Court Filings

The Third District Court of Appeal considered an appeal by Norman Williams from a Miami-Dade County circuit court decision. The appeal was taken under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2). The appellate court, in a per curiam decision, affirmed the lower court's ruling. No published opinion or extended reasoning appears in the filed entry; the judgment simply affirms the trial court's disposition and notes the decision is not final until any timely rehearing motion is resolved.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision in a civil case between appellant Kazi Ahmed and appellee Krzysztof Duszka. The appeal arose from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, and both parties appeared pro se. The per curiam opinion is brief and simply states the appeal is affirmed without published reasoning in the opinion. The ruling is subject to possible change if a timely motion for rehearing is filed.

The Third District Court of Appeal reviewed a criminal appeal by Jose D. Alcazar from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County under Florida appellate rules. The panel, in a brief per curiam decision, affirmed the lower court's judgment. No opinion explaining the court's reasoning or the issues decided was published; the decision was entered on April 29, 2026, subject to any timely motion for rehearing.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a non-final circuit court order in a civil case where appellant Fernando Costantini Gomes sought to pursue punitive damages under Florida’s vulnerable-adult statutes. The panel held that the statutory framework permits a vulnerable adult to recover actual and punitive damages for abuse, neglect, or exploitation, but a plaintiff must make a reasonable showing in the record (or by proffer) that the defendant’s conduct amounted to intentional misconduct or gross negligence to justify punitive damages. Applying those standards, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision in a dispute between Emilie Gonzalez and others (appellants) and Maria Del Pilar Alvarez (appellee). The appellate court concluded the record was insufficient to overturn the lower court and deferred to the trial judge's exercise of discretion. Citing precedent, the court explained that without a trial record the appellate court cannot resolve factual disputes or find an abuse of discretion, so the lower court's ruling stands.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision in a criminal appeal brought by Drakar Lamar Smith against the State of Florida. The opinion, filed April 29, 2026, is per curiam and brief: the court announced its disposition as "Affirmed" without published reasoning in this short opinion. The decision is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a non-final circuit court order in a civil case between appellant Carlos A. Zarraluqui and appellees Fetes & Events, Inc., et al. The appeal arose from a 2023 Miami-Dade County proceeding and was argued by counsel for both sides. The appellate court issued a brief per curiam decision, simply stating 'Affirmed,' without published opinion or extended reasoning in this document. The judgment affirms the lower court's non-final ruling, and the mandate will follow after disposition of any timely motion for rehearing.

The appellate court reviewed Marie Fleurima's appeal from a Broward County circuit court final judgment. Because Fleurima did not provide a trial transcript and the offered statement of the evidence lacked the trial court's required approval under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200(b)(5), the Fourth District limited its review to errors apparent on the face of the final judgment and found none. The court therefore affirmed the trial court's judgment. The opinion cites Edman v. Edman as controlling precedent and notes the decision is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of Justin Pantzer's Florida Rule 3.800 postconviction motion. The panel relied on recent Florida precedent holding that a 2024 U.S. Supreme Court decision (Erlinger) — even if a change in the law — does not apply retroactively, so Pantzer's claim based on that decision fails. The court cited Wainwright v. State and related Florida authority in reaching its decision and noted that the opinion is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved.

The Court of Appeal reversed a superior court judgment that had dismissed a Proposition 65 enforcement lawsuit for inadequate pre-suit notice. The plaintiff, a private enforcer, had sent a 60-day notice that identified the organization and provided contact information for its outside counsel rather than a specific internal “responsible individual.” The appellate court followed a recent decision (Pancho Villa’s) and held the regulation requiring a contact for the noticing entity is directory, not mandatory, and that the notice here substantially complied with the regulation’s purposes (informing prosecutors and giving defendants an opportunity to investigate and cure). The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Christopher Garner’s writ petition after the California Victim Compensation Board rejected his request for compensation under Penal Code section 4900. Garner had his 2007 murder conviction vacated and resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.6, and he sought compensation for time served beyond the revised sentence. The Board denied the claim because Garner did not allege an "erroneous conviction" as required by section 4900 — his original conviction was lawful under the law in effect at the time — and the Board permissibly used a regulation (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 642) to screen and dismiss legally deficient claims without a hearing. The court held the statute and regulation were correctly applied and valid.

The Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court award of attorney fees to environmental group Raptors Are the Solution under California’s private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5). Raptors sued the Department of Pesticide Regulation over its renewals and reevaluation decisions for certain rodenticides. Two trade associations (CropLife and RISE) intervened to defend the Department and were held jointly and severally liable for fees along with other defending parties. The appellate court found the associations had asserted direct pecuniary interests when seeking intervention, actively participated in the litigation, and therefore qualified as opposing parties eligible to share fee liability. The court also upheld the trial court’s fee calculation and refusal to apportion liability among defenders.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to increase defendant Sami Wayne Mohammed’s sentence after execution of his original sentence had begun. Mohammed initially received an aggregate seven-year, four-month term on January 12, 2024. The CDCR later notified the trial court that parts of that sentence were unauthorized under the Three Strikes law, and the trial court resentenced Mohammed on October 21, 2024 to an aggregate 10 years, eight months. The appellate court concluded the trial court could not lawfully resentence him after jurisdiction had ended, treated the appeal as a habeas petition, granted relief, and ordered reinstatement of the January 12, 2024 sentence.

The Court of Appeals denied Ernest Dale Benson Jr.'s personal restraint petition challenging the Department of Corrections’ recalculation of his earned release time (ERT). Benson was resentenced in 2024 from life without parole to two concurrent 40-year terms. DOC initially credited him with 33.33% ERT but later concluded aggravated first degree murder qualifies as a serious violent offense, limiting ERT to 15% under RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b). The court held aggravated first degree murder is a type of first degree murder within the statutory scheme, so Benson was eligible only for 15% ERT and failed to show unlawful restraint.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s judgment upholding the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals and the Department of Labor and Industries (DLI). The court held that the one-year limitation in RCW 51.32.240(1)(a) applies to benefits paid to injured workers and does not bar DLI from recouping overpayments made to health service providers like Office Careers. The court also affirmed partial summary judgment for DLI terminating Office Careers’ provider number, finding Office Careers failed to raise a genuine factual dispute and that DLI’s audits and use of available records were lawful.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Troy Rimes's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Rimes was convicted after a jury trial and the trial court denied his motion for a new trial on August 17, 2023. After Rimes moved for an out-of-time appeal, the trial court vacated and re-entered its denial order on January 26, 2026. Rimes filed a notice of appeal on March 31, 2026, but because Georgia law requires a notice of appeal within 30 days of the order's entry and his notice was filed 64 days after re-entry, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Nichelle Taylor’s direct appeal from the trial court’s denial of her motion to set aside a final judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60(d). The court held it lacked jurisdiction because appeals from denials of such motions must be pursued by application for a discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(8), (b), and Georgia precedent makes that process jurisdictional. Because Taylor filed a direct appeal instead of seeking discretionary review, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on April 28, 2026.

The Court of Appeals considered Eric Maxwell's direct appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion for an out-of-time appeal following convictions that included malice murder. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because Georgia's Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases in which the death penalty could be imposed. Because malice murder carries a potential death sentence, the Court of Appeals transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia for disposition.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the City of Atlanta's application for an interlocutory appeal in the case City of Atlanta v. William Neal. The order permits the appellant to file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the order date (April 28, 2026) and directs the Clerk of State Court to include this order in the record sent to the Court of Appeals. The court's action is procedural—allowing review before final judgment—rather than resolving the underlying merits of the dispute.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ashlee Mock’s application for interlocutory review of the trial court’s order striking her answer in a civil forfeiture case because the application was filed late. The trial court struck Mock’s answer on January 7, 2026, and issued a certificate of immediate review on January 20, 2026. Mock filed her application in this Court 28 days after that certificate, but Georgia law requires an application be filed within ten days of the certificate. Because the timeliness requirement is jurisdictional, the court had to dismiss the untimely application.

The Court of Appeals dismissed a direct appeal by Robert Stafford and Icon Studios, LLC because the Court previously denied their application for discretionary appeal and that denial constituted an adjudication on the merits, barring a second direct appeal. The case arose after Heritage purchased property at foreclosure, obtained a writ of possession in magistrate court, and brought a dispossessory action; Icon and Stafford sought superior-court review but the superior court dismissed the petition and Stafford’s motion to join. The Court held that the prior denial precludes relitigation and thus the court lacks jurisdiction to hear this direct appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an Application for Discretionary Appeal filed by the father in a child-custody or juvenile case (LC No. 25JV0018) and denied the application on April 28, 2026. The order is brief and administrative: the court declined to exercise its discretionary review power and did not provide additional explanation or address the merits of the underlying juvenile-court proceedings. The denial leaves the lower-court action in place and does not create precedent on the substantive issues in the case.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Gary D. James's appeal for failure to file his brief and enumerations of error by the deadline set under Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) and a subsequent court order. The court had given James until 4:30 P.M. on April 27, 2026, to file the required materials and warned that failure to comply would result in dismissal. Because James did not comply, the court dismissed the appeal and cited Tolbert v. Tolbert as authority supporting dismissal for noncompliance with appellate deadlines.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of William Bernard White’s plea in bar asserting immunity under Georgia’s 9-1-1 Medical Amnesty Law (OCGA § 16-13-5). White was arrested on an outstanding probation-violation warrant after a 911 call reported an apparently unconscious driver; paramedics found no medical emergency, and a search incident to arrest uncovered fentanyl. The court held the statute protects defendants only when the incriminating evidence “resulted solely from seeking such medical assistance,” and here the evidence flowed from the arrest on the outstanding warrant, not from the 911 call.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Delaware County Common Pleas Court’s convictions and sentences of Billie Jo Kirven following her consolidated guilty pleas in two cases. Kirven argued the trial court convicted her without first accepting guilty pleas and that her pleas were not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary under Crim.R. 11. The appellate court reviewed the plea hearing transcript, found the record showed Kirven personally acknowledged and accepted the plea terms, received the required constitutional advisements, and that the court accepted the pleas after completing the advisements. The court held any irregular sequencing did not invalidate the pleas.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the Franklin County trial court’s grant of summary judgment to BMI Federal Credit Union and its award of attorney fees after Carl Medley sued over the repossession and sale of his Audi. The trial court found Medley’s claims—fraud, waiver based on prior acceptance of late payments, emotional distress, and punitive damages—unsupported by admissible evidence, and granted BMI its deficiency, fees, and costs. The appellate court agreed that the loan’s anti-waiver language allowed BMI to accept late payments without forfeiting its rights, that BMI validly repossessed and sold the vehicle, and that Medley failed to rebut BMI’s evidence.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals held that R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a), a statutory restriction that limited who could file undervaluation complaints based on arm’s-length sales occurring before (but not after) the tax lien date and exceeding specified thresholds, violated Ohio’s constitutional requirement that property be taxed by a uniform rule. The court found the provision systematically and intentionally departed from uniform valuation by treating some properties as immune from complaint. The court severed the unconstitutional clause, left the legislative-resolution requirement intact, reversed the Board of Tax Appeals decisions, and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, while certifying a conflict to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the Board of Tax Appeals’ order that vacated a county board of revision decision and remanded to dismiss a taxpayer’s complaint. The court held that R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) — a statutory condition barring third-party valuation complaints unless the property sold in an arm’s-length transaction before the tax lien date and the sale price exceeded listed value by 10% and a monetary threshold — violates Ohio’s constitutional requirement that land be taxed by a uniform rule. The court severed that subsection, left the legislative-resolution requirement intact, and certified a conflict to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The court reversed the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), finding an Ohio statute, R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a), unconstitutional because it allowed different treatment of parcels for valuation complaints and thus violated the state constitutional requirement that land be taxed by a uniform rule. Appellant Bahorek had filed a complaint challenging a neighbor’s valuation; the county Board of Revision dismissed it under R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a). The appellate court held that the statute’s conditions on who may file and when (arm’s-length sale before the lien date and a 10%/threshold sales test) create systematic departures from uniform valuation, so the court severed that subsection, reversed the BTA, and remanded for further proceedings.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the Belmont County Common Pleas Court's October 3, 2025 denial of Kawame Turner’s pro se motion for additional jail-time credit. Turner had pled guilty pursuant to a jointly recommended 36-month sentence in Case No. 19 CR 209 with 430 days credited, and later was convicted in a separate case (23 CR 258) for failure to appear and received 224 days credit. The appeals court held Turner’s current challenge was a substantive dispute about categories of credited time that must have been raised on direct appeal and is therefore barred by res judicata; Turner also waived review by agreeing to the jointly recommended sentence.