Court Filings

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas dismissed Katherine Wesley King’s appeal from a Denton County default judgment because she failed to file her appellate brief. The appellant’s brief was due March 9, 2026; the court notified her on March 16 that the appeal could be dismissed if no brief arrived by March 26, 2026. King did not file a brief or otherwise communicate with the court, so the panel dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Tyler Hernandez's appeal from a trial court's Final Decree of Divorce for want of prosecution. The clerk's record was due but not filed because Hernandez failed to arrange payment; the court directed him to pay by a deadline and warned the appeal would be dismissed if he did not. He failed to comply or to elect filing an appendix instead, so the appellate court dismissed the appeal under the appellate rules permitting dismissal for failure to prosecute.

The court issued a memorandum order in an appeal from a trial court’s termination of J.H.’s parental rights to R.D. because the court reporter failed to file the reporter’s record by the due date. Noting lack of communication from the reporter, the appellate court abated the appeal and remanded to the trial court to determine what remains to complete the record, why it is incomplete, how much time is needed, and whether a substitute reporter is required. The trial court must enter orders, include findings in a supplemental clerk’s record, and file that record by April 23, 2026, unless the reporter files the record first.

The court affirmed the trial court’s revocation of Edward Bobby Martinez’s community supervision for indecency with a child by sexual contact and the imposition of his ten-year sentence, but it modified the judgment and bill of costs to remove language permitting future assessment of court-appointed attorney’s fees. The court held that Martinez’s refusal to submit to an instant-offense polygraph—required by his sex-offender treatment—constituted a violation of supervision because his Fifth Amendment privilege no longer applied to the final, adjudicated offense. Because Martinez has been found indigent, the court deleted any prospective attorney-fee assessment.

The City of Edinburg filed a petition for writ of mandamus claiming the trial court abused its discretion by freezing discovery deadlines. The city later moved to withdraw the petition because the parties reached an agreement about the disputed discovery, rendering the mandamus request moot. The court treated the withdrawal as a motion to dismiss, found the matter moot under controlling authority, and dismissed the petition for writ of mandamus.

The court denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Anderson & Associates, PLLC seeking to overturn a trial court order of December 5, 2025 that redistributed an attorney fee award. The court explained mandamus requires showing both that the trial court abused its discretion and that there is no adequate remedy by appeal, or that the order is void. The court concluded the relator has an adequate remedy by appeal, withdrew its prior order requesting responses from the real parties in interest, and denied the petition and emergency relief.

The First District Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court’s final decree terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to four minor children. The parents argued lack of jurisdiction due to timing and challenged the sufficiency of evidence on reasonable efforts, predicate grounds, and best interest. The appellate court held the earlier trial commencement was not a sham, so jurisdiction was proper. The court found clear-and-convincing evidence that both parents engaged in conduct and allowed conditions that endangered the children (Family Code §161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)) and that termination served the children’s best interests given parental substance abuse, violence, instability, probation violations, incarceration, and the children’s special needs.

The Court dismissed William Berry Waters III’s appeal because the notice of appeal was filed on his behalf by a non-lawyer and Waters failed to cure the deficiency by filing a signed amended notice after being notified. Texas law prohibits non-lawyers from representing others or preparing pleadings, and a notice of appeal filed in a representative capacity by a non-attorney is ineffective. The clerk repeatedly asked Waters to file a signed amended notice but he did not do so, so the court dismissed the appeal under its procedural rule allowing dismissal for failure to comply with rules or clerk notices.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals reversed the county court’s no-evidence summary judgment that had dismissed Samantha Lopez’s claim that she and Felix Lengyel were informally married. Lopez alleged an informal marriage based on an agreement to be married, living together, and holding themselves out as married. The appeals court found Lopez presented more than a minimal amount of evidence on (1) an agreement to be married (her deposition and hearing testimony that they agreed to represent themselves as married to permit travel to Canada) and (2) holding out (testimony that family, housekeepers, and others treated them as married and that they represented to the Canadian government they were married). The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Court dismissed Practical Technology, Inc.'s interlocutory appeal because the notice of appeal and appellant's brief were signed only by a person who is not a licensed attorney. The same non-attorney had previously filed a mandamus petition in this Court and the Court had dismissed that petition for lack of an attorney appearance. The Court gave Practical Technology time to respond to the appellee's motion to dismiss and rejected a late-filed extension because it was submitted by the same non-attorney. Because no licensed attorney ever appeared and no cure was shown, the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution.

A jury convicted Jordan Stephens of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated after police stopped his truck following a citizen’s 911 call reporting erratic driving. Officers observed signs of intoxication (odor of alcohol, glassy eyes), found empty alcohol bottles in the vehicle, and administered standardized field sobriety tests on which Stephens performed poorly. Stephens argued on appeal that errors in test administration and other explanations could account for observations, but the court found the combined evidence — eyewitness report of dangerous driving, officer observations, test performance, admissions about drinking, and refusal of blood testing — sufficient to support the conviction and affirmed.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals, in an original mandamus proceeding arising from Travis County, denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. The court issued a brief memorandum opinion concluding the petitioner was not entitled to the extraordinary relief sought and cited the appellate rule governing disposition. No further explanation or relief was provided in the opinion, and the denial resolves the petition without granting any mandamus relief.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied Sonny Delgado's petition for a writ of mandamus and dismissed his emergency motion for temporary relief as moot. The court issued a brief memorandum opinion stating only the disposition and citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. No substantive opinion or reasoning was provided in the document beyond the procedural rulings and the filing date.

The Court of Appeals of the Eighth District of Texas affirmed a trial court judgment that terminated the father's parental rights to his child, J.K.C. After a bench trial the trial court found termination was in the child's best interest and that the Department of Family and Protective Services proved grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (N). Appellate counsel reviewed the record under Anders procedures and the court conducted an independent review, finding no non-frivolous issues to support reversal. The court also denied counsel's motion to withdraw, preserving the father's right to appointed counsel through further review.

The Court of Appeals of the Eighth District of Texas denied Ruben Dario Almela's petition for a writ of mandamus. Almela filed the petition on April 6, 2026 seeking extraordinary relief, but the court concluded he failed to demonstrate entitlement to that relief. The court therefore denied the petition and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The opinion is brief and affirms the denial without issuing further instructions or relief.

The Texas Second Court of Appeals considered Miceala Hurtado’s original mandamus petition seeking extraordinary relief from an order of the 325th District Court of Tarrant County. After review, the appellate court concluded mandamus relief was not warranted and denied the petition in a brief per curiam memorandum opinion. No extended reasoning or factual discussion appears in the opinion; the court simply states it considered the petition and determined relief should be denied.

The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the Texas Department of Public Safety lawfully terminated Texas Ranger Robert Christopher Callaway after an incident at his daughter’s high school in which he threatened counselors and other officers while carrying his badge, handcuffs, and a firearm. Callaway claimed his conduct was caused by PTSD and sued for disability discrimination under the Texas Labor Code. The Court held that Section 21.105 excludes from Chapter 21 protection disabilities that impair an individual’s ability to reasonably perform the job, and concluded Callaway’s PTSD objectively impaired his ability to perform DPS duties, so his discrimination claim fails as a matter of law.

The Texas Supreme Court decided that a 1984 pole-attachment contract between Spectrum (successor) and CPS Energy incorporates later-enacted statutory limits on pole-attachment rates. The Court held the agreement’s clear promise to “at all times observe and comply with . . . all laws” and that the contract is “subject to” such laws means legislative changes affecting the parties’ rights and obligations become enforceable under the contract. Because CPS charged and collected higher rates from Spectrum while collecting less from AT&T, Spectrum may pursue its breach-of-contract claim alleging violations of the Public Utility Regulatory Act. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded to the trial court.

The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus relief directing the trial court to vacate its new-trial order and enter judgment on an 11–1 defense verdict in a medical-negligence suit. After a jury found Dr. Lapuerta not liable for Jose Torres’s eventual ray amputation, the trial court granted a new trial based on perceived error in a “loss of chance” jury instruction and possible juror confusion. The Supreme Court held the trial court misapplied controlling Texas law about loss-of-chance instructions, noted an improper juror letter that could have influenced the result, and concluded the record did not show the instruction probably caused an improper judgment.

The Texas Supreme Court denied a mandamus petition challenging a trial court order that disqualified defendants’ counsel because a legal assistant who formerly worked for the plaintiffs later worked on the same case for the defendants’ firm without having been instructed to avoid the matter. The Court reaffirmed a longstanding bright-line rule that side-switching nonlawyers must be admonished not to work on matters from their prior employment before they commence work on a later-arising conflict, and that institutional screening measures must also be shown. The Court held the plaintiffs timely sought disqualification and that the absence of the required admonition justified disqualification.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated summary judgment for H-E-B in a slip-and-fall premises-liability case. The plaintiff slipped on a clear liquid puddle in a grocery aisle and sued H-E-B, alleging the store knew or should have known of the hazard. The Court held that to raise a fact issue on constructive notice a plaintiff must present some evidence about how long the dangerous condition existed at the time and place of injury. Because the record lacked any evidence on the puddle’s duration, H-E-B could not be charged with constructive knowledge and summary judgment was proper.

The Texas Supreme Court resolved a dispute over how to value a nonparticipating royalty reserved in a 1960 deed. The court held the deed’s phrase “produced from the above described acreage” fixes the valuation point at the wellhead, and the phrase “free of cost forever” refers only to exemption from exploration and production costs. Because the deed lacks language shifting valuation to processed, downstream sales or expressly adding postproduction costs to the royalty base, postproduction costs may be deducted from downstream proceeds to determine the value of the raw minerals at the well. The court reversed the court of appeals and rendered partial summary judgment for the operator, remanding for further proceedings consistent with that interpretation.

Justice Young filed a short opinion respecting the Court’s denial of rehearing in a petition for review concerning the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA). He explains that the Court has rarely authoritatively construed TUFTA and that many lower and federal courts have had to make independent interpretations. Justice Young concluded this particular case is a poor vehicle to resolve the broader statutory question—whether terminating a contract right to future payments can be a fraudulent transfer—because the record is highly fact-specific. For those reasons the Court denied rehearing and declined to take the case for further guidance on TUFTA.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for ISI Contracting, Inc. in Robert Huber’s trespass suit arising from a TxDOT highway project adjacent to Huber’s restaurant. ISI had claimed immunity under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 97.002, arguing it complied with contract documents. The appellate court held ISI failed to conclusively prove every statutory element: Huber sought loss-of-use and lost-profit damages not barred by the statute, some alleged harms arose from ISI’s activities rather than a contract-related condition or defect, and ISI did not conclusively show compliance with contract documents material to any alleged condition or defect. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals of the Ninth District of Texas affirmed a county court’s final eviction judgment for landlord Matthew Twombly against pro se tenant Marcus Thirstrup. Thirstrup appealed the denial of his emergency motion for continuance filed the day of trial, claiming a medical inability to appear. The appellate court found the notice of appeal timely and held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely motion because Thirstrup knew of his condition days earlier, failed to timely seek relief, did not contact the court, and did not appear at trial. A due-process challenge to the docket control order was not preserved for appeal.

The Court of Appeals reversed and rendered judgment for AZZ, Inc. in a breach-of-contract case. Southeast Texas Industries (STI) sued multiple AZZ entities for defective galvanizing and obtained a jury verdict and judgment against AZZ, Inc. for $4,539,468.25 plus fees and interest. On appeal AZZ, Inc. argued there was no evidence it was the entity that contracted with STI. The court held the evidence was legally insufficient to show AZZ, Inc. (rather than the Beaumont galvanizing entity) agreed to galvanize the pipe, so the verdict against AZZ, Inc. could not stand and STI takes nothing from AZZ, Inc.

The Tenth Court of Appeals dismissed Thomas Dione Moore's petition seeking mandamus relief because the challenged district court (the 20th District Court of Milam County) lies outside the geographic jurisdiction of the Tenth Court. The court explained it lacks writ jurisdiction to issue mandamus against a court located in a different appellate district under the cited statutory provisions, and therefore the petition cannot proceed in this court. The opinion was delivered April 9, 2026.

The Court of Appeals (Tenth Appellate District of Texas) received Thomas Blanchard's March 2, 2026 filing titled a petition for writ of habeas corpus but construed it as a petition for a writ of mandamus because of the relief sought. The court considered the filing and denied the petition. The opinion is a short memorandum with the Chief Justice delivering the opinion and the denial issued on April 9, 2026.

The Tenth Appellate District of Texas dismissed Louis Benjamin Vargas's appeal from a municipal court judge's denial of a habeas corpus petition because the court lacked jurisdiction. Vargas had pleaded no contest to a speeding complaint, paid the fine and costs, and filed his appeal in this appellate court instead of the statutorily required county court at law. The Court explained that appellate review of municipal court judgments lies in the county court at law unless the fine exceeds $100 and the county court affirms or the sole issue is the constitutionality of the statute, neither of which applied here.

The Tenth Appellate District of Texas reversed the trial court’s denial of Joseph Blair Brooks’ habeas corpus application seeking release under article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Brooks had been jailed more than 90 days awaiting trial on an indictment for solicitation of capital murder. The Court held article 17.151 mandates release—either by personal recognizance or by reducing bail to an amount the record shows the defendant can afford—when the statute’s prerequisites are met, and that the trial court abused its discretion by denying relief even though Brooks previously had a bail reduction and did not post bond.