate appellate review of the trial court's interlocutory order and must proceed in the trial court or seek other appellate remedies allowed by law.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Joseph Michael Hirsch's appeal for failure to comply with the Court's docketing and briefing rules. The appellant did not file the required enumeration of errors and brief within the time ordered by the Court, despite a specific March 17, 2026 order giving a March 27, 2026 deadline. Because the filings were not received by the court, the appeal was deemed abandoned and dismissed under the Court of Appeals rules cited in the order.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas' dismissal of Haneef Muhammad’s complaint against PNC Financial Services. Muhammad sued PNC for claims arising from a 2023 bank-branch incident. The trial court granted PNC’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, concluding res judicata barred the claims because Muhammad previously sued PNC in federal court and that court dismissed several claims for failure to state a claim. The appellate court found the federal dismissal on those claims to be an adjudication on the merits under Ohio precedent, so the state action was precluded and the trial court’s dismissal was proper.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Anthony Cooper-King’s motion for leave to file a petition for postconviction relief. Cooper-King had been convicted of several drug-possession offenses and filed the postconviction materials more than 365 days after the trial transcript was filed in his direct appeal. The appellate court held the petition was untimely, Cooper-King failed to show he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts supporting his claims, and his claim that retained appellate counsel failed to timely file postconviction documents did not excuse the statutory deadline.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed Preston D. Jefferson's convictions after a jury trial for possession of over 100 grams of cocaine with a major drug offender specification and operating a vehicle while under the influence. The stop, inventory search of Jefferson's truck, body-camera footage, narcotics testing, and field-sobriety observations supported the convictions. The court found the evidence — including a large brick of cocaine in a compartment behind the driver's seat, drug paraphernalia within reach, traffic infractions, and poor performance on sobriety tests — did not create a manifest miscarriage of justice.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the Harrison County Court's judgment granting Cedar One Properties possession of rental premises after finding tenant Isis Rudolph breached her lease by failing to pay rent. Rudolph argued various due-process, bankruptcy-stay, and disability-accommodation defects, and contended the bankruptcy court's order lifting the automatic stay was void. The appellate court found many issues involved the federal bankruptcy proceeding (beyond its jurisdiction), noted Rudolph's briefing and record deficiencies (no trial transcript, App.R. violations), and concluded the eviction was authorized because the bankruptcy court had granted relief from the stay limited to pursuing eviction.

The court dismissed a mandamus complaint filed by Davontez Otis seeking an order compelling a judge to calculate jail-time credit in his underlying criminal case. Otis argued the calculation was ministerial and that appeal would be inadequate because his 90-day jail term would expire before appellate review. The court held that the statute governing jail-time credit grants the sentencing court discretion to grant or deny credit, so mandamus is not available to control that discretion; furthermore, an appeal (with a stay request) is an adequate remedy. The writ was dismissed and costs were assessed to Otis.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Stark County Common Pleas Court's dismissal without a hearing of Nicole Perenkovich's petition for post-conviction relief. Perenkovich argued trial counsel was ineffective for not subpoenaing a stepsister to testify, for failing to use Snapchat photos to impeach police testimony about an unoccupied bedroom, and for not using a phone record to impeach testimony about a jail-call. The appellate court found the submitted affidavits and exhibits did not provide sufficient, authenticated operative facts showing counsel's performance was deficient or that the outcome would likely have changed, so no evidentiary hearing was required.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Eighth District and held that a police officer lawfully extended a traffic stop to verify the driver’s license status even after the original basis for the stop (a believed inoperable headlight) was shown to be mistaken. Officer Rose stopped Quentin Fips for a presumed faulty headlight, learned Fips did not have his license, obtained identifying information, and then confirmed through dispatch that Fips’s license was suspended and a warrant existed. The Court ruled the additional inquiry was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that Fips’s failure to produce a license gave new reasonable suspicion to continue the stop.

The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ dismissal of inmate Patrick O. Stokes’s mandamus action seeking copies of an electronic kite and its response. Stokes filed the action against A. Combs but, in the affidavit required by R.C. 2969.25(A), failed to provide the case numbers for three appeals he said he filed within the prior five years. The court held that the statute requires strict compliance and that an inmate must list and describe all civil actions and appeals filed in the previous five years, including their case numbers, so dismissal was proper.

The Ohio Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part James Quinn’s mandamus request to compel Judge Douglas Rastatter to rule on filings in Quinn’s 2014 criminal case. Quinn had filed a petition for postconviction relief and a combined motion for leave to file a new-trial motion plus the new-trial motion itself in April 2024. Because the trial judge later denied the postconviction petition, the Court denied that part of the writ as moot. The Court held the judge must rule on the motion for leave to file a new-trial motion (Crim.R. 33(B)) but denied relief as to the substantive new-trial motion because the rules require the motions be decided sequentially.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment of sentence imposed on Kevin Lee Steager after he pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offenses against his daughter. Steager received an aggregate term of 4½ to 9 years’ imprisonment and 4 years’ probation, and was later designated a sexually violent predator (SVP). Appellate counsel sought to withdraw under Anders; the court found counsel’s submission compliant and conducted an independent review. The court held that challenges to the plea, merger, sentencing legality, SVP designation, and discretionary sentencing were either waived or lacked merit, so the appeal was frivolous and the sentence was affirmed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the candidate Mark Lavelle leave to file an amended jurisdictional statement and to supplement his brief after receiving trial notes, but otherwise affirmed the Commonwealth Court's prior order. The appeal concerned Lavelle's nomination petition for the Democratic primary for the 177th Legislative District. The court noted jurisdiction and allowed procedural relief to complete the appellate record, while concluding that the Commonwealth Court's disposition should stand. A concurring opinion was filed by Justice Brobson, joined by Justices Dougherty and Mundy.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered Mark LaVelle’s challenge to a Commonwealth Court standing order that deems candidates notified of petitions to set aside nomination petitions when the court posts the filing on its public website. LaVelle argued this practice violates Section 977 of the Election Code, which requires an order specifying the time and manner of notice to the candidate. The Justice writing separately expressed doubt about the standing order’s compliance with the statute but concluded any defect in notice would only require a new hearing, not dismissal. Because LaVelle had, by stipulation, fewer than the 300 valid signatures required for the ballot, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s order for that independent reason.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed an appeal by Todd Elliot Koger, Sr. challenging a Commonwealth Court order concerning his nomination petition as the Democratic candidate for the 34th Legislative District. After consideration, the Supreme Court entered a per curiam order on April 7, 2026, affirming the Commonwealth Court's March 25, 2026 decision. The Supreme Court did not provide extended opinion or additional reasoning in this short order, simply affirming the lower court's disposition and ending the appeal at the state supreme court level.

The appellate court reversed orders detaining Kevin Bagby pending a probation-violation hearing. Bagby had been placed on mental-health probation after a retail-theft conviction, and the State later filed a violation petition based on a newly charged retail-theft offense. The court held that because the new retail-theft charge is not a detainable offense under Illinois’s Pretrial Fairness Act (it is a probationable, nonforcible felony that does not carry mandatory imprisonment), Bagby was entitled to pretrial release pending the violation hearing. The case is remanded for a hearing to set appropriate release conditions.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Lavell Tyrone Player’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The resentencing court, after an evidentiary hearing, found beyond a reasonable doubt that Player was the actual killer (and alternatively a major participant acting with reckless indifference), making him ineligible for resentencing. The appellate panel held that a jury’s earlier “not true” findings on a personal firearm enhancement and robbery special circumstance did not collaterally estop the resentencing court from finding Player was the shooter, relying on People v. Santamaria and subsequent authority. The court also found substantial evidence—principally the testimony of accomplice Walter Fonteno and corroborating witnesses—supports the actual-killer finding.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the family court’s orders vacating a default judgment in a marital dissolution case and denying the petitioner’s request for a statement of decision, then remanded for further proceedings. The court held the default judgment exceeded the relief requested in the form petition because the petition left property division items as “to be determined,” so the entry of a default awarding specific property violated the respondent’s due process right to notice. The court also concluded Family Code set-aside provisions and Code of Civil Procedure section 580 both apply, found the record supported mistake/lack of notice, and directed amendment of the petition and an opportunity to answer.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Pengfei Philip Chi’s petition challenging the DMV’s suspension of his driver’s license after he refused a chemical test following a DUI arrest. Chi argued the DMV hearing officer acted as a prosecutor rather than a neutral adjudicator, violating his due process rights. The appellate court held that the DMV’s post-2022 policy requires hearing officers to act as neutral factfinders who may introduce evidence, ask clarifying questions, and rule on objections, and that combining investigative and adjudicative functions does not, by itself, create an unacceptable risk of bias. Because Chi presented no evidence of a constitutionally intolerable risk of bias, the court affirmed the judgment.

The Court of Appeals held that Washington public policy bars an insured from assigning legal malpractice claims against defense counsel to its liability insurer when a conflict of interest exists between insurer and insured. The dispute arose after Great American (primary insurer) paid a $5 million settlement for its insured C3 and obtained an assignment of C3’s malpractice claims against defense counsel. Because the insurer had defended under a reservation of rights and thus had potential conflict with the insured, the court reversed the superior court’s denial of judgment on the pleadings and ordered dismissal of the assigned claims.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Marvin Hillman III’s discretionary application challenging the denial of his 2025 extraordinary motion for a new trial because the application was untimely. Hillman sought review of the trial court’s December 17, 2025 order but filed his discretionary application to this Court on March 20, 2026, which was 93 days after the order. The Court held it lacks jurisdiction where a discretionary application is not filed within the 30-day period required by OCGA § 5-6-35(d), and therefore dismissed the application for failure to comply with the statute's jurisdictional deadline.

The Court of Appeals denied Clarence Cowart's emergency motion asking this Court to order the trial court clerk to immediately transmit the trial record or to certify the cause of delay. Cowart's appeal from a dispossessory order was not docketed because the transcript was not timely transmitted. The Court held that issues about delay and possible dismissal under OCGA § 5-6-48(c) must be decided first by the trial court after notice and hearing, so Cowart cannot bypass those proceedings by seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.