Court Filings

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Anthony Cooper-King’s motion for leave to file a petition for postconviction relief. Cooper-King had been convicted of several drug-possession offenses and filed the postconviction materials more than 365 days after the trial transcript was filed in his direct appeal. The appellate court held the petition was untimely, Cooper-King failed to show he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts supporting his claims, and his claim that retained appellate counsel failed to timely file postconviction documents did not excuse the statutory deadline.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed Preston D. Jefferson's convictions after a jury trial for possession of over 100 grams of cocaine with a major drug offender specification and operating a vehicle while under the influence. The stop, inventory search of Jefferson's truck, body-camera footage, narcotics testing, and field-sobriety observations supported the convictions. The court found the evidence — including a large brick of cocaine in a compartment behind the driver's seat, drug paraphernalia within reach, traffic infractions, and poor performance on sobriety tests — did not create a manifest miscarriage of justice.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the Harrison County Court's judgment granting Cedar One Properties possession of rental premises after finding tenant Isis Rudolph breached her lease by failing to pay rent. Rudolph argued various due-process, bankruptcy-stay, and disability-accommodation defects, and contended the bankruptcy court's order lifting the automatic stay was void. The appellate court found many issues involved the federal bankruptcy proceeding (beyond its jurisdiction), noted Rudolph's briefing and record deficiencies (no trial transcript, App.R. violations), and concluded the eviction was authorized because the bankruptcy court had granted relief from the stay limited to pursuing eviction.

The court dismissed a mandamus complaint filed by Davontez Otis seeking an order compelling a judge to calculate jail-time credit in his underlying criminal case. Otis argued the calculation was ministerial and that appeal would be inadequate because his 90-day jail term would expire before appellate review. The court held that the statute governing jail-time credit grants the sentencing court discretion to grant or deny credit, so mandamus is not available to control that discretion; furthermore, an appeal (with a stay request) is an adequate remedy. The writ was dismissed and costs were assessed to Otis.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Stark County Common Pleas Court's dismissal without a hearing of Nicole Perenkovich's petition for post-conviction relief. Perenkovich argued trial counsel was ineffective for not subpoenaing a stepsister to testify, for failing to use Snapchat photos to impeach police testimony about an unoccupied bedroom, and for not using a phone record to impeach testimony about a jail-call. The appellate court found the submitted affidavits and exhibits did not provide sufficient, authenticated operative facts showing counsel's performance was deficient or that the outcome would likely have changed, so no evidentiary hearing was required.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Eighth District and held that a police officer lawfully extended a traffic stop to verify the driver’s license status even after the original basis for the stop (a believed inoperable headlight) was shown to be mistaken. Officer Rose stopped Quentin Fips for a presumed faulty headlight, learned Fips did not have his license, obtained identifying information, and then confirmed through dispatch that Fips’s license was suspended and a warrant existed. The Court ruled the additional inquiry was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that Fips’s failure to produce a license gave new reasonable suspicion to continue the stop.

The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ dismissal of inmate Patrick O. Stokes’s mandamus action seeking copies of an electronic kite and its response. Stokes filed the action against A. Combs but, in the affidavit required by R.C. 2969.25(A), failed to provide the case numbers for three appeals he said he filed within the prior five years. The court held that the statute requires strict compliance and that an inmate must list and describe all civil actions and appeals filed in the previous five years, including their case numbers, so dismissal was proper.

The Ohio Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part James Quinn’s mandamus request to compel Judge Douglas Rastatter to rule on filings in Quinn’s 2014 criminal case. Quinn had filed a petition for postconviction relief and a combined motion for leave to file a new-trial motion plus the new-trial motion itself in April 2024. Because the trial judge later denied the postconviction petition, the Court denied that part of the writ as moot. The Court held the judge must rule on the motion for leave to file a new-trial motion (Crim.R. 33(B)) but denied relief as to the substantive new-trial motion because the rules require the motions be decided sequentially.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment of sentence imposed on Kevin Lee Steager after he pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offenses against his daughter. Steager received an aggregate term of 4½ to 9 years’ imprisonment and 4 years’ probation, and was later designated a sexually violent predator (SVP). Appellate counsel sought to withdraw under Anders; the court found counsel’s submission compliant and conducted an independent review. The court held that challenges to the plea, merger, sentencing legality, SVP designation, and discretionary sentencing were either waived or lacked merit, so the appeal was frivolous and the sentence was affirmed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the candidate Mark Lavelle leave to file an amended jurisdictional statement and to supplement his brief after receiving trial notes, but otherwise affirmed the Commonwealth Court's prior order. The appeal concerned Lavelle's nomination petition for the Democratic primary for the 177th Legislative District. The court noted jurisdiction and allowed procedural relief to complete the appellate record, while concluding that the Commonwealth Court's disposition should stand. A concurring opinion was filed by Justice Brobson, joined by Justices Dougherty and Mundy.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered Mark LaVelle’s challenge to a Commonwealth Court standing order that deems candidates notified of petitions to set aside nomination petitions when the court posts the filing on its public website. LaVelle argued this practice violates Section 977 of the Election Code, which requires an order specifying the time and manner of notice to the candidate. The Justice writing separately expressed doubt about the standing order’s compliance with the statute but concluded any defect in notice would only require a new hearing, not dismissal. Because LaVelle had, by stipulation, fewer than the 300 valid signatures required for the ballot, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s order for that independent reason.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed an appeal by Todd Elliot Koger, Sr. challenging a Commonwealth Court order concerning his nomination petition as the Democratic candidate for the 34th Legislative District. After consideration, the Supreme Court entered a per curiam order on April 7, 2026, affirming the Commonwealth Court's March 25, 2026 decision. The Supreme Court did not provide extended opinion or additional reasoning in this short order, simply affirming the lower court's disposition and ending the appeal at the state supreme court level.

The appellate court reversed orders detaining Kevin Bagby pending a probation-violation hearing. Bagby had been placed on mental-health probation after a retail-theft conviction, and the State later filed a violation petition based on a newly charged retail-theft offense. The court held that because the new retail-theft charge is not a detainable offense under Illinois’s Pretrial Fairness Act (it is a probationable, nonforcible felony that does not carry mandatory imprisonment), Bagby was entitled to pretrial release pending the violation hearing. The case is remanded for a hearing to set appropriate release conditions.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Lavell Tyrone Player’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The resentencing court, after an evidentiary hearing, found beyond a reasonable doubt that Player was the actual killer (and alternatively a major participant acting with reckless indifference), making him ineligible for resentencing. The appellate panel held that a jury’s earlier “not true” findings on a personal firearm enhancement and robbery special circumstance did not collaterally estop the resentencing court from finding Player was the shooter, relying on People v. Santamaria and subsequent authority. The court also found substantial evidence—principally the testimony of accomplice Walter Fonteno and corroborating witnesses—supports the actual-killer finding.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the family court’s orders vacating a default judgment in a marital dissolution case and denying the petitioner’s request for a statement of decision, then remanded for further proceedings. The court held the default judgment exceeded the relief requested in the form petition because the petition left property division items as “to be determined,” so the entry of a default awarding specific property violated the respondent’s due process right to notice. The court also concluded Family Code set-aside provisions and Code of Civil Procedure section 580 both apply, found the record supported mistake/lack of notice, and directed amendment of the petition and an opportunity to answer.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Pengfei Philip Chi’s petition challenging the DMV’s suspension of his driver’s license after he refused a chemical test following a DUI arrest. Chi argued the DMV hearing officer acted as a prosecutor rather than a neutral adjudicator, violating his due process rights. The appellate court held that the DMV’s post-2022 policy requires hearing officers to act as neutral factfinders who may introduce evidence, ask clarifying questions, and rule on objections, and that combining investigative and adjudicative functions does not, by itself, create an unacceptable risk of bias. Because Chi presented no evidence of a constitutionally intolerable risk of bias, the court affirmed the judgment.

The Court of Appeals held that Washington public policy bars an insured from assigning legal malpractice claims against defense counsel to its liability insurer when a conflict of interest exists between insurer and insured. The dispute arose after Great American (primary insurer) paid a $5 million settlement for its insured C3 and obtained an assignment of C3’s malpractice claims against defense counsel. Because the insurer had defended under a reservation of rights and thus had potential conflict with the insured, the court reversed the superior court’s denial of judgment on the pleadings and ordered dismissal of the assigned claims.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Marvin Hillman III’s discretionary application challenging the denial of his 2025 extraordinary motion for a new trial because the application was untimely. Hillman sought review of the trial court’s December 17, 2025 order but filed his discretionary application to this Court on March 20, 2026, which was 93 days after the order. The Court held it lacks jurisdiction where a discretionary application is not filed within the 30-day period required by OCGA § 5-6-35(d), and therefore dismissed the application for failure to comply with the statute's jurisdictional deadline.

The Court of Appeals denied Clarence Cowart's emergency motion asking this Court to order the trial court clerk to immediately transmit the trial record or to certify the cause of delay. Cowart's appeal from a dispossessory order was not docketed because the transcript was not timely transmitted. The Court held that issues about delay and possible dismissal under OCGA § 5-6-48(c) must be decided first by the trial court after notice and hearing, so Cowart cannot bypass those proceedings by seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an interlocutory application by defendant Calvin Lewis Neal challenging a trial court’s December 22, 2025 order that vacated a prior suppression ruling and denied his motion to suppress. The Court held it lacked jurisdiction because the trial court’s certificate of immediate review was not entered within ten days of the December 22 order as required by OCGA § 5-6-34(b). The Court explained the ten-day certificate requirement is jurisdictional and instructed the trial court on how to allow interlocutory review (vacate and re-enter the order and then promptly issue a certificate).

The Georgia Court of Appeals denied Willie G. Smith’s emergency motion asking for a stay and enforcement of the Cambron remedy. The filing was an urgent request to halt some action and to require implementation of a particular remedy described as the Cambron remedy; the court considered the motion and refused it. The order is brief and dispositive: the Court did not grant emergency relief and left whatever underlying proceedings or remedies in place without modification by this order.

The Court of Appeals dismissed April Campbell’s application for discretionary review of a magistrate court dispossessory judgment because the court lacks jurisdiction. Columbia Park Citi obtained a magistrate judgment on February 25, 2026 awarding possession and $11,773.69 in past-due rent. Campbell filed for discretionary review on March 10, 2026, which was 13 days after the judgment. The court held that appeals in dispossessory actions must be filed within seven days, so Campbell’s filing was untimely and the Court declined to transfer the matter to the state or superior court.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Victor Oswald Robinson Jr.'s original mandamus petition because the court lacks jurisdiction. Robinson filed in the Supreme Court of Georgia seeking an order requiring the trial court to rule on pretrial pro se motions; the Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that a party seeking mandamus against a superior court judge must first pursue relief in the superior court itself and that this case does not present the extremely rare circumstances that would justify invoking the Court of Appeals' original jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Tony L. Ware’s direct appeal of a January 23, 2026 trial-court order that corrected a clerical error under OCGA § 9-11-60(g). The court found it lacked jurisdiction because the corrected order left issues pending in the trial court and was therefore not a final judgment subject to direct appeal. The court also rejected Ware’s arguments that the order dissolved an injunction or could be treated as a collateral attack under the collateral-order doctrine, explaining those paths required interlocutory application or were inapplicable here.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in A26A1231 because the appellant failed to comply with the Court's docketing notice and Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) by not filing an enumeration of errors and brief within the required time. The court had given a specific deadline of March 27, 2026, after an earlier order on March 17, 2026, but the appellant did not file the required documents. For these procedural violations, the Court concluded the appeal was abandoned and ordered it dismissed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the City of Atlanta's application for an interlocutory appeal in the case styled City of Atlanta v. Ronald Frank Petty, Jr. The court ordered that the appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the order and directed the Clerk of Superior Court to include this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals. The order is procedural: it authorizes an immediate appeal before final judgment and sets a short deadline for filing the notice and for inclusion of the order in the appellate record.

The Court of Appeals dismissed a direct discretionary appeal from a magistrate-court dispossessory judgment because it lacks jurisdiction. After the magistrate court granted Star Borrower SFR6 LP a writ of possession on March 11, 2026, defendants filed this application for discretionary appeal to the Court of Appeals. The court explained that appeals from magistrate courts are ordinarily taken by a new (de novo) appeal to the state or superior court under OCGA § 15-10-41(b)(1), and therefore the Court of Appeals may review such matters only after that intermediate review. The filing was transferred to the magistrate court for transmission to the state or superior court.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the appellant Star Venture Auto, LLC’s motion to withdraw its appeal in the case against Jacquelyn Taylor. By granting the motion, the appellate court released jurisdiction back to the trial court effective upon receipt of the order. The decision is procedural: the court did not address the merits of the underlying dispute but approved dismissal of the appeal and returned the matter to the trial court for further proceedings or finalization there.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by Demarcus Davis from a final divorce judgment entered January 6, 2026. The court held that appeals in domestic relations cases must be brought by application for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2). Davis filed only a notice of appeal and asked the court to treat it as a discretionary application, but the court found that compliance with the discretionary-appeal procedure is jurisdictional. Because Davis did not file the required application, the court granted Young Seon Jo’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Lorain County Common Pleas Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Nancy Vega, holding she is entitled to participate in the Ohio workers’ compensation system. Vega fell at work and injured her shoulder; the court concluded her fall was an “unexplained fall” under Waller v. Mayfield, meaning it arose from a neutral risk tied to the workplace. Because Vega eliminated idiopathic (personal) causes and there was no evidence of a non-employment cause, an inference arose that the injury was work-related. The BWC forfeited its challenge by not participating in initial briefing.