Court Filings

Justice Sullivan dissents from the Court’s interpretation of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 18.001. He would hold that when a defendant serves a controverting affidavit the statute’s hearsay exception for medical-expense affidavits is defeated as to the entire affidavit, not just the particular line items the counteraffidavit disputes. Because the defendant served a controverting affidavit here, Ortiz could not rely on her medical-affidavits alone and the trial court properly denied a new trial on damages. Sullivan argues the statute’s plain text refers to "affidavits," so its all-or-nothing approach must be applied even if it creates odd or inefficient results.

The Texas Supreme Court held that when a party uses the pretrial affidavit process in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 18.001 to prove medical expenses, only those specific items or charges that are actually controverted by a compliant counteraffidavit lose the statute’s evidentiary effect. Unchallenged portions of an initial affidavit remain competent evidence and may be submitted to the factfinder. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded because the trial court erred by excluding entire medical-cost affidavits and counteraffidavits even though only portions were controverted, which deprived the claimant of admissible evidence of certain medical expenses.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals dismissed Woodforest National Bank's appeal from a final judgment because the bank failed to pay required filing fees and failed to arrange or pay for the clerk's record. The court repeatedly notified the appellant, sent invoices and a certified bill of costs, and warned the appeal would be dismissed if fees were not paid or arrangements made. The appellant did not respond or show indigency, so the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the applicable appellate rules.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of a plea to the jurisdiction and rendered judgment for county officials. Plaintiff Nelson sought mandamus and declaratory relief to force Polk County officials to assign 911 addresses and a street name for lots in his subdivision, claiming a statutory exemption from platting and that officials acted unlawfully. The appellate court held Nelson failed to plead or prove he submitted the required plat, exemption request, or addressing application (or that officials denied one), so he did not show officials failed to perform any ministerial duty. Because governmental immunity was not waived, the court dismissed his claims.

The Court of Appeals reversed a default judgment against CE Acquisition, LLC (CEA) in a construction payment dispute and remanded for a new trial. On-Site Construction obtained a default judgment after CEA and a co-defendant failed to answer suit seeking payment and lien foreclosure. CEA moved for a new trial, supported by affidavits saying it never received the petition and asserting meritorious defenses and an offer to pay plaintiff’s fees. The court found CEA met the three Craddock factors (mistake, meritorious defense, no undue prejudice) and held the trial court abused its discretion in denying the new-trial motion.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Zenayda Guadalupe Portillo-Rodriguez’s appeal from a Potter County district court judgment because she failed to pay the required appellate filing fee and did not seek to proceed without payment. The Clerk notified her of the overdue fee and gave a deadline of April 13, 2026, but she took no action. Relying on the court’s appellate rules and the Clerk’s notice requirement, the court concluded dismissal was appropriate for noncompliance and entered a per curiam dismissal on April 29, 2026.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal by William Martin, independent executor, from a trial-court order that required co-executor Steven Martin to resign or be removed. The appellate court found the appeal moot because Steven formally resigned after the order was entered, so reversing the order would have no practical effect on Steven’s status or estate administration. The court therefore declined to address the parties’ standing and procedural arguments and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals (Sixth District) denied Jeffrey Don Brock's petition for a writ of mandamus asking the county court judge to rule on his motion to compel an executor's accounting. Brock had demanded an accounting by March 16, 2026, but filed for mandamus on March 10, before that deadline expired. The executor filed a verified accounting on March 13 (with clerk acceptance disputed by Brock). The court held Brock was not entitled to extraordinary relief because he sought mandamus before the accounting deadline and did not show the trial court refused to rule on his later complaints about the accounting.

The Texas Supreme Court (Justice Hawkins, joined by two justices) concurred with the Court’s opinion holding that the plaintiffs qualify as prevailing parties entitled to attorney’s fees under a specific Texas statute. The concurrence explains that although the trial court labeled the relief a "temporary injunction," the statutory scheme at issue makes such relief effectively final because disclosure of information cannot be undone. Because the defendants complied and the information was disclosed, the plaintiffs obtained ultimate relief and thus prevailed for fee-shifting purposes.

The Texas Supreme Court held that two former Webb Consolidated ISD board members who obtained a trial-court temporary injunction ordering the district to produce requested board materials qualified as "prevailing" under Texas Education Code § 11.1512(c-2) and may recover reasonable attorney’s fees for the relief obtained. The court explained that although temporary injunctions normally preserve the status quo and do not confer prevailing-party status, the injunction here effectively granted the only relief the statute authorizes — production of requested information — and the district complied. The court also held board members need not exhaust administrative remedies before suing under § 11.1512(c-2). The case is remanded for determination of recoverable fees limited to the injunction-related claims.

The Texas Supreme Court granted two petitions for review in competing claims over a 1933 deed that reserved an “undivided one-fourth of the usual one eighth” royalty. The court held the court of appeals erred in declining to address the presumed-grant doctrine on jurisdictional grounds, vacated the court of appeals’ merits decision, and remanded for reconsideration of both deed construction and the presumed-grant doctrine. The Court emphasized that the presumed-grant issue was fairly included in the permissive appeal and instructed the court of appeals to resolve both paths without expressing a view on the ultimate ownership outcome.

Justice Young dissented from the Court’s denial of a petition for writ of mandamus by Warwick Construction, Bustamante Construction, and DLC General Construction Services. The relators asked the trial court for limited reopening of discovery under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 190.5(b); the trial court denied that request and the relators sought mandamus relief. Justice Young would have stayed the upcoming trial so the Court could fully consider whether the denial of discovery implicated Rule 190.5(b) and risked mooting review. He explains that proceeding to trial could vitiate relators’ ability to present their case and waste judicial resources if an appellate remedy were later required.

The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus to direct the trial court to enter summary judgment for Bell Helicopter. The family of a pilot who died in a 2017 helicopter crash sued Bell, claiming the flight manual failed to warn adequately about flying with a loose engine cowling. Bell invoked the federal General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA), which bars suits against manufacturers brought more than 18 years after delivery unless a "new" part that is alleged to have caused the accident was added or replaced within 18 years. The Court held the manual revisions did not restart GARA’s 18-year clock because none of the changes constituted a new part alleged to have caused the crash.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Elisha Holloway’s appeal from a county court judgment awarding possession and damages to The Julian at South Pointe because Holloway failed to file the required docketing statement and did not respond to the Court’s notices. The Clerk had set deadlines and warned that failure to comply could result in dismissal. Because no docketing statement or extension request was received, the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and for failure to follow a clerk’s directive, and it dismissed an emergency motion as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed an eviction appeal as moot after the appellants informed the court they no longer occupy the disputed property and do not oppose dismissal. The court noted that eviction proceedings in justice and county courts focus solely on the right to actual possession under Texas law and the civil rules. Because the appellants vacated the premises, the court vacated the county court judgment, dismissed the appeal and all pending motions, and provided no further relief on possession or related claims.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas dismissed an appeal brought by Mitternight Boiler Works, Inc. after Mitternight filed a motion to dismiss under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appellate court granted the motion prior to issuing any decision on the merits and dismissed the appeal, denying as moot all other pending motions. The dismissal was entered by per curiam opinion and the court noted the procedural rule authorizing dismissal on the appellant's motion.

The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Mireyda and Joel Gonzalez’s suit against the City of Vidor. The Gonzalezes claimed the City was vicariously liable for a police officer’s negligent driving that led to a crash, arguing the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) waived immunity because the officer acted recklessly and failed to use his siren. The Court of Appeals held the emergency exception to the TTCA applied: the officer was responding to an emergency, his use of lights but not a siren was justified under statutory exceptions, and the record did not show conscious indifference or reckless disregard that would waive immunity. The City’s plea to the jurisdiction was properly granted.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Ronald Sutherland’s suit for want of prosecution. Sutherland had sued Thomas Dean Stewart and Phillip Chapman for falsely reporting a 1966 Ford Mustang stolen and sought sanctions and a default judgment against Stewart for discovery failures. The trial court dismissed the case after Sutherland failed to appear for trial. The appeals court held Sutherland did not challenge the dismissal itself, and interlocutory denials of sanctions or default judgments cannot be reviewed separately once a final dismissal stands, so the dismissal is dispositive.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District granted the parties' joint motion to reinstate and dismiss an appeal brought by Rene Martinez from an order enforcing a Rule 11 settlement. After the case was abated for mediation, the parties executed a mediated settlement agreement and asked the court to dismiss the appeal. The court reinstated the appeal and dismissed it by joint motion, ordering costs taxed against the party that incurred them and noting that no motion for rehearing will be entertained.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Jason Kelsey’s petition for a bill of review seeking to set aside an agreed final divorce decree that awarded most marital assets to Maria Rocha. Kelsey, who signed the decree while incarcerated and proceeded pro se, claimed fraud, duress, lack of a valid marriage, and mischaracterization of his separate property. The trial court found he failed to prove a meritorious defense or that he was prevented by fraud, official mistake, or wrongful act from presenting a defense, and that his own negligence contributed to the outcome. The appellate court held those findings were supported and reviewed for abuse of discretion, so the denial was affirmed.

The Court of Appeals (Thirteenth District) denied Randall Bolivar’s petition for a writ of mandamus challenging several trial-court actions in cause no. 2021-DCL-05478. Bolivar argued the trial court abused its discretion by not deeming requests for admission admitted, by failing to provide notice and hearings on six motions, and by not signing a nonsuit order. The court held that mandamus is extraordinary relief and that Bolivar failed to meet his burden to show both a clear abuse of discretion and lack of an adequate appellate remedy, and the record provided was insufficient to support mandamus relief.

The court granted a petition for writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its January 7, 2026 order that allowed a defendant to add four third-party defendants late in a long-running ownership and fraud dispute. The appellate court held the trial judge abused his discretion because adding new parties at that stage—after nearly five years of litigation and many prior trial settings—would unreasonably delay the case; the trial court’s ruling to vacate the March 23, 2026 setting was the primary harm. The court found the proposed third parties were not indispensable and that the delay was not reasonable under the case history.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default judgment entered against Access Dental Management, LLC (ADM) in favor of June’s Boutique, LLC. June attempted service on ADM by first trying the named agent at a Dallas address, then seeking substitute service via the Texas Secretary of State. The court held the record did not demonstrate ADM’s registered agent or registered address matched the Dallas address used for service, and the Secretary of State’s certificate did not establish the forwarding address required by statute. Because strict service requirements were not met, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction and the default judgment is void.

The court reversed a jury verdict awarding noneconomic and exemplary damages to Candace Williams after finding that her malpractice claim was based solely on the emotional harms of an unplanned pregnancy that arose from a doctor’s failure to perform a tubal ligation. Relying on the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Noe v. Velasco (2024), the court held that pregnancy-related noneconomic harms (including mental anguish from deciding to terminate) are not legally compensable because pregnancy is inseparable from bringing about a child’s life. Because Williams offered no other compensable damages, the judgment was reversed and judgment rendered that she take nothing.

The Second District Court of Appeals at Fort Worth dismissed Reginald Munoz’s appeal for failure to pay the required $205 filing fee after being warned twice under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court cited the appellant’s noncompliance with Rule 42.3(c) and related rules, and referenced the Texas Supreme Court’s 2015 fee order. The court ordered Munoz to pay all costs of the appeal and issued a per curiam memorandum opinion dismissing the case on April 23, 2026.

The court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment declaring valid and enforceable a 2018 contract conveying a 25% interest in income-producing property to two law firms (later assigned to HPGM, LLC). Price’s attempt to defeat summary judgment relied on untimely, stricken amended pleadings and did not respond with evidence to many no-evidence challenges to her originally pleaded claims and defenses. The court also upheld the award of approximately $300,000 in attorney’s fees to HPGM, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion given HPGM’s billing records and counsel’s testimony about rates, services, and the receivership and bankruptcy work that advanced the declaratory claim.

The court dismissed pro se appellant Isabelle Edwards’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Edwards sought review of the trial court’s August 5, 2025 order granting KFS Lewisville LLC’s motion to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a and awarding attorneys’ fees, but the trial court expressly stated the fee amount had not yet been determined and that its order was not final. The appellate court concluded the order neither finally disposed of every claim nor was an appealable interlocutory order, so the appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction after Edwards failed to respond to the court’s notice to show grounds to continue the appeal.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed Rae Neel’s suit against the City of Hurst for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Neel sued after tripping on an uneven section of public sidewalk and the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The appeals court held the sidewalk condition was not a “special defect” and, under the premises-defect standard, Neel’s own deposition showed she knew of the sidewalk’s condition before the fall, defeating her claim of lack of knowledge and preserving the City’s immunity.

The court considered Anthony Lopez’s appeal after the trial court granted summary judgment dismissing his dram-shop, respondeat superior assault, negligence, and gross-negligence claims against CBE Extreme Nightlife FW, LLC (Old School Texas). The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of Lopez’s negligence and gross-negligence claims because they were preempted by the Texas Dram Shop Act and affirmed dismissal of the respondeat superior assault claim because Lopez failed to challenge every ground supporting summary judgment. The court reversed summary judgment on the dram-shop claim, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence that Lopez’s extreme intoxication proximately caused his eye injury, and remanded for further proceedings.

The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of appellants’ motion to dissolve a temporary injunction. Highland Village Management (HVM) had obtained a temporary injunction preventing appellants from using or transferring funds or property allegedly taken from HVM. Appellants argued on appeal that HVM failed to prove irreparable injury and that newly revealed facts required dissolution. The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction to revisit the original injunction and found appellants presented no new evidence or changed circumstances at the dissolution hearings, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dissolve the injunction.