Court Filings

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Pengfei Philip Chi’s petition challenging the DMV’s suspension of his driver’s license after he refused a chemical test following a DUI arrest. Chi argued the DMV hearing officer acted as a prosecutor rather than a neutral adjudicator, violating his due process rights. The appellate court held that the DMV’s post-2022 policy requires hearing officers to act as neutral factfinders who may introduce evidence, ask clarifying questions, and rule on objections, and that combining investigative and adjudicative functions does not, by itself, create an unacceptable risk of bias. Because Chi presented no evidence of a constitutionally intolerable risk of bias, the court affirmed the judgment.

The Court of Appeals held that Washington public policy bars an insured from assigning legal malpractice claims against defense counsel to its liability insurer when a conflict of interest exists between insurer and insured. The dispute arose after Great American (primary insurer) paid a $5 million settlement for its insured C3 and obtained an assignment of C3’s malpractice claims against defense counsel. Because the insurer had defended under a reservation of rights and thus had potential conflict with the insured, the court reversed the superior court’s denial of judgment on the pleadings and ordered dismissal of the assigned claims.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Marvin Hillman III’s discretionary application challenging the denial of his 2025 extraordinary motion for a new trial because the application was untimely. Hillman sought review of the trial court’s December 17, 2025 order but filed his discretionary application to this Court on March 20, 2026, which was 93 days after the order. The Court held it lacks jurisdiction where a discretionary application is not filed within the 30-day period required by OCGA § 5-6-35(d), and therefore dismissed the application for failure to comply with the statute's jurisdictional deadline.

The Court of Appeals denied Clarence Cowart's emergency motion asking this Court to order the trial court clerk to immediately transmit the trial record or to certify the cause of delay. Cowart's appeal from a dispossessory order was not docketed because the transcript was not timely transmitted. The Court held that issues about delay and possible dismissal under OCGA § 5-6-48(c) must be decided first by the trial court after notice and hearing, so Cowart cannot bypass those proceedings by seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an interlocutory application by defendant Calvin Lewis Neal challenging a trial court’s December 22, 2025 order that vacated a prior suppression ruling and denied his motion to suppress. The Court held it lacked jurisdiction because the trial court’s certificate of immediate review was not entered within ten days of the December 22 order as required by OCGA § 5-6-34(b). The Court explained the ten-day certificate requirement is jurisdictional and instructed the trial court on how to allow interlocutory review (vacate and re-enter the order and then promptly issue a certificate).

The Georgia Court of Appeals denied Willie G. Smith’s emergency motion asking for a stay and enforcement of the Cambron remedy. The filing was an urgent request to halt some action and to require implementation of a particular remedy described as the Cambron remedy; the court considered the motion and refused it. The order is brief and dispositive: the Court did not grant emergency relief and left whatever underlying proceedings or remedies in place without modification by this order.

The Court of Appeals dismissed April Campbell’s application for discretionary review of a magistrate court dispossessory judgment because the court lacks jurisdiction. Columbia Park Citi obtained a magistrate judgment on February 25, 2026 awarding possession and $11,773.69 in past-due rent. Campbell filed for discretionary review on March 10, 2026, which was 13 days after the judgment. The court held that appeals in dispossessory actions must be filed within seven days, so Campbell’s filing was untimely and the Court declined to transfer the matter to the state or superior court.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Victor Oswald Robinson Jr.'s original mandamus petition because the court lacks jurisdiction. Robinson filed in the Supreme Court of Georgia seeking an order requiring the trial court to rule on pretrial pro se motions; the Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that a party seeking mandamus against a superior court judge must first pursue relief in the superior court itself and that this case does not present the extremely rare circumstances that would justify invoking the Court of Appeals' original jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Tony L. Ware’s direct appeal of a January 23, 2026 trial-court order that corrected a clerical error under OCGA § 9-11-60(g). The court found it lacked jurisdiction because the corrected order left issues pending in the trial court and was therefore not a final judgment subject to direct appeal. The court also rejected Ware’s arguments that the order dissolved an injunction or could be treated as a collateral attack under the collateral-order doctrine, explaining those paths required interlocutory application or were inapplicable here.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in A26A1231 because the appellant failed to comply with the Court's docketing notice and Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) by not filing an enumeration of errors and brief within the required time. The court had given a specific deadline of March 27, 2026, after an earlier order on March 17, 2026, but the appellant did not file the required documents. For these procedural violations, the Court concluded the appeal was abandoned and ordered it dismissed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the City of Atlanta's application for an interlocutory appeal in the case styled City of Atlanta v. Ronald Frank Petty, Jr. The court ordered that the appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the order and directed the Clerk of Superior Court to include this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals. The order is procedural: it authorizes an immediate appeal before final judgment and sets a short deadline for filing the notice and for inclusion of the order in the appellate record.

The Court of Appeals dismissed a direct discretionary appeal from a magistrate-court dispossessory judgment because it lacks jurisdiction. After the magistrate court granted Star Borrower SFR6 LP a writ of possession on March 11, 2026, defendants filed this application for discretionary appeal to the Court of Appeals. The court explained that appeals from magistrate courts are ordinarily taken by a new (de novo) appeal to the state or superior court under OCGA § 15-10-41(b)(1), and therefore the Court of Appeals may review such matters only after that intermediate review. The filing was transferred to the magistrate court for transmission to the state or superior court.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the appellant Star Venture Auto, LLC’s motion to withdraw its appeal in the case against Jacquelyn Taylor. By granting the motion, the appellate court released jurisdiction back to the trial court effective upon receipt of the order. The decision is procedural: the court did not address the merits of the underlying dispute but approved dismissal of the appeal and returned the matter to the trial court for further proceedings or finalization there.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by Demarcus Davis from a final divorce judgment entered January 6, 2026. The court held that appeals in domestic relations cases must be brought by application for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2). Davis filed only a notice of appeal and asked the court to treat it as a discretionary application, but the court found that compliance with the discretionary-appeal procedure is jurisdictional. Because Davis did not file the required application, the court granted Young Seon Jo’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Lorain County Common Pleas Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Nancy Vega, holding she is entitled to participate in the Ohio workers’ compensation system. Vega fell at work and injured her shoulder; the court concluded her fall was an “unexplained fall” under Waller v. Mayfield, meaning it arose from a neutral risk tied to the workplace. Because Vega eliminated idiopathic (personal) causes and there was no evidence of a non-employment cause, an inference arose that the injury was work-related. The BWC forfeited its challenge by not participating in initial briefing.

The Eleventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Jeffrey A. Swiecicki’s pro se appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Swiecicki appealed a February 6, 2026 magistrate’s decision, but the court determined the decision was not a final, appealable order because the trial court had not yet adopted the magistrate’s decision or entered judgment disposing of all claims. Under Ohio law, only a judge’s final order is appealable; magistrate decisions remain interlocutory until the trial court acts. The court granted the appellee’s motion to dismiss and noted the appellant may appeal after a final judgment is entered in the trial court.

The Eleventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Todd D. Campbell Sr.’s petition for postconviction relief. Campbell, who pleaded guilty in 2022 to aggravated vehicular homicide and OVI, sought to vacate his convictions in a 2025 filing asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, discovery violations, evidence tampering, and competency issues. The trial court found the petition untimely under Ohio R.C. 2953.21 and that Campbell failed to meet the statutory exceptions in R.C. 2953.23, and that his claims were barred by res judicata. The appellate court concluded Campbell did not show error in that ruling and affirmed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants-appellees and denial of plaintiffs-appellants’ summary judgment in a foreclosure action. Plaintiffs had executed and recorded a quitclaim deed in 2020 conveying the property to defendants and later sued in 2024 claiming an oral land-sale contract and unpaid installments. The court held plaintiffs lacked standing to foreclose because they held no recorded mortgage or lien, and the deed’s recited consideration barred use of prior oral agreements under the parol evidence and merger-by-deed rules. The judgment dismissing the case was affirmed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Lake County Court of Common Pleas’ grant of summary judgment for defendant-attorney David Patterson in Bruce Arnoff’s legal malpractice suit. Arnoff alleged Patterson’s representation in his federal habeas proceedings breached professional duties and caused dismissal of his habeas petition. The appellate court held there were no genuine issues of material fact: Patterson owed a duty but Arnoff failed to produce expert proof of breach or causation, and the federal petition’s untimeliness preceded Patterson’s retention. The court also rejected claims of improper joinder, discovery abuse, denial of jury trial, and judicial bias.

The Ohio Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and 17-month prison sentence of Allen Ochier for felony domestic violence arising from an altercation with his mother. The jury rejected Ochier’s self-defense claim and found prior domestic-violence conduct; the trial court sentenced within the statutory range. On appeal, the court rejected challenges that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, that the prosecutor’s remarks deprived Ochier of a fair trial, that trial counsel was ineffective, and that the sentence was contrary to law. The court found the jury’s credibility determinations reasonable and the sentence supported by the record.

The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the Marion Municipal Court conviction and sentence of Marquis D. Montgomery for telecommunications harassment. Montgomery had been charged after repeatedly sending unwanted texts to the mother of his children and her boyfriend despite warnings from them and police. He represented himself at trial after counsel withdrew, was convicted by a jury, and received community control with jail time. The appeals court rejected claims that the court lacked jurisdiction due to service defects, that the waiver of counsel and standby/hybrid representation were invalid, that evidence was insufficient, and that the court abused its discretion in denying a continuance.

The Ohio Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the Marion Municipal Court’s denial of Nicholas Meads’ 2025 request to expunge a 2019 disorderly conduct conviction. Meads had pleaded no contest in 2019 and later violated community control, resulting in a 10-day jail term. At the expungement hearing the prosecutor did not object, but the victim opposed expungement and described continued harassment. Meads presented no testimonial or documentary evidence. The trial court found the government’s interest in maintaining the record outweighed Meads’ interest, and the appeals court held the decision was supported by the record.

The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the Marion Municipal Court’s denials of Nicholas Meads’s requests to seal two dismissed misdemeanor matters (domestic violence and violation of a civil protection order). The appeals arose after the trial court denied sealing following a hearing where the victim spoke and the State took no position. The appellate court held the trial court applied the wrong statute and improperly considered the victim’s statements when R.C. 2953.33 governs sealing of dismissed cases and limits the court to considering the movant’s submissions and any prosecutor objection. The matters are remanded for further proceedings under the correct statute.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the Bellefontaine Municipal Court conviction of Eric Lochtefeld for driving under an administrative suspension (R.C. 4510.14). The appeal challenged the weight of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and exclusion of evidence that Lochtefeld held a valid Florida license. The court found the Florida license irrelevant because Ohio suspension rules apply to Ohio driving privileges and are triggered when an arresting officer reads the suspension notice after a chemical-test refusal. The court concluded the jury reasonably found Lochtefeld had been told his Ohio privileges were suspended and counsel’s performance caused no prejudice.

The Ohio Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s dispositions adjudicating R.G. and R.C. juvenile traffic offenders. Both juveniles challenged the denial of motions to suppress statements they made to police without receiving Miranda warnings. The appellate court concluded the encounters occurred at the juveniles’ workplace, were brief and unrestrained, and did not involve physical restraint, threats, or coercive tactics; therefore the questioning was not custodial and Miranda warnings were not required. The court also found the statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.

The Twelfth District Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's grant of a three-year civil stalking protection order (CSPO) against appellant William Thomas after he posted repeatedly about appellee Brittney Thomason on his public Facebook page. The appellate court found sufficient credible evidence that Thomas engaged in a pattern of conduct that knowingly caused Thomason mental distress, so it affirmed the issuance of the CSPO. However, the court concluded one provision was an unconstitutional, overbroad prior restraint on speech because it effectively barred Thomas from posting anything concerning Thomason, and it vacated that portion and remanded for a narrower order.

The Court of Appeals reviewed an appeal by Shiviez Montrel Howard from his conviction in Butler County Common Pleas. Counsel filed an Anders brief concluding no nonfrivolous issues exist but identified two potential arguable errors and sought permission to withdraw. The appellate court independently reviewed the record, found no prejudicial error or infringement of appellant's rights, granted counsel's motion to withdraw, and dismissed the appeal as wholly frivolous. The court ordered the trial-court mandate issued and costs taxed to appellant.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendants' convictions for robbery, kidnapping, grand theft, and possession of criminal tools, but reversed sentencing in part and remanded for limited resentencing. The court held that the kidnapping and robbery convictions merge for sentencing because the victim's movement through the store was instrumental to the theft and did not create an independent risk or purpose. By contrast, possession of criminal tools (bags, gloves, masks) did not merge with robbery because those items facilitated but did not constitute the instrument of the robbery. The court also found procedural sentencing errors: the trial court failed to provide oral postrelease-control advisals and failed to make required consecutive-sentence findings at the sentencing hearing.

The Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed Geoffery Barrow's conviction for fifth-degree theft arising from four shoplifting incidents at a Nike outlet totaling $2,334.44. The court reviewed Barrow's speedy-trial, sufficiency, and evidentiary challenges. It held Barrow forfeited some speedy-trial claims by failing to move to dismiss in the trial court and by absconding, which reset the speedy-trial clock. The court found the evidence (surveillance video, store receipts, witness testimony, and items recovered from Barrow's vehicle) sufficient to prove the aggregate value exceeded $1,000. Any evidentiary errors were harmless.

The Twelfth District Court of Appeals vacated a juvenile-court order that had granted visitation rights to the paternal grandfather because the juvenile court in Madison County lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide a grandparent-visitation claim under R.C. 3109.11. The appellate court reviewed statutory text and Ohio Supreme Court precedent establishing that only the common pleas general division has jurisdiction under R.C. 3109.11 and that juvenile courts have only the powers expressly granted by statute. Because Madison County's juvenile division has not been granted the common-pleas division's powers, the visitation judgment was void and therefore vacated.