Court Filings

The Appellate Division, Third Department granted Robin Plummer Keller's application to resign from the New York bar for nondisciplinary reasons under the court's attorney discipline rules. The court reviewed Keller's sworn affidavit and the Attorney Grievance Committee's response, found Keller eligible to resign for nondisciplinary reasons, accepted the resignation, struck his name from the roll of attorneys, enjoined him from practicing or holding himself out as an attorney in New York, and ordered surrender of any Attorney Secure Pass within 30 days.

The Appellate Division affirmed Family Court's July 2, 2024 order modifying custody and parenting time for a child born in 2011. Family Court awarded primary physical custody to the father, granted the grandparents limited monthly visitation plus additional holiday and summer time, and denied the mother's request to convert supervised parenting time to unsupervised time. The appellate court found the visitation schedule supported by the child's best interests given travel burdens and the child's anxiety, and upheld supervised parenting time because the mother had an inconsistent parenting history and was still on a high methadone dosage without other supports.

The Appellate Division, Third Department granted attorney John R. Gowell Jr.'s request to resign from the New York bar for nondisciplinary reasons. The court reviewed Gowell's sworn affidavit and the Attorney Grievance Committee's response, found him eligible under the applicable rule, and accepted his resignation. As a result, his name is stricken from the roll of attorneys, he is prohibited from practicing or holding himself out as an attorney in New York, and he must surrender any Attorney Secure Pass within 30 days. The AGC did not oppose the application.

The Appellate Division (Third Department) affirmed Family Court's March 12, 2025 order terminating the mother's parental rights after adjudicating the child permanently neglected. The child, born in 2019, has autism and developmental delays and has been in foster care since May 2023 following the mother's arrest for driving while intoxicated with the child. The court found the mother repeatedly failed to meaningfully engage in or complete substance abuse treatment, did not make significant progress toward reunification, and that termination — allowing adoption by foster parents who provided stable, therapeutic care — served the child's best interests.

The Appellate Division, Third Department granted attorney Jonathan R. Flora's application to resign from the New York bar for nondisciplinary reasons. The Court reviewed Flora's sworn affidavit and the Attorney Grievance Committee's statement that it did not oppose the application, found him eligible under the court's disciplinary rules, accepted the resignation, struck his name from the roll, and imposed the usual prohibitions against practicing or holding out as an attorney in New York. Flora must surrender any Attorney Secure Pass within 30 days.

The Appellate Division, Third Department granted attorney Jacob Timothy English’s application to resign from the New York bar for nondisciplinary reasons. The court reviewed English’s sworn affidavit and the Attorney Grievance Committee’s response, found him eligible under the court’s rules, accepted his nondisciplinary resignation, struck his name from the roll, and ordered that he cease practicing or holding himself out as an attorney in New York and surrender any Attorney Secure Pass within 30 days.

The Appellate Division, Third Department granted attorney Alan E. Davis's application to resign from the New York bar for nondisciplinary reasons. The court reviewed Davis's sworn affidavit and the Attorney Grievance Committee's response, found him eligible under the court rules, accepted his resignation, struck his name from the roll of attorneys, and directed that he cease practicing law in New York and surrender any Attorney Secure Pass within 30 days. The decision is administrative, not a disciplinary sanction.

The Appellate Division, Third Department granted Jennifer T. Conti-Bediner's application to resign from the New York bar for nondisciplinary reasons. The court reviewed her sworn affidavit and the Attorney Grievance Committee's statement that it did not oppose the resignation, determined she was eligible under the court rules, accepted her resignation, and struck her name from the roll of attorneys effective immediately. The court also enjoined her from practicing or holding herself out as an attorney in New York and ordered surrender of any Attorney Secure Pass within 30 days.

The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court and held that the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) must apply a deferential standard when reviewing the New York City Water Board’s rates for voluntary “excess water.” The court concluded that DEC should assess whether the Water Board’s excess-water rates serve the Board’s economic and public policy goals and have a rational basis, rather than applying the statutory “fair and reasonable” test used for entitlement water. The court granted DEC’s motion for summary judgment and modified the judgment accordingly.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed Family Court's March 15, 2023 order awarding the child's maternal grandmother sole legal and physical custody. The father appealed only arguing the judge abandoned neutrality and acted as an advocate for the grandmother. The appellate court found the issue unpreserved because the father did not raise it below, and in any event the record shows the judge's active questioning was appropriate to assist a pro se petitioner and to elicit relevant information. The court concluded there was no judicial bias and affirmed the custody order.

The Appellate Division reversed Family Court's denial of a motion to vacate an order of protection entered by default against Jonathan U. The Family Court had removed respondent's counsel from the courtroom when Jonathan failed to appear for an in-person hearing and declined available alternatives (such as allowing a virtual appearance). The appellate court held that this conduct deprived respondent of the fundamental right to be heard, so the default order of protection was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed Supreme Court's denial of Gravity Ciders, Inc.'s pre-note-of-issue motions for summary judgment on three counterclaims. Gravity had asked the court to declare unenforceable a contract provision awarding Copeland Holdings a 5% ownership interest (plus another 5%) and to win on a conversion/replevin claim over a corporate book. The court found genuine factual disputes and legal issues (including whether Alcoholic Beverage Control Law provisions render the ownership-transfer clause void) that precluded summary judgment, and held return of the corporate book while the motion was pending defeated replevin but left conversion contested.

The Appellate Division, Third Department reversed part of a Court of Claims judgment and held that the State can be liable for the alleged rectal intrusion by correction officers. Claimant had been allowed to file a late claim for assault and battery but the Court of Claims declined to consider sexualized conduct under the law of the case. This Court found that the law of the case did not bind it and that the alleged rectal intrusion was sufficiently connected to officers' duties to survive the late‑claim screening and to support vicarious liability. The case is remitted for recalculation of damages.

The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed part of a Supreme Court order that had denied a nursing assistant's motion to compel two internal incident reports (RL6 forms) and granted the hospital a protective order. The plaintiff sued for wrongful termination and retaliation after reporting safety concerns. The court held the hospital failed to carry its burden to show the reports were privileged under New York Education Law § 6527(3) or the federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, because there was no proof the reports were actually part of a medical peer‑review or submitted to a patient safety organization. The case was otherwise affirmed.

The Appellate Division reversed part of a divorce judgment that enforced a 2015 postnuptial agreement and remitted the case for a hearing. The defendant had sought to set aside the agreement, alleging limited English, that his lawyer did not review the document and was later disbarred for fraud, and that he thought he was signing a business document. The appellate court found triable issues about whether the agreement was fair and about the circumstances of its execution, so the trial court's denial without a hearing could not stand and a new hearing is required to determine whether the postnuptial agreement should be set aside.

The Appellate Division reviewed a nonjury trial judgment in a contract and related action arising from the 2016 sale of a gas station business. The court modified the trial judgment to declare that plaintiff Yong Xu does not own an interest in defendant 401 Foster Gasoline, Inc., and awarded Xu $60,625.63 on his conversion claim against co-defendant Xiao Yan Wang for withdrawing funds from a joint bank account. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The court relied on the asset purchase agreement's clear written terms and the parol evidence rule to reject oral-contract and fraud claims, but found evidence supported Xu's conversion claim against Wang as to funds taken beyond her one-half share of the joint account.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed the Supreme Court and granted defendant Joan Crema-Samalya's pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint against her. The plaintiff sued Crema-Samalya after property restoration work allegedly performed by Five Boro Fire Restoration was found deficient, asserting claims for violation of General Business Law § 349 and fraud. The appellate court held the complaint failed to plead any materially misleading consumer-oriented conduct under GBL § 349 and did not plead fraud with the required particularity, so dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) was appropriate.

The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability and to dismiss the defendants' comparative negligence defenses in a rear-end collision case. The plaintiff had asserted his vehicle was stopped for about 10 seconds at a red light when the defendants' vehicle struck him from behind. The court found that a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a presumption of negligence by the rear driver, and the defendants failed to present admissible evidence of a non-negligent explanation (such as an unanticipated brake failure), so the plaintiff met his prima facie burden.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment that had dismissed third-party claims for contractual indemnification asserted by the project owner and general contractor against Gabriel Steel Erectors. The underlying lawsuit arises from a 2018 workplace fall of an ironworker employed by Gabriel. The court found that the indemnity clause obligating Gabriel to indemnify for losses “to the fullest extent permitted by law” could permit partial indemnification and that triable issues exist about whether Gabriel had primary responsibility for the worker's safety. Thus the indemnification claims cannot be decided as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division reversed a medical-malpractice judgment for a child born extremely premature after concluding the trial court erred by allowing a neurologist to testify that the defendants' failure to diagnose and treat the mother's preterm labor caused the child's later autism. Applying New York's Frye standard, the court held the proffered causation theory rested on observational associations and speculative inference rather than generally accepted scientific principles linking prematurity or low birth weight to autism. Because that testimony was improperly admitted, the court ordered a new trial and dismissed the plaintiff's cross-appeal as academic.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claims for specific performance, fraud, and tortious interference and denied the plaintiff's summary judgment motions. The court found that the seller (Gholis) showed it was ready, willing, and able to close by producing a title policy and that the buyer (Scott Randolph, LLC) defaulted by failing to appear at the time-of-the-essence closing, so Gholis may retain the down payment. The court also found Bushwack and Stellberger entitled to dismissal of the fraud and interference claims because key events occurred after the plaintiff sought to terminate the contract.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and granted Drexel University's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff's personal injury claim against Drexel. The plaintiff was injured at his employer's workplace when equipment fell from a forklift operated by two Drexel students participating in Drexel's cooperative education program. The court held Drexel did not exercise sufficient control over the students' work or conduct to be vicariously liable as an employer or principal, and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact to the contrary.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court's dismissal of Rosario's wrongful-death, fraud, and civil-conspiracy claims against the Town and Village of Mount Kisco. The plaintiff alleged the municipality failed to enforce housing regulations after her adult son died in a basement fire in an illegally converted apartment. The court held the complaint did not plead a special relationship between the municipality and decedent, did not identify a private right of action under the cited statutes, and failed to allege facts showing voluntary assumption of duty, affirmative control, justifiable reliance, or municipal participation in fraud or a conspiracy.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court judgment that had granted summary judgment to Remede Consulting Group on damages against employee-defendant Jason Pitter for misuse of a corporate credit card. The court affirmed that Remede proved Pitter's liability on breach of contract, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty because Pitter had received the corporate card policy, acknowledged it, and used the card for personal expenses without raising a triable issue of authorization. However, the appellate court held the plaintiff did not establish a precise, uncontested sum owed, so summary judgment on damages awarding $135,246.77 was denied and the judgment was reversed on that point.

The Appellate Division affirmed a Supreme Court order granting summary judgment to Lakeview Auto Sales and Service, Inc., and to Herold Motor Cars, Inc. and John C. Herold, and denying RJK Auto Brokers' cross-motion. RJK had purchased nine vehicles from Dream Carz, which never obtained title; RJK then paid Herold Motor to obtain title to eight sold vehicles. The court held the moving defendants showed they had no contract or fraudulent conduct with RJK and that Dream Carz was not an entrustee or a merchant able to pass good title. RJK failed to raise triable issues of fact to avoid dismissal.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's personal-injury claims against homeowner Kim Eichle and certain claims against third-party defendant Joseph Russo. The plaintiff alleged the infant was injured after being punched outside a New Year's Eve party at Eichle's home and asserted causes of action under New York's Dram Shop statutes and premises liability. The court held Eichle showed she neither served visibly intoxicated guests nor furnished alcohol to minors, and that the infant could not identify whether an icy sidewalk caused his fall, so the plaintiff failed to raise triable issues of fact.

The Appellate Division (Second Department) reviewed the People’s appeal from a Supreme Court order that, after a hearing and reargument, vacated Omarny Williams’s 2017 guilty plea judgment and set aside his sentence. The appellate court reversed the grant to vacate the plea because the plea record showed Williams told the court he was a U.S. citizen, and thus the court’s failure to warn about immigration consequences could be reviewed on direct appeal and was untimely raised. The court affirmed that the sentence must be set aside because the sentencing court failed to properly determine Williams’s eligibility for youthful offender treatment and remitted the case for resentencing.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Kings County Supreme Court judgment adjudicating the defendant a youthful offender after he pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal possession of a weapon and imposing sentence. The defendant argued that the youthful-offender adjudication violated his Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but the appellate court found those constitutional claims unpreserved for review and declined to decide them in the interest of justice. Consequently, the lower court's judgment was affirmed without addressing the merits of the constitutional challenges.

The Appellate Division reviewed a County Court order that had designated Joshua Stewart a level three sexually violent offender under New York's Sex Offender Registration Act after his New Jersey conviction for promoting child prostitution. The court upheld the risk-point scoring and refused a downward departure, finding the Guidelines had adequately considered mitigating factors. However, the panel held that applying Correction Law § 168-a(3)(b) to label him a "sexually violent offender" was unconstitutional as applied because the underlying New Jersey offense would not qualify as a sexually violent offense under New York law. The court therefore modified the designation to "level three sex offender" and affirmed as modified.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed defendant Jaquan Oden’s conviction for disorderly conduct under Penal Law § 240.20(3) after a jury trial. Oden was acquitted of a separate disorderly conduct count under § 240.20(6) that alleged failure to disperse. The court rejected arguments that the conviction was legally insufficient or against the weight of the evidence because the disputed dispersal order was an element only of the acquitted charge, not the conviction. The court also found defense counsel effective and upheld the denial of a mistrial, concluding the prosecutor’s improper remark was cured by immediate instructions to the jury.