Court Filings

The Texas Supreme Court (Justice Hawkins, joined by two justices) concurred with the Court’s opinion holding that the plaintiffs qualify as prevailing parties entitled to attorney’s fees under a specific Texas statute. The concurrence explains that although the trial court labeled the relief a "temporary injunction," the statutory scheme at issue makes such relief effectively final because disclosure of information cannot be undone. Because the defendants complied and the information was disclosed, the plaintiffs obtained ultimate relief and thus prevailed for fee-shifting purposes.

The Texas Supreme Court held that two former Webb Consolidated ISD board members who obtained a trial-court temporary injunction ordering the district to produce requested board materials qualified as "prevailing" under Texas Education Code § 11.1512(c-2) and may recover reasonable attorney’s fees for the relief obtained. The court explained that although temporary injunctions normally preserve the status quo and do not confer prevailing-party status, the injunction here effectively granted the only relief the statute authorizes — production of requested information — and the district complied. The court also held board members need not exhaust administrative remedies before suing under § 11.1512(c-2). The case is remanded for determination of recoverable fees limited to the injunction-related claims.

The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus to direct the trial court to enter summary judgment for Bell Helicopter. The family of a pilot who died in a 2017 helicopter crash sued Bell, claiming the flight manual failed to warn adequately about flying with a loose engine cowling. Bell invoked the federal General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA), which bars suits against manufacturers brought more than 18 years after delivery unless a "new" part that is alleged to have caused the accident was added or replaced within 18 years. The Court held the manual revisions did not restart GARA’s 18-year clock because none of the changes constituted a new part alleged to have caused the crash.

The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Mireyda and Joel Gonzalez’s suit against the City of Vidor. The Gonzalezes claimed the City was vicariously liable for a police officer’s negligent driving that led to a crash, arguing the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) waived immunity because the officer acted recklessly and failed to use his siren. The Court of Appeals held the emergency exception to the TTCA applied: the officer was responding to an emergency, his use of lights but not a siren was justified under statutory exceptions, and the record did not show conscious indifference or reckless disregard that would waive immunity. The City’s plea to the jurisdiction was properly granted.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Ronald Sutherland’s suit for want of prosecution. Sutherland had sued Thomas Dean Stewart and Phillip Chapman for falsely reporting a 1966 Ford Mustang stolen and sought sanctions and a default judgment against Stewart for discovery failures. The trial court dismissed the case after Sutherland failed to appear for trial. The appeals court held Sutherland did not challenge the dismissal itself, and interlocutory denials of sanctions or default judgments cannot be reviewed separately once a final dismissal stands, so the dismissal is dispositive.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Jason Kelsey’s petition for a bill of review seeking to set aside an agreed final divorce decree that awarded most marital assets to Maria Rocha. Kelsey, who signed the decree while incarcerated and proceeded pro se, claimed fraud, duress, lack of a valid marriage, and mischaracterization of his separate property. The trial court found he failed to prove a meritorious defense or that he was prevented by fraud, official mistake, or wrongful act from presenting a defense, and that his own negligence contributed to the outcome. The appellate court held those findings were supported and reviewed for abuse of discretion, so the denial was affirmed.

The court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment declaring valid and enforceable a 2018 contract conveying a 25% interest in income-producing property to two law firms (later assigned to HPGM, LLC). Price’s attempt to defeat summary judgment relied on untimely, stricken amended pleadings and did not respond with evidence to many no-evidence challenges to her originally pleaded claims and defenses. The court also upheld the award of approximately $300,000 in attorney’s fees to HPGM, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion given HPGM’s billing records and counsel’s testimony about rates, services, and the receivership and bankruptcy work that advanced the declaratory claim.

The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of appellants’ motion to dissolve a temporary injunction. Highland Village Management (HVM) had obtained a temporary injunction preventing appellants from using or transferring funds or property allegedly taken from HVM. Appellants argued on appeal that HVM failed to prove irreparable injury and that newly revealed facts required dissolution. The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction to revisit the original injunction and found appellants presented no new evidence or changed circumstances at the dissolution hearings, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dissolve the injunction.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a trial-court judgment ordering specific performance of a written buy-sell agreement requiring Joann Crawford to convey a parcel to Buffalo Creek Properties, LLC (an assignee of Trails End). The trial court found Buffalo Creek ready, willing, and able to perform, that Crawford breached the contract and conveyed the property with knowledge of the pending suit and lis pendens, and it adjusted the sale proceeds for liens, taxes, life-estate compensation, costs, and fees. The appellate court presumed the trial record supported the findings (Crawford failed to timely request the reporter’s record) and found no reversible error in the trial court’s award or its accounting adjustments.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed a no-answer default judgment entered by the County Court at Law No. 10 in Bexar County in favor of Investment Retrievers, Inc. The Rodriguezes, appearing pro se, challenged the default judgment on three grounds: violation of due process, the absence of a hearing, and that their SSI benefits are exempt from execution. The appeals court found the record showed proper service and compliance with rules for default judgments, that damages may be proved by affidavit without oral testimony, and that the appellants failed to support or cite authority for their exemption claim, so there was nothing preserved for review.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment granting Castroville State Bank a judicial foreclosure against Lance and Kerry Meyer after the Meyers defaulted on loans secured by deeds of trust. The Bank moved for a hybrid summary judgment and no-evidence dismissal of the Meyers’ affirmative defenses; the trial court granted final summary judgment. The appellate court held the Meyers (pro se) failed to raise fact issues or provide admissible, properly cited record evidence to defeat summary judgment and waived other complaints, so the foreclosure judgment stands.

The Texas Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s default judgment against appellant Nicholas Lind in a suit by investors M3 Fort Worth Developer, LLC and The YoungESTone, LLC. M3 and YO invested in residential development projects run by Serene and Windridge, paid management and construction fees, and sued after projects stalled. Lind was served with the original petition but not the first amended petition; the trial court entered default judgment and later a damages judgment. The appellate court held lack of re-service was not error because the amended petition did not seek more onerous relief, and any challenge to sufficiency of evidence failed because securities claims under the Texas Securities Act do not require proof of loss causation.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a bench-trial judgment awarding Douglas Fuhrman $187,244 plus $30,782.58 in attorney’s fees after he sued his ex-wife, Nancy Fuhrman, for breach of the 2020 agreed divorce decree’s tax-allocation provisions. The trial court found the decree was a valid contract, Douglas performed (Deloitte prepared and filed the 2020 returns), Nancy breached by failing to pay her allocated share, and Douglas suffered damages. The appellate court held the record (tax returns, expert testimony, decree language) provided legally and factually sufficient support for the trial court’s findings and legal conclusions.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s temporary injunction preventing four former CRNA employees from providing CRNA services within 20 miles of any location where they worked for their former employer, Anesthesia Associates, for three years. Anesthesia Associates sued after the CRNAs resigned and began working for a competitor at a local hospital, alleging breach of noncompetition and irreparable harm. The appellate court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion: the employer showed a legitimate protectable interest (goodwill, specialized training, credentialing), probable success on the claim at trial, and probable irreparable injury that could not be adequately remedied by money damages.

Appellants Mark Goloby and Richard Vega sued Harris County commissioners, contending Commissioner Adrian Garcia resigned his county office when the Commissioners Court appointed him to the Gulf Coast Protection District (GCPD) board. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Commissioners Court’s appointment of one of its own members to the GCPD was void under the common-law self-appointment branch of the incompatibility doctrine, so Garcia never lawfully became a GCPD director and therefore did not resign his commissioner seat. Because Garcia remained an official-capacity county officer, governmental immunity barred the claims and the dismissal with prejudice was proper.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the City of Houston’s summary-judgment motion asserting governmental immunity after a parking-garage collision between a City-owned truck and the plaintiff’s car. The City argued its employee was off-duty and not acting in the course of employment, but the court held the undisputed fact that a City employee was driving a City-owned vehicle gave rise to a rebuttable presumption she was acting within the scope of employment. The City’s affidavit and records were conclusory and failed to conclusively rebut that presumption, so a fact issue remained.

The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of U.S. Bank’s motion for new trial and upheld the default judgment in favor of Business Unlimited. Business Unlimited sued to quiet title after a lien sale and obtained a default judgment when U.S. Bank failed to answer. U.S. Bank sought a new trial under the three-part Craddock standard for setting aside defaults, claiming an administrative mistake and asserting meritorious defenses. The appellate court found U.S. Bank proved mistake but failed to adequately set up factual support for meritorious defenses, so the Craddock test was not satisfied and the denial of a new trial was not an abuse of discretion.

The court affirmed the trial court’s default judgment against U.S. Bank (USB) in a quiet-title action because USB failed to prove entitlement to a new trial under the Craddock standard. USB was served but did not answer, a default judgment was entered, and USB later sought a new trial supported by a late affidavit from a bank vice president. The court held the affidavit was conclusory and lacked personal knowledge about the registered agent’s handling of service, so USB did not show its failure to answer was an accident rather than intentional or due to conscious indifference.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment for attorneys Leslie Hyman and Pullman, Cappuccio & Pullen, LLP in Susan Harriman’s legal-malpractice suit. Harriman sued claiming the lawyers mishandled a 2017 hearing to unseal certain sealed court records and that their actions forced her into an unfavorable settlement in an underlying defamation case. The appellees moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment arguing Harriman offered no proof that their conduct proximately caused her damages. The appellate court held Harriman produced only speculation and no more than a scintilla of evidence on proximate cause, so summary judgment was proper.

The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment committing Edward Lincoln Goff as a sexually violent predator under the Texas SVP Act. On appeal Goff argued the evidence was legally insufficient to show he currently suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to commit predatory sexual violence. The appellate court reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury, relied chiefly on the jury’s credibility determinations, and found the expert testimony (diagnosing pedophilic disorder and identifying risk factors) plus Goff’s history of multiple child-victim offenses, continued offending after detection, lack of insight, and certain coercive acts supported the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court affirmed the trial court’s final divorce decree enforcing a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) that divided the marital estate. The wife, Soo Jin, argued the MSA should be set aside because she signed under duress and did not sign voluntarily, citing health issues, language barriers, a panic attack, and pressure from counsel and the mediator. The appellate court held the MSA met Texas Family Code §6.602 requirements and found competent evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Soo Jin’s testimony did not show fraud, coercion, or incapacity that would void the agreement. The judgment enforcing the MSA was affirmed.

The El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for PlainsCapital Bank in a trespass-to-try-title dispute. Appellants C.V.P.G. Family Trust and its trustee claimed ownership as successors to heirs of Joaquin Chapa, but PlainsCapital relied on a 2018 final judgment from a previous suit that adjudicated mineral title and declared hundreds of named and unknown Chapa heirs to have no ownership. The court held PlainsCapital met its burden to show a final judgment and that Appellants failed to raise a genuine fact issue that the prior judgment was void for lack of proper service or that C.V.P.G. lacked privity with the prior defendants.

The Stonewater Homeowners Association sued Luther and Laticia Evans for unpaid HOA fees. The parties presented an agreed judgment to the trial court, but at a hearing the Evanses (pro se) disavowed some terms, and the court orally modified the proposed agreement (reducing attorney’s fees, lowering interest, and striking foreclosure language) before signing the judgment. The HOA later filed a motion for new trial complaining the court lacked authority to alter the agreed judgment. The appeals court held the trial court acted within its authority because the modifications were made in open court after the Evanses did not accept the original terms and the HOA did not pursue separate enforcement remedies.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment denying appellant George Michael Welch attorney’s fees. Welch sold property to Felix and Summerlyn Lopez under an owner-financed contract. The Lopezes missed a May 1, 2023 payment but attempted to tender payment within the contract’s 91-day cure period; Welch rejected the tender and filed for foreclosure. The trial court found Welch prematurely sought foreclosure, unjustifiably refused payment, and reinstated the note upon payment of $22,221.92, denying fees because Welch was not the prevailing party. The appeals court held a temporary injunction and reinstatement did not confer prevailing-party status under section 38.001.

The court affirmed a trial-court judgment forfeiting $8,000 and a 2006 Harley-Davidson to the State under Texas civil forfeiture law. The owner, Chad Wade Spence, argued the trial court abused its discretion by forcing him to trial without material witnesses and that doing so violated his constitutional rights. The appellate court held Spence never properly requested subpoenas — he filed only informal witness lists and failed to complete the clerk’s subpoena request form — and therefore the trial court did not err in proceeding. The court also explained the right to compulsory process is a criminal right and does not apply in civil in rem forfeiture proceedings.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a trespass to try title suit. Houston International Management & Trade, Inc. (HIM) claimed ownership of 23 commercial lots by adverse possession, but a jury found HIM had not possessed the property peaceably and adversely for the statutory period and instead found a verbal management agreement existed between HIM and the record owners (the Peacock parties). The court held there was some evidence supporting the jury’s findings, rejected HIM’s challenges to JNOV, new trial claims, and factual-sufficiency complaints, and affirmed the hold that the Peacock parties own the properties.

The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus relief directing the trial court to vacate its new-trial order and enter judgment on an 11–1 defense verdict in a medical-negligence suit. After a jury found Dr. Lapuerta not liable for Jose Torres’s eventual ray amputation, the trial court granted a new trial based on perceived error in a “loss of chance” jury instruction and possible juror confusion. The Supreme Court held the trial court misapplied controlling Texas law about loss-of-chance instructions, noted an improper juror letter that could have influenced the result, and concluded the record did not show the instruction probably caused an improper judgment.

The Court of Appeals of the Ninth District of Texas affirmed a county court’s final eviction judgment for landlord Matthew Twombly against pro se tenant Marcus Thirstrup. Thirstrup appealed the denial of his emergency motion for continuance filed the day of trial, claiming a medical inability to appear. The appellate court found the notice of appeal timely and held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely motion because Thirstrup knew of his condition days earlier, failed to timely seek relief, did not contact the court, and did not appear at trial. A due-process challenge to the docket control order was not preserved for appeal.

The court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Rockport-Fulton Independent School District (RFISD). Don Jackson Construction appealed after RFISD sought a declaratory judgment that it retained governmental immunity from Don Jackson’s contract and related claims arising from Hurricane Harvey repairs arranged through the Regional Pool Alliance (RPA). The court held RFISD kept its immunity because there was no evidence that RFISD’s board or superintendent ever approved or voted to adopt the Interlocal Agreement or otherwise authorized the RPA to contract on RFISD’s behalf, so the contracts were not “properly executed” on RFISD’s behalf under Texas law.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment vacating an arbitration award in a workplace-injury dispute. Cynthia Love won a large award from an arbitrator after suing her former employer, Kaspar Ranch Hand Equipment, but the trial court vacated that award after Kaspar petitioned under the Federal Arbitration Act. The appellate court held vacatur was proper because the arbitrator failed to include factual findings and legal conclusions expressly required by the parties’ arbitration agreement, so she exceeded her contractual authority under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). The court rejected Love’s other challenges and affirmed denial of attorney’s fees.