Court Filings

The First District of Texas dismissed Ashlee Walker's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 for failure to prosecute after she did not file an appellate brief or respond to the court's notice and directive to file a brief and motion for extension. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring briefs and authorizing dismissal for failure to comply, and it also dismissed any pending motions as moot. The dismissal was issued as a memorandum opinion by a three-justice panel on April 16, 2026.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Angel Fuentes's appeal from a County Civil Court at Law in Harris County because the appellant failed to file a brief by the deadline, did not seek an extension, and did not respond to the court's notice that the brief was overdue. The court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and treated any outstanding motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a ruling on the merits of the underlying case.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal by Affordable Ready Mix.com and Grace Raven because they failed to establish indigence or pay the required appellate filing fee, and they did not respond to the Court's notice directing them to either pay or explain why they should not. The court cited Texas appellate rules and statutory fee provisions, concluded appellants did not comply with the Court's directive, and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court also dismissed any pending motions as moot.

The Fifteenth Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by With Strength We Lead 2018, LLC for want of prosecution because the appellant failed to file or pay for the clerk's record. The court notified appellant of intent to dismiss and granted a 30-day extension to arrange payment and file the record, warning that failure to do so by April 2, 2026 would result in dismissal. Because no clerk's record was filed and no proof of payment was shown, the court dismissed the appeal.

The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of U.S. Bank’s motion for new trial and upheld the default judgment in favor of Business Unlimited. Business Unlimited sued to quiet title after a lien sale and obtained a default judgment when U.S. Bank failed to answer. U.S. Bank sought a new trial under the three-part Craddock standard for setting aside defaults, claiming an administrative mistake and asserting meritorious defenses. The appellate court found U.S. Bank proved mistake but failed to adequately set up factual support for meritorious defenses, so the Craddock test was not satisfied and the denial of a new trial was not an abuse of discretion.

The court affirmed the trial court’s default judgment against U.S. Bank (USB) in a quiet-title action because USB failed to prove entitlement to a new trial under the Craddock standard. USB was served but did not answer, a default judgment was entered, and USB later sought a new trial supported by a late affidavit from a bank vice president. The court held the affidavit was conclusory and lacked personal knowledge about the registered agent’s handling of service, so USB did not show its failure to answer was an accident rather than intentional or due to conscious indifference.

The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) dismissed Tonia Lynn Edwards’s appeal for failure to pay the required $205 filing fee after giving notice under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court cited its prior notices (March 3 and March 18, 2026), the appellant’s noncompliance with procedural rules and a Texas Supreme Court fee order, and dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(c) and 43.2(f). The opinion also orders the appellant to pay all appellate costs.

The court reversed a trial-court order that denied the employer’s motion to compel arbitration and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration and stay the case. Josh Adams sued his former employer, The Bridge Strategy & Technology Consulting, LLC, for unpaid cash and phantom-stock commissions. Bridge moved to compel arbitration under an employment agreement clause that referenced wage-related statutes and the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court of Appeals held the arbitration clause was governed by the federal act, that the phrase “wages” reasonably includes commissions, and that the clause’s broad “arising from/relating to” language covers Adams’s claims.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment for attorneys Leslie Hyman and Pullman, Cappuccio & Pullen, LLP in Susan Harriman’s legal-malpractice suit. Harriman sued claiming the lawyers mishandled a 2017 hearing to unseal certain sealed court records and that their actions forced her into an unfavorable settlement in an underlying defamation case. The appellees moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment arguing Harriman offered no proof that their conduct proximately caused her damages. The appellate court held Harriman produced only speculation and no more than a scintilla of evidence on proximate cause, so summary judgment was proper.

The Second Court of Appeals at Fort Worth dismissed Sergio Guadal Maresmartinez’s appeal of his convictions for two counts of sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child because his notice of appeal was untimely. His sentence was imposed June 29, 2023, and without a motion for new trial his notice of appeal was due July 31, 2023. He filed his notice on February 27, 2026. The court concluded that timely filing of a notice of appeal is essential to its jurisdiction and that Maresmartinez’s response did not show any grounds for continuing the appeal or authorization for an out-of-time appeal.

The court dismissed Ross Thomas Brantley’s pro se appeal for lack of jurisdiction because there was no signed trial-court order denying his statutory request for postconviction DNA testing (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 64.01). The appellate court gave Brantley ten days to show grounds to continue the appeal but received no response. Citing its rules and prior precedent, the court concluded there was no appealable order and therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) affirmed Reginald Dewayne Taylor’s conviction for possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine (4–200 grams) and the jury’s punishment verdict of 35 years’ imprisonment. The court rejected Taylor’s three appellate challenges: (1) the trial court properly denied his motions to suppress because the search-warrant affidavits and reasonable inferences supplied a substantial basis for probable cause to search two residences and vehicles; (2) Instagram records were properly authenticated through a records certificate and corroborating testimony and circumstances; and (3) including a limiting instruction listing all permissible Rule 404(b) purposes was not reversible error and in any event benefited Taylor. The court affirmed the judgment.

The court reviewed an appeal by Oliver Perry Harris from the trial court’s revocation of his deferred adjudication and seven-year sentence after the court found a supervision violation true. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief concluding the appeal was frivolous. After its independent review, the appellate court found no arguable grounds for reversal but identified an unsupported $1,743.00 reparations assessment in the written judgment and related inmate trust withdrawal order. The court deleted that reparations assessment from the judgment and the withdrawal order, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the judgment as modified.

The Second Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court’s adjudication of guilt and three-year prison sentence for Joey Sullivan. Sullivan had been placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision after pleading guilty to evading arrest with a vehicle. The State later petitioned to adjudicate, alleging Sullivan fled from a peace officer; after a hearing the trial court found the violation true, adjudicated guilt, and imposed sentence. Sullivan’s appointed appellate attorneys concluded the appeal was frivolous, submitted an Anders brief, and the court agreed there were no arguable grounds for relief.

The Second Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed a juvenile court's order committing D.A. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department after a modification hearing. D.A. had admitted to delinquent conduct, was placed on probation, then repeatedly absconded and violated probation terms; the juvenile court found she violated lawful orders and made the required findings to commit her. On appeal she argued the trial court refused to consider the full range of dispositions by denying a psychological evaluation and prejudging the case. The appellate court found no preserved due-process complaint about the evaluation and no evidence the court predetermined disposition, so it affirmed.

The Second Court of Appeals for Texas dismissed Father's accelerated appeal from a January 6, 2026 final order in a suit affecting the parent–child relationship because Father failed to file his appellate brief by the March 3, 2026 deadline and did not respond to the court's March 16, 2026 notice. The court gave Father until March 26, 2026 to file a brief and a motion explaining the delay but received no response. Citing Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure allowing dismissal for want of prosecution, the court dismissed the appeal on April 16, 2026.

The court affirmed a district court’s post-answer default order in a suit affecting the parent–child relationship, except it removed the portion changing the child’s last name. The mother sought sole managing conservatorship and child support; the father filed an answer but did not appear at trial. The trial court granted sole managing conservatorship and child support and ordered a name change. On appeal the father argued lack of notice, due process violations, recusal error, venue and evidentiary complaints. The appellate court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief, but the name change was unauthorized because no petition sought it, so that part was deleted and the order was otherwise affirmed.

The Court of Appeals of the Second Appellate District of Texas affirmed a trial court order terminating Father’s parental rights to A.S. after a bench trial. Mother had petitioned to terminate, alleging Father failed to support the child and that termination was in the child’s best interest. The appellate court found legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Father failed to provide support in accordance with his ability during the relevant twelve-month period and that termination was in A.S.’s best interest, noting the child’s distress over visits, the child’s improved well-being since visits stopped, and Father’s financial choices and reliance on his fiancée to pay household expenses.

The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment committing Edward Lincoln Goff as a sexually violent predator under the Texas SVP Act. On appeal Goff argued the evidence was legally insufficient to show he currently suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to commit predatory sexual violence. The appellate court reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury, relied chiefly on the jury’s credibility determinations, and found the expert testimony (diagnosing pedophilic disorder and identifying risk factors) plus Goff’s history of multiple child-victim offenses, continued offending after detection, lack of insight, and certain coercive acts supported the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeals reversed a trial-court order that granted a plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Cornelius Hudson’s survival-action suit filed on behalf of his deceased mother’s estate. Hudson had sued multiple transportation-related defendants for injuries his mother allegedly sustained before her death. The appellate court held Hudson’s petition sufficiently alleged that the decedent’s estate had standing to pursue the survival claim, and it explained that a plea to the jurisdiction is not the correct procedural vehicle to challenge a plaintiff’s capacity to sue. The case is remanded for further proceedings in the trial court.

The court affirmed the trial court’s final divorce decree enforcing a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) that divided the marital estate. The wife, Soo Jin, argued the MSA should be set aside because she signed under duress and did not sign voluntarily, citing health issues, language barriers, a panic attack, and pressure from counsel and the mediator. The appellate court held the MSA met Texas Family Code §6.602 requirements and found competent evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Soo Jin’s testimony did not show fraud, coercion, or incapacity that would void the agreement. The judgment enforcing the MSA was affirmed.

The court dismissed an eviction appeal as moot after the appellee (the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs) executed a writ of possession and obtained physical possession of the premises. The trial court had entered judgment for the appellee and set the statutorily required supersedeas bond amount under Texas law, but there is no indication the appellants posted a bond to stay possession. Because the appellee already recovered possession and the appellants did not respond to the appellee’s motion to dismiss, the appellate court concluded there was no live controversy and dismissed the appeal.

The Texas Court of Appeals denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by WC 4th and Rio Grande LP in an original proceeding from Travis County. The court issued a brief memorandum opinion concluding the petition did not warrant mandamus relief and cited the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. No further explanation of the merits or factual background was provided in the published entry, and the court simply denied the requested extraordinary writ.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied Geoji, Inc.'s petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a trial-court action. The appellate court issued a short memorandum opinion simply stating denial and citing the appellate rule allowing such disposition. No extended reasoning, factual background, or separate opinion was included in the published entry. The decision concludes the original proceeding from Travis County without granting the extraordinary relief requested by the petitioner.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied David Paul Shipp's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a Williamson County court action. The opinion is a brief memorandum disposition that grants no relief and cites the appellate rule for denial. No extended reasoning or factual discussion is provided in the published entry. The petition remains unresolved in the trial court as a result of this denial, and the appellate court provided no substantive ruling on the merits.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) dismissed an appeal brought by Dale Cole against Discover Bank after Cole filed an unopposed motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and entered an order dismissing the appeal. No substantive ruling on the underlying merits was made; the dismissal was procedural and based solely on the appellant's request.

The Second Court of Appeals, Fort Worth, dismissed Wes and Tina Dobransky's appeal from the County Court at Law, Cooke County, because the appellants repeatedly failed to pay the required filing fee despite two warnings and deadlines. The court gave notice on February 19 and March 11, 2026, allowed at least ten days to cure, and concluded the deadlines passed with no payment. The court therefore dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellants to pay all costs of the appeal.

The Second Court of Appeals, Fort Worth, dismissed Tumininu Banwo's appeal from the 325th District Court for want of prosecution because the appellant failed to file the required appellate brief. The court had notified appellant after the March 16, 2026 brief deadline and gave a grace period until March 30, 2026 to file the brief and explain the delay, but received no response. Because the appellant did not comply with Texas appellate rules or offer an explanation, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered appellant to pay all appellate costs.

The court denied the appellee’s motion for rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and issued a replacement opinion that reaches the same result: the Texas Department of Public Safety’s plea to the jurisdiction was sustained and the employee’s disability-discrimination and retaliation claims against DPS under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act were dismissed with prejudice. The court found Sanders failed to plead facts establishing a prima facie discrimination or retaliation claim (and thus failed to invoke the TCHRA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity). Because Sanders had multiple opportunities to amend and the defects were incurable, dismissal was proper.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas reviewed an interlocutory appeal by Nidal T. Baem from a trial court’s temporary injunction freezing all First National Bank of Texas accounts in his name. Western Frontier Trading alleged Baem embezzled customer payments and sought to freeze accounts where those funds were deposited. The appellate court found sufficient evidence to support a temporary injunction in part but held the injunction was overbroad: it unlawfully froze all Baem’s bank accounts and did not limit the freeze to the dollar amount tied to Western’s disputed funds. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a narrowly tailored injunction and further hearing.