Court Filings

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Dawon’s motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration in a construction-payment dispute. The parties had a detailed January 2024 service agreement that included a broad, surviving arbitration clause. In August 2024 they signed a short one-page follow-up agreement about cost handling and scheduling that did not address dispute resolution and did not supplant the original contract. The appellate court held the second agreement did not supersede the first, so the original arbitration clause remained enforceable and dismissal and arbitration were required.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s temporary injunction that had blocked the Texas Department of State Health Services from treating manufactured delta-8 THC products as Schedule I controlled substances. The Department and its commissioner had amended Schedule I definitions after objecting to a federal rule; the Court held those amendments were within the commissioner’s broad, statutorily granted discretion and did not conflict unambiguously with the 2019 Texas Farm Bill. The Court also held the Administrative Procedure Act did not govern publication of schedule changes, and that sovereign immunity bars the vendors’ claims.

The Texas Supreme Court held that when a party uses the pretrial affidavit process in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 18.001 to prove medical expenses, only those specific items or charges that are actually controverted by a compliant counteraffidavit lose the statute’s evidentiary effect. Unchallenged portions of an initial affidavit remain competent evidence and may be submitted to the factfinder. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded because the trial court erred by excluding entire medical-cost affidavits and counteraffidavits even though only portions were controverted, which deprived the claimant of admissible evidence of certain medical expenses.

The Fifth District reversed and remanded a Seminole County dissolution case because the trial court summarily denied the former husband’s timely motion to vacate a magistrate’s recommended order solely for not providing all trial transcripts. The appellate court held that the rule requires submission of a record or notice of a partial record but also contemplates substantial compliance and a mandatory hearing on a timely motion to vacate. Because the court cancelled the hearing and denied the motion without assessing substantial compliance or allowing the hearing, the denial was reversible error and the case is sent back for further proceedings.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the county court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant Eric Babcock in a defamation suit brought by neighbor and HOA board member Gregory Lattimer. The appellate court held that disputed factual issues remain about whether Babcock reasonably relied on unnamed government sources when he told HOA members that Lattimer threatened to shoot him and was under investigation for a hate crime. Because credibility and verification issues create jury questions under the current summary-judgment standard, the court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial-court order awarding attorney’s fees to Meagan Garmon in a post-dissolution proceeding and also reversed the denial of Jason Garmon’s rehearing request. The appeals court held that the record lacked competent, substantial evidence demonstrating Former Wife’s need for fee awards. Because the trial court’s finding of need was unsupported, the appellate court reversed the fee award, relying on Florida precedent requiring competent evidence of need before awarding attorney’s fees in family-law matters.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's denial of Dearek Randy Williams's motion to withdraw a nolo contendere plea to trafficking in fentanyl. Williams argued his plea was involuntary because trial counsel misadvised him that he could later appeal and "be out," which induced him to accept a mandatory 15-year sentence. The appellate court held that affirmative misadvice of counsel can create a manifest injustice rendering a plea involuntary, cited controlling precedent, and remanded the case for further proceedings on Williams's withdrawal motion.

The Sixth District reversed and remanded a trial-court final judgment awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to DidierGroup, LLC because that fee judgment was based on an underlying final judgment that this Court had already reversed in a prior opinion. The panel held that when the foundation judgment is reversed or vacated, any dependent award of fees and costs must likewise be reversed. The court remanded without prejudice to allow either party to seek attorneys’ fees after the trial proceedings conclude consistent with the mandate.

The Court of Appeals reversed a trial-court award of $14,525 in attorney fees to a third party, Yaarit Silverstone, in a garnishment proceeding. SMS Financial Recovery Services had appealed the fee award under OCGA § 9-15-14 after the trial court found SMS’s post-judgment motions and discovery were frivolous or for harassment. The appellate court held that OCGA § 9-15-14 authorizes fee awards only in "civil actions" and must be strictly construed; garnishment is a special statutory proceeding, not a civil action, so § 9-15-14 does not authorize fees in this context. Because of that legal conclusion, the court reversed the award and did not decide the other claimed errors.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss in a negligence suit filed by a mother on behalf of her burned six-year-old son against his teacher, another teacher/paraprofessional, the school nurse, the principal, and the Cobb County School District. The defendants moved to dismiss under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(1), asserting sovereign and official immunity and submitted affidavits. The trial court treated the motion as converted to summary judgment because affidavits were attached and delayed ruling on immunity. The appeals court held that attaching affidavits did not automatically convert a jurisdictional immunity motion into summary judgment and remanded for the trial court to consider the immunity defenses properly.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement and remanded for further proceedings. The trial court had announced a settlement at an on-the-record hearing in which it expressly stated it would retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement, but its subsequent journal entry omitted that retention of jurisdiction and did not incorporate the settlement terms. The appellate court held the journal entry did not reflect what occurred in open court and directed the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc entry conforming the record to the hearing so the court can enforce the settlement terms.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the First District and remanded the case. The court held that Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution (the state right-to-counsel clause) did not apply to Morris’s preindictment investigatory interview, because that provision applies to trials in court. The court also considered whether Morris invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the recorded interrogation after an initial waiver. It concluded Morris did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke his federal right to counsel at the relevant point, so suppression under the federal Constitution was not required.

The Superior Court reversed a Philadelphia County trial court order that had denied Juliett Barzilayeva and Eugene Zwick’s petition to set aside a sheriff’s sale of real property. The panel held that the restitution order imposed in Montgomery County remained a criminal sentencing matter under the sentencing court’s continuing jurisdiction and that the procedures in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728 vested the county clerk (not a private victim) with authority to transmit certified restitution judgments for docketing. Because the Philadelphia filing and resulting judgment were outside the authorized procedure and thus void ab initio, the court struck the Philadelphia judgment and reversed the denial of the petition to set aside the sale.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and held that the judicially created "positive steps" test cannot disqualify an unemployment benefits claimant for self-employment when the claimant has not actually performed services for wages. The case involved a claimant who, after leaving employment, formed a business entity, created a website, and spent money advertising but had not yet performed services or received earnings. The Court ruled that Section 4(l)(2)(B) of the Unemployment Compensation Law requires proof that services were performed for wages before applying the control and independence inquiry, so aspirational or preparatory acts alone cannot bar benefits.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's May 21, 2025 order and granted Mary Trump's motion to compel discovery from Donald Trump in a breach-of-settlement-agreement case. Mary Trump asserted an affirmative defense of fraudulent inducement based on alleged false asset valuations in a 2001 settlement agreement. The court held that because the requested materials relate to that affirmative defense they are discoverable under CPLR 3101(a), which requires liberal disclosure of matter material and necessary to prepare for trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the decision.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed defendant Mauro Vivar's conviction for attempted assault in the second degree, vacated his guilty plea, and remitted the case for further proceedings. The court found Vivar's appellate-waiver invalid because the trial court failed to explain appellate rights separately from rights lost by pleading guilty and relied only on defense counsel to confirm the written waiver. The court also held the suppression court should have granted Vivar's motion to suppress custodial statements to the arresting officer, and that that error was not harmless because the statements could have affected his decision to plead.

The Appellate Division, Third Department reversed a Supreme Court order and granted petitioner Junarian Walker's motion for counsel fees under CPLR 8601. Walker, an incarcerated person in a residential mental health unit, had a 120-day special housing sanction imposed after threats; Supreme Court annulled the sanction as violating the HALT Act and SHU Exclusion Law but denied fees, finding the state's position substantially justified and citing special circumstances. The appellate court held the state's position was not substantially justified and no special circumstances made a fee award unjust, so the case is remitted to determine the fee amount.

The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court and held that the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) must apply a deferential standard when reviewing the New York City Water Board’s rates for voluntary “excess water.” The court concluded that DEC should assess whether the Water Board’s excess-water rates serve the Board’s economic and public policy goals and have a rational basis, rather than applying the statutory “fair and reasonable” test used for entitlement water. The court granted DEC’s motion for summary judgment and modified the judgment accordingly.

The Appellate Division reversed Family Court's denial of a motion to vacate an order of protection entered by default against Jonathan U. The Family Court had removed respondent's counsel from the courtroom when Jonathan failed to appear for an in-person hearing and declined available alternatives (such as allowing a virtual appearance). The appellate court held that this conduct deprived respondent of the fundamental right to be heard, so the default order of protection was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of a plea to the jurisdiction and rendered judgment for county officials. Plaintiff Nelson sought mandamus and declaratory relief to force Polk County officials to assign 911 addresses and a street name for lots in his subdivision, claiming a statutory exemption from platting and that officials acted unlawfully. The appellate court held Nelson failed to plead or prove he submitted the required plat, exemption request, or addressing application (or that officials denied one), so he did not show officials failed to perform any ministerial duty. Because governmental immunity was not waived, the court dismissed his claims.

The Florida Supreme Court reversed a circuit court order that denied death-row inmate James Aren Duckett access to the underlying DNA testing data from a private laboratory. Duckett had obtained a court-ordered DNA test of a 1987 swab but sought the raw data so a qualified bioinformaticist could perform further statistical analysis (SNP/Y-SNP data). The Court held the statute and rule permitting postconviction DNA testing require production of the underlying data once testing is ordered and completed. The Court affirmed denial of Duckett’s public-records requests for the lab’s testing process and protocols and remanded for provision of the underlying data, with an evidentiary hearing if disputes over scope arise.

The Court of Appeal reversed two convictions and affirmed one from defendant Wayne Hansen Hsiung’s convictions arising from “open rescue” animal-rights protests at Sonoma County poultry farms. The court held the trial court erred by barring a mistake-of-law defense based on defendant’s good-faith (though mistaken) reliance on legal advice that a necessity justification made trespass lawful for rescuing or treating suffering animals; that defect required reversal of the conspiracy count and one trespass count and remand for further proceedings. The court rejected challenges to Penal Code section 31 and to section 602(o) and affirmed the remaining conviction.

The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and remanded the case of Robert Lopez, convicted in 2007 of murder and related offenses, for further proceedings under Penal Code section 1172.6 (Senate Bill 1437/775). The trial court had denied his resentencing petition after an evidentiary hearing; the Court of Appeal affirmed on the ground Lopez forfeited his instructional-ambiguity claim by not raising it on direct appeal. The Supreme Court held that section 1172.6 does not categorically bar petitions based on jury instruction ambiguity that may have permitted conviction by imputed malice, and ordered the appellate court to consider Lopez’s claims on the merits.

The Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s denial of pretrial release for Toni R. Kelly, who was charged with multiple methamphetamine delivery offenses. The trial court found Kelly dangerous and concluded no conditions could mitigate the threat. The appellate court held the lower court erred because the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that no combination of conditions (for example, inpatient treatment followed by GPS/home confinement) could mitigate any danger. The case is remanded for the trial court to determine appropriate conditions of release.

The Appellate Division reviewed consolidated appeals by Allstate and GEICO from interlocutory orders that allowed plaintiffs to pursue common-law bad faith and statutory Insurance Fair Conduct Act (IFCA) claims while their underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage disputes remained unresolved. Allstate's appeal was dismissed as moot after the UIM coverage dispute was resolved. As to GEICO, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by denying GEICO's request to sever and stay discovery on plaintiff Cirelli's bad faith and IFCA claims until the UIM coverage dispute was resolved, because proceeding with expansive bad-faith discovery prematurely would be inefficient and potentially prejudicial. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with that ruling.

The Appellate Division reversed part of a divorce judgment that enforced a 2015 postnuptial agreement and remitted the case for a hearing. The defendant had sought to set aside the agreement, alleging limited English, that his lawyer did not review the document and was later disbarred for fraud, and that he thought he was signing a business document. The appellate court found triable issues about whether the agreement was fair and about the circumstances of its execution, so the trial court's denial without a hearing could not stand and a new hearing is required to determine whether the postnuptial agreement should be set aside.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed the Supreme Court and granted defendant Joan Crema-Samalya's pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint against her. The plaintiff sued Crema-Samalya after property restoration work allegedly performed by Five Boro Fire Restoration was found deficient, asserting claims for violation of General Business Law § 349 and fraud. The appellate court held the complaint failed to plead any materially misleading consumer-oriented conduct under GBL § 349 and did not plead fraud with the required particularity, so dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) was appropriate.

The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability and to dismiss the defendants' comparative negligence defenses in a rear-end collision case. The plaintiff had asserted his vehicle was stopped for about 10 seconds at a red light when the defendants' vehicle struck him from behind. The court found that a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a presumption of negligence by the rear driver, and the defendants failed to present admissible evidence of a non-negligent explanation (such as an unanticipated brake failure), so the plaintiff met his prima facie burden.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment that had dismissed third-party claims for contractual indemnification asserted by the project owner and general contractor against Gabriel Steel Erectors. The underlying lawsuit arises from a 2018 workplace fall of an ironworker employed by Gabriel. The court found that the indemnity clause obligating Gabriel to indemnify for losses “to the fullest extent permitted by law” could permit partial indemnification and that triable issues exist about whether Gabriel had primary responsibility for the worker's safety. Thus the indemnification claims cannot be decided as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division reversed a medical-malpractice judgment for a child born extremely premature after concluding the trial court erred by allowing a neurologist to testify that the defendants' failure to diagnose and treat the mother's preterm labor caused the child's later autism. Applying New York's Frye standard, the court held the proffered causation theory rested on observational associations and speculative inference rather than generally accepted scientific principles linking prematurity or low birth weight to autism. Because that testimony was improperly admitted, the court ordered a new trial and dismissed the plaintiff's cross-appeal as academic.