Court Filings

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a Bronx County judgment that had convicted Angel Rivas, upon a guilty plea, of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and sentenced him to five years probation. The court struck six specific probation conditions because they were not reasonably related to Rivas's rehabilitation or necessary to ensure he would lead a law-abiding life. The court reasoned there was no evidence supporting dependence-support, gang affiliation, substance abuse, mental-health treatment, or ignition-interlock requirements, and the People did not oppose removing several of the conditions.

The Superior Court affirmed most of the Berks County custody decision awarding Mother sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the parties’ five-year-old daughter, and awarding Father professionally supervised physical visitation. The court found credible evidence of Father’s history of violence, a validated child-protective-services report, criminal convictions, and allegations of drug-dealing that supported a present risk finding under the custody statute and justified safety restrictions. However, the court reversed a supplemental order (a gag order) that broadly prohibited public discussion about the case because the trial court did not make specific factual findings that Father’s posts had harmed or would imminently harm the child, so the speech restriction failed constitutional scrutiny.

The Appellate Division affirmed defendant Jonathan Sanchez’s convictions for second-degree murder, second-degree attempted murder, and three counts of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon, but reduced his sentence in the interest of justice. The court upheld a protective order that kept a witness’s identity from defendant until shortly before trial, rejected challenges to identification and jury-selection rulings (including a Batson claim), and found the evidence legally sufficient and not against the weight of the evidence. Because the aggregate sentence was excessive compared to codefendants and the defendant’s youth, the court reduced the attempted-murder sentence to a 15-year determinate term, producing a new aggregate of 40 years to life.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal reviewed Troy William Armstrong’s convictions for multiple counts of sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation. The State conceded that one count (Count II), charging sexual battery under section 794.011(2)(a) based on 'union' with the victim’s anus by the defendant’s mouth, required proof of penetration and there was no evidence of anal penetration. The court reversed Count II on that basis, affirmed the remaining convictions, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with that partial reversal.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reviewed a probation revocation and five-year prison sentence imposed on Carliovis Bandera-Valier. The court affirmed the finding that Bandera-Valier violated probation, concluding the earlier Faretta (self-representation) inquiry was adequate for the violation hearing. However, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court failed to renew the offer of counsel before sentencing as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(5). The court certified conflict with a Fifth District decision that treated similar error as harmless.

The Court of Appeals reviewed Deandre Brooks’s appeal after the trial court adjudicated him guilty of evading arrest in a motor vehicle, revoked his community supervision, and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief concluding the appeal is frivolous; Brooks did not file a pro se response. The appellate court conducted an independent review, found no reversible error, but identified a nonreversible clerical error in the judgment’s listed court costs. The court modified the judgment to reflect $404 in costs, affirmed the judgment as modified, and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw.

The First Department affirmed defendant Jamar Carr’s conviction following a guilty plea to fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon and three years of probation, but modified the sentence by striking several probation conditions. The court found Carr validly waived most appellate rights, which barred review of his excessive-sentence and many constitutional claims, but allowed review of a Second Amendment challenge and several statutory challenges to probation conditions. The court rejected the Second Amendment claim and upheld certain conditions as reasonably related to rehabilitation, while striking fees, drug testing/treatment conditions, and a gang-association restriction as unsupported by the record.

The Appellate Division reviewed a Family Court order that found a mother abused and neglected her child. The court unanimously vacated the abuse finding against the mother but affirmed the neglect finding. The court concluded the father, who lived with the family, inflicted excessive corporal punishment and sexual abuse, and the mother knew or should have known and failed to protect the child. The appellate court also upheld a neglect finding based on the mother's threat to the child with a knife, by conforming the pleadings to the proof, but found the evidence insufficient to support a finding that the mother committed abuse.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a lower-court order denying summary judgment to the landlord-defendants on their counterclaim for unpaid rent. The court held defendants were entitled to partial summary judgment that plaintiffs owe use-and-occupancy damages for the period October 2020 through March 2021, when plaintiffs returned to and lived in the apartment after elevator service was restored. The court otherwise affirmed the denial of summary judgment because disputed facts remain about defendants' alleged fraudulent inducement, whether plaintiffs were partially constructively evicted or unreasonably rejected alternative housing, and whether plaintiffs ratified the lease.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a Bronx Supreme Court order on a Labor Law § 241(6) claim. The court affirmed that plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment and defendants were not entitled to dismissal as to Industrial Code §§ 23-1.5(c)(3) and 23-9.2(a) because the grinder lacked a visible guard, the employer had notice, and the unguarded tool was necessary for the work. The court reversed as to Industrial Code § 23-1.5(c)(1), holding that provision is too vague to support liability under Labor Law § 241(6). The remainder of the lower court's order was affirmed.

The Appellate Division reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment about whether two individuals (Maloney and Stern) must indemnify plaintiffs under two paragraphs of limited joinders tied to a joint venture agreement (JVA). The court affirmed the lower court in holding that paragraph (ii) does not obligate Maloney and Stern to indemnify plaintiffs for first-party claims, but it vacated the declaration and denied summary judgment as to paragraph (i) because that paragraph is ambiguous about covering first-party claims. The court relied on Delaware law requiring a clear statement to extend indemnities to first-party claims and found disputed issues of contractual interpretation for paragraph (i).

The court considered Anthony Lopez’s appeal after the trial court granted summary judgment dismissing his dram-shop, respondeat superior assault, negligence, and gross-negligence claims against CBE Extreme Nightlife FW, LLC (Old School Texas). The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of Lopez’s negligence and gross-negligence claims because they were preempted by the Texas Dram Shop Act and affirmed dismissal of the respondeat superior assault claim because Lopez failed to challenge every ground supporting summary judgment. The court reversed summary judgment on the dram-shop claim, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence that Lopez’s extreme intoxication proximately caused his eye injury, and remanded for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division, Second Department modified the Supreme Court order by granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability in a personal-injury action where the plaintiff's electric bicycle collided with a vehicle while the driver attempted a left turn. The court concluded the driver was negligent as a matter of law for attempting the left turn when it could not be made with reasonable safety, and the defendants failed to raise a triable issue on liability. The court nevertheless affirmed the denial of the plaintiff's separate motion to dismiss the defendants' comparative negligence affirmative defense under CPLR 3211(b).

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded a final judgment for the property owner against Berman Construction arising from a fire that destroyed a home during renovation. The trial court had denied the contractor’s requested interrogatory asking whether the contractor was excused from performance under a contract risk-of-loss clause allocating certain perils to the owner. The appeals court held the denial was an abuse of discretion because the affirmative defense tied to section 15.9 was unresolved and the jury should have been able to decide whether the fire was caused by an owner-borne peril, such as arson or other events beyond the contractor’s reasonable control.

The court considered a mandamus petition from JPMorgan Chase challenging a trial court order that sanctioned Chase and held it in contempt for failing to comply with a trustee appointment order and a subpoena for trust records. The appellate court found the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Chase and that the subpoena was valid, but concluded the trial court abused its discretion in three respects: (1) imposing discovery sanctions against a non-party under rules that apply only to parties, (2) assessing a $750,000 criminal contempt fine that exceeded the $500 statutory cap, and (3) ordering contempt fines payable to the private trustee rather than to the court. The court partially granted mandamus, vacating the $6,700 and $750,000 awards and directing the trial court to modify the contempt fine to $500 payable to the court.

The court considered an appeal by the State and two state agencies seeking dismissal of claims by landlord 8317 Cross Park, LLC arising from a lease termination notice. The court held that the landlord’s breach-of-lease and declaratory-judgment claims against the State, Texas Facilities Commission (TFC), and Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) are barred by sovereign immunity and were dismissed. The court also dismissed the landlord’s ultra vires claim against HHSC deputy executive commissioner Rolland Niles. The court affirmed jurisdiction over and preserved the landlord’s ultra vires claim against TFC Executive Director Mike Novak for alleged violations of TFC regulations, and remanded for further proceedings on those surviving claims.

The Court of Appeals considered an appeal from a no-evidence summary judgment in a multi-vehicle pileup case. The trial court granted summary judgment for the truck driver Mark Richard and his employer Millwood Trucking. The court held it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal as to Richard because he died before the judgment and no estate representative was substituted, so the judgment as to him is void and must be vacated. The court nonetheless reviewed and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Millwood Trucking, concluding the plaintiffs produced no evidence of causation or damages against the employer.

The Court of Appeals granted the Department of Labor and Industries’ motion for reconsideration, withdrew its prior opinion, and issued a new published opinion. The court held that Cache Valley Electric violated WAC 296-45-255(7) by making expired rubber protective blankets available at a worksite, and therefore reinstated the Department’s citation and penalty for that item. The court also upheld the Board’s serious-violation finding and penalty assessment for an employee operating a chainsaw within the minimum approach distance of an energized line, concluding the Board did not abuse its discretion in weighing the high probability of harm given how close the chainsaw came to the line. The result: the judgment was reversed in part (vacated Board finding on blankets) and affirmed in part (chainsaw violation).

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed most of Calvin Sneed’s convictions for the 2017 fatal shooting of Gregory Jones but found merger and sentencing errors. The court rejected Sneed’s claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to two prosecutor remarks during closing argument, concluding those remarks were permissible inferences from the evidence and that objections would have been meritless. However, the court held that two firearm convictions (Counts 7 and 8) should have merged with Count 9, vacated those convictions and sentences, and remanded for correction of the sentence summary to reflect the proper 15-year term for Count 9.

The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed Alex Khalil Smith’s appeal of his 2022 convictions for malice murder and related offenses arising from the July 8, 2020 shooting death of Cassandra Arnold. The Court held that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the convictions—pointing to motive from a shorted drug deal, cell-phone location data placing Smith at the scene near the time of the shooting, incriminating phone calls, and gunshot-residue on clothing and a mask. However, the Court vacated and remanded the trial court’s denial of Smith’s motion for new trial because the trial court failed to exercise and state its discretion under Georgia’s general grounds for a new trial.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed in part and modified in part the trial court's summary judgment order in a suit by Muslim maintenance workers who refused to shave their beards to pass N-95 fit tests. The court upheld dismissal of plaintiffs' selective-enforcement discrimination claims because the hospital showed a neutral safety-based reason applicable to all Building Services staff. The court reversed to reinstate plaintiffs' claims (including Brian Jones) for failure to accommodate and failure to engage in a cooperative dialogue, finding genuine issues of fact about feasibility of accommodation and whether the hospital cut off interactive discussions.

The Appellate Division reviewed a Family Court disposition that adjudicated 17-year-old Jesus G. a juvenile delinquent after he admitted to taking a car and driving it a short distance before abandoning it. The court affirmed the delinquency finding and 15-month probation but vacated the $1,000 restitution award. The panel held the victim's statements were sufficient to establish replacement cost, but vacated restitution because the juvenile's written admission did not include an agreement to pay restitution and restitution was not sought in the charging document prior to disposition.

The Appellate Division, First Department reviewed an appeal by husband Jerome Dewald from a post-trial family court order that denied him spousal maintenance and awarded the wife $5,500 in counsel fees. The appellate court affirmed the denial of maintenance, finding the trial court permissibly deviated from statutory guidelines after considering factors such as the husband’s age, assets, prior fraud conviction, pendente lite payments, and the short time the parties lived together. However, the court vacated the counsel-fee award because the trial court failed to provide the written findings and reasons required by court rules before imposing such fees.

The Washington Court of Appeals reviewed Harlan Blackburn’s convictions for multiple counts of incest and child rape. The court held that police violated his state constitutional privacy rights by obtaining hotel and purchase data without a warrant, but that the admission of that evidence was harmless. It reversed one conviction (Count 8 for incest in the first degree) for insufficient evidence as to the specific dates charged, affirmed the other convictions, and remanded for resentencing on Counts 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 because the combined confinement and community custody terms exceeded statutory maximums. The court explained which testimony supported each upheld conviction and the basis for the sentencing remand.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals reviewed a default-judgment ruling in a bailment case where Mahadev Logistics claimed Columbus Truck & Equipment failed to safeguard and return a 2015 Volvo truck after it was stolen from the repair facility. The trial court found breach and awarded only $1,447.94 for increased repair costs, denying towing, storage, replacement-key, and lost-profit claims. The appellate court affirmed liability but reversed the damages ruling in part, finding insufficient evidence to support the trial court's limited calculation and remanding for a hearing to quantify repair- and towing-related damages while rejecting lost-profit and most storage claims.

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded after reviewing Brandon Johnson’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Johnson, convicted in 1995 of murder and related offenses, argued his petition showed actual innocence and satisfied the cause-and-prejudice standard for claims that police misconduct undermined identifications and that Brady violations occurred. The court found Johnson presented a colorable actual innocence claim and a colorable due-process claim based on evidence of a pattern and practice of detective misconduct that could have affected eyewitness identifications, so it reversed the denial and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed rejection of the Brady claim under controlling precedent.

The appellate court reviewed a dismissal under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure of negligence claims filed by Samantha Allumi on behalf of her son Chase after he fell from an inflatable slide at a school field day. The trial court dismissed the negligence claims against the school district, board, and the parent organization (SHSO) as immune under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. The appellate court affirmed dismissal as to negligence allegations that amounted to failures of supervision, but reversed as to specific pre-activity failures to guard or warn (including failure to provide safety equipment, notify parents, ensure medical clearance, and provide a safe slide) and remanded for further proceedings, including a determination whether the activity was a "hazardous recreational activity." The court also held SHSO qualifies as a local public entity under the Act.

The California Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of John Anthony Bertsch and Jeffery Lee Hronis for the 1985 murder, rape, and kidnapping of Linda Canady. The court affirmed the death sentence for Bertsch but reversed Hronis’s death sentence and remanded for further penalty-phase proceedings because Hronis was allowed to represent himself at penalty phase without the trial court applying current law assessing competency to self-represent. Both defendants’ convictions remain affirmed. The court also vacated any remaining unpaid balances of $10,000 restitution fines under the statutory 10-year enforcement limit and ordered amended abstracts of judgment.

The Ohio Court of Appeals reviewed a final divorce decree after the wife filed for annulment and the husband counterclaimed for divorce. The court reversed the trial court only to the extent it awarded $3,000 in attorney’s fees to the husband, and affirmed the remainder of the decree. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s finding that the wife engaged in financial misconduct — transferring and spending the husband’s premarital funds during the parties’ cohabitation — and approved a $58,827.40 distributive award to compensate the husband and an unequal allocation of marital debts reflecting the wife’s misconduct.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed part of a trial court order in a parenting-plan relocation case because the trial court granted permanent relocation relief after a hearing that had been noticed only for temporary relief. The appellant had requested both temporary and permanent relief, but the notice for the July 17, 2024 hearing specified only temporary relief. The appellate court held that granting permanent relief without proper notice violated due process. The court affirmed the temporary relief, reversed the permanent-relief portion, and remanded for a proper final hearing on permanent relocation.