Court Filings

The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s November 5, 2025 dismissal without a hearing of Sammie Smith Jr.’s pro se August 5, 2025 filing titled “Motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial pursuant to Crim.R. 33(B).” The appellate court held the filing relied on Ohio’s postconviction statute (R.C. 2953.21) and was therefore properly treated as a petition for postconviction relief. The petition was untimely (filed nearly 14 years after the trial transcripts were filed), Smith failed to show an exception to the statute of limitations or to present operative facts or credible evidence entitling him to relief, and his claims were barred by res judicata.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed a municipal-court judgment awarding William R. Meek $4,160 against Gino Collins for an incomplete fence installation and return of materials. Collins appealed pro se arguing the damages award lacked competent proof and was against the weight of the evidence. The appeals court held Collins failed to provide a transcript or an approved substitute of the bench hearing, so the court could not review the factual record and must presume the trial court acted properly. For that reason the appellate court affirmed the judgment.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the municipal court’s rulings that tenants Nedra Bloor and Wayne Reed could deposit rent with the clerk and that the escrowed rent should not be released to landlord Alan Barnes. The tenants had notified Barnes of multiple repair issues (roof leaks, mold, loose fixtures, exposed wiring, floor problems) and deposited rent after giving notice. The trial court found the tenants were current on rent when they initiated escrow and that Barnes failed to remedy the conditions. The appeals court upheld the credibility findings and applied Ohio landlord-tenant statutes to affirm the return of the escrowed funds to the tenants.

The Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals denied Latoya J. Yancy’s App.R. 26(B) application to reopen her direct criminal appeal. Yancy claimed appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging various trial errors, including prosecutorial misconduct, failure to move to suppress, and failure to present mitigating evidence. The court found no record support that appellate counsel performed deficiently or that Yancy suffered prejudice; many issues had already been considered on direct appeal or lacked record evidence. Because the record did not show a colorable ineffective-assistance claim, the application to reopen was denied.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the First District Court of Appeals and remanded the case. The dispute involved C.E., an unmarried former partner who sought legal parental recognition of three children born to P.S. through artificial insemination. The First District had directed the trial court to determine whether the couple "would have been married" but for Ohio's pre-Obergefell ban on same-sex marriage and to apply R.C. 3111.95(A) if so. The Supreme Court held R.C. 3111.95(A) applies only to married spouses and that Obergefell and Pavan do not authorize retroactively rewriting that statute to cover unmarried couples.

The Superior Court affirmed the denial of Tyrell Giles’s PCRA petition challenging his convictions for aggravated assault and related offenses. Giles filed a late (nunc pro tunc) post-conviction petition claiming trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting when witnesses testified that he was on state parole. The court held the petition was untimely and Giles failed to plead or prove any statutory exception to the PCRA time bar, so the court lacked jurisdiction to review the claim. The Superior Court therefore affirmed denial of relief, noting the lower court’s merits ruling was unnecessary.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that cast vote records (CVRs) are not the "contents of ballot boxes and voting machines" under Section 308 (25 P.S. § 2648) of the Election Code, and therefore are not exempt from public disclosure. The court rejected the Commonwealth Court’s view that CVRs are the digital equivalent of machine contents and found the statute’s plain language dispositive. The Court noted that if policy concerns exist about disclosure, the proper remedy is legislative change rather than judicial construction of a statute enacted in 1937.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that cast vote records (CVRs) — digital spreadsheet reports of votes generated by a county’s tabulating equipment — are not the "contents" of ballot boxes or voting machines under Section 308 of the Election Code and therefore are subject to public disclosure. The dispute arose from a Right-to-Know request to Lycoming County for CVRs from the 2020 general election, which had been denied as exempt. The Court concluded CVRs are documents/reports generated by tabulators (automatic tabulating equipment), not the physical ballots in ballot boxes or the voting machines that let voters mark and verify votes.

The Illinois Appellate Court (Third District) answered two certified questions about the Biometric Information Privacy Act exemption for government contractors. The court held that the exemption does not require a contractor to work exclusively for a state agency or local government. However, the exemption applies only when the contractor’s challenged conduct occurred within the scope of the contractor’s governmental work—i.e., when the contractor was acting as a contractor for the government. The court therefore rejected a purely temporal reading that would exempt all conduct during the existence of a government contract.

The Illinois Appellate Court vacated the trial court's denial of plaintiff Mary Owens’ request to amend her timely post-judgment motion for a new trial after a jury verdict for a nursing home and an independent contractor nurse practitioner. The court held the trial court retained jurisdiction to consider amendments to a timely post-judgment motion until it actually denied that motion, and that the trial court erred by refusing to exercise discretion and instead concluding it lacked jurisdiction. Because that error prevented consideration of the amendment, the court vacated both the order denying leave to amend and the later denial of the new-trial motion, and remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court Bronx County's grant of summary judgment to Wells Fargo in a foreclosure-related case and denied Wells Fargo's motion. The court held Wells Fargo failed to prove strict compliance with RPAPL 1304's notice requirements because its affiant did not establish knowledge of the third-party vendor's mailing procedures or integration of the vendor's records into the bank's business records. The court also rejected Wells Fargo's claim that the loan was not a covered primary-residence loan, finding plaintiff did not prove the property was never the borrower's primary residence.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Supreme Court's denial of plaintiff Moises Ramirez's motion for partial summary judgment on a Labor Law § 240(1) claim against 2500 Webb LLC. The court found that genuine issues of fact remained about which object struck the plaintiff (horizontal versus vertical pipe/post), whether that object was a target of disassembly when the injury occurred, and whether a safety device was available that would have prevented the accident. Because these disputed facts are material to liability under Labor Law § 240(1), summary judgment was properly denied.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Khalil Wisdom's conviction after a jury trial for two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and the concurrent 12-year sentences imposed as a second violent felony offender. The court also affirmed the denial of his CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment alleging ineffective assistance and newly discovered evidence. The court concluded counsel provided effective representation under state and federal standards, any alleged failures did not prejudice defendant given overwhelming video and other evidence, and the trial court properly declined various jury instructions and a new-evidence hearing.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Yordani Urena’s conviction following a guilty plea to second-degree assault and the three-year probation sentence, but modified the probation by striking fees and mandatory surcharge. The court declined to review an unpreserved facial constitutional challenge to a probation condition restricting association and places, and alternatively rejected the challenge on the merits. The court found the association/frequenting condition reasonably necessary given the violent nature of the offense, but concluded that imposing court fees and the mandatory surcharge was not related to rehabilitation and therefore removed that condition.

The Appellate Division, First Department, reviewed defendant Julsean Thompson’s conviction and sentence following his guilty plea to first-degree custodial interference. The court unanimously modified the trial court’s judgment by reducing Thompson’s term of imprisonment from two-to-four years to 1 1/3-to-3 years as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, finding the original sentence excessive. In all other respects the judgment was affirmed, leaving the conviction and other components of the trial court’s decision intact.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a Bronx County judgment that had convicted Angel Rivas, upon a guilty plea, of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and sentenced him to five years probation. The court struck six specific probation conditions because they were not reasonably related to Rivas's rehabilitation or necessary to ensure he would lead a law-abiding life. The court reasoned there was no evidence supporting dependence-support, gang affiliation, substance abuse, mental-health treatment, or ignition-interlock requirements, and the People did not oppose removing several of the conditions.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Bronx County Supreme Court's June 14, 2021 judgment in People v. Gonzalez. Carlos Gonzalez appealed his conviction and sentence; the appellate panel reviewed the arguments, found the sentence was not excessive, and unanimously affirmed the trial court judgment. The court provided no extended opinion or new legal rule, simply announcing affirmation and referring appellant's counsel to the court's rule § 606.5 regarding appellate practice matters.

The First Department unanimously affirmed Supreme Court's order dismissing Yolanda Murray's complaint against Planned Parenthood as time-barred and for failure to state a viable claim. The court held Murray's claims arising from alleged 1996 misconduct did not fall within the Adult Survivors Act because the complaint did not allege criminal conduct enumerated by that statute, and the Child Victims Act revival window had already closed. The court also found that, even on the merits, Murray failed to plead facts showing Planned Parenthood's knowledge of the provider's dangerous propensities, control over the local affiliate, or any valid alter-ego theory, and there was no evidence of judicial bias.

The Appellate Division, First Department granted the Attorney Grievance Committee's motion for reciprocal discipline and suspended attorney Tamar Toledano from the practice of law in New York for four months, effective 30 days from the order. The suspension follows Toledano's consent to a four-month USPTO suspension for violating USPTO trademark signature and conduct rules, and her admission in a USPTO settlement that she permitted non-signatories to sign trademark filings and failed to timely notify clients about a referring firm's fraud. The court found New York rules substantially similar and imposed reciprocal discipline on consent.

The First Department granted the Attorney Grievance Committee's motion for reciprocal discipline and publicly censured attorney Barbara Jayne Resnick. Connecticut previously publicly reprimanded Resnick after she admitted holding herself out as an attorney while administratively suspended there for failing to pay client security fees. The New York court found no defects in the Connecticut proceeding, determined the misconduct would also violate New York Rule 5.5(a), and concluded that a public censure in New York is appropriate and consistent with the sanction imposed in Connecticut and First Department precedent.

The Appellate Division, First Department granted the Attorney Grievance Committee's motion for an immediate interim suspension of attorney William John Lloyd King. The court found uncontroverted documentary evidence — bank records and King's written admission — that he converted or misappropriated $17,420 in a client's funds to satisfy a gambling addiction. The court rejected King's request for diversion or a disability suspension, concluding his misconduct posed an immediate threat to the public and that addiction-based mitigation, restitution, or brief recovery efforts do not prevent an interim suspension pending any formal charges.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a lower court order that had remanded an NYC Housing Authority denial of a remaining family member (RFM) grievance. The petitioner, Eric Camacho, sought succession after his aunt (the tenant) died; NYCHA denied his claim because he did not meet the policy requirement of at least 12 months of continuous authorized occupancy prior to the tenant's death. The court held NYCHA's denial had a rational basis, rejected hardship and estoppel arguments, and found that a later change in NYCHA policy would not have altered the outcome.

The First Department reviewed a motion in a class-action landlord-tenant case where defendants sought disqualification of plaintiffs' counsel for an alleged conflict arising from counsel's prior representation of several former building owners. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in finding defendants had waived the conflict claim, and concluded the record was incomplete to decide disqualification. The court therefore ordered plaintiffs' counsel to produce itemized files related to the prior representation so defendants can assess whether an actual conflict exists, and otherwise affirmed the lower court's denial of immediate disqualification and dismissal.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Harvey's personal-injury complaint arising from a May 2020 motor vehicle accident. Defendants (the New York Foundling Hospital and others) presented expert reports and MRI comparisons showing plaintiff's cervical, lumbar, and right-shoulder conditions were preexisting, chronic, and degenerative from a prior March 30, 2019 crash, not caused by the 2020 accident. The court held plaintiff's expert failed to meaningfully dispute the prior-accident causation, so she could not meet the statutory threshold for a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102(d).

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a lower court order denying the insurer Mountain Valley Indemnity Company's summary judgment motion to dismiss an insureds' fire-damage complaint. The insurer argued the dwelling was a three-family property (allowing a coverage disclaimer) based on the basement configuration, while the insureds said it was two-family and the basement was shared family space. The court found disputed facts about the basement's physical separation, usage, and the investigator's qualifications, so summary judgment was improper and the case must proceed.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal by William Martin, independent executor, from a trial-court order that required co-executor Steven Martin to resign or be removed. The appellate court found the appeal moot because Steven formally resigned after the order was entered, so reversing the order would have no practical effect on Steven’s status or estate administration. The court therefore declined to address the parties’ standing and procedural arguments and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The State of Texas, as appellant, moved to dismiss its own appeal in a criminal case from the County Court at Law No. 9 of Travis County. The motion to dismiss was signed by the Travis County Attorney and filed under the applicable Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals granted the State’s motion and dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a short memorandum decision, noting the procedural compliance with the rule and disposing of the appeal accordingly.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed Efrain Rodulfo Jr.'s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Rodulfo, who pleaded guilty under a plea bargain and was sentenced to 25 years on November 18, 2025, filed a pro se motion construed as a notice of appeal on April 14, 2026. The appellate court found the notice untimely because it was filed well after the 30-day deadline (or 90 days only if a timely motion for new trial is filed), and no extension was sought. The trial court also certified that Rodulfo waived and did not have a right to appeal, which required dismissal as well.

The court received a motion from appointed appellate counsel in Brandon Dmichael Lively’s appeal in which counsel stated continued representation was not in the appellant’s best interest and requested substitution. Because the trial court, not the appellate court, has authority to appoint or replace counsel for an indigent defendant on appeal, the court dismissed the motion, abated the appeal, and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether good cause exists to replace counsel and to appoint substitute counsel if appropriate. The trial court must file records of its hearing and any appointment/removal orders by May 22, 2026.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Dana Meador’s pretrial habeas petition seeking a reduction of a $750,000 bond in a first-degree murder prosecution. The court reviewed the statutory and common-law factors for bail, including the violent nature of the offense, potential punishment, community safety, flight risk, and financial ability to post bond. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court, the appeals court found Meador failed to prove the bond was excessive or used as an instrument of oppression and concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion.