Court Filings

The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court's denial of petitioner Karen Anthone's motion for summary judgment in a proceeding to enforce a judgment lien against real property owned by George Carlo and the Carlo Family Trust. The court held that the trust is a self-settled trust and therefore its assets are available to satisfy the settlor's creditors, so petitioner did not need to prove a fraudulent conveyance. However, the court found a triable issue whether the homestead exemption applies to the property sale, so summary judgment was improper and the matter remains for further fact-finding on that exemption issue.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed Family Court's March 17, 2025 order in a child-protective proceeding under Family Court Act article 10, which had found that respondent Thomas M. neglected the child Aleena M. The appeal challenged that neglect determination; the appellate court issued a short per curiam affirmance, adopting the reasoning set out in its separate memorandum in Matter of Akeem M. (Thomas M.). The court thus left undisturbed the Family Court's findings and disposition holding Thomas M. neglectful.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a Family Court order that found Thomas M. neglected the child Ahmilia M. This appeal challenged the Family Court’s neglect determination in a proceeding brought by the Onondaga County Department of Children and Family Services under Family Court Act article 10. The appellate court relied on the same reasoning and memorandum it used in a companion case (Matter of Akeem M. (Thomas M.)) and concluded there were no reversible errors, so the Family Court’s ruling stands and costs were denied.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed Family Court's order finding Heather H. neglected her child and placing her under the supervision of the Wayne County Department of Social Services. The appeal challenged the fact-finding that the mother's mental illness and illicit drug use caused neglect, but the appellate court held petitioner proved neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. The court relied on testimony and records showing the mother experienced delusions and paranoid behavior that placed the child's physical, mental, or emotional condition in imminent danger of impairment, and affirmed the dispositional supervision order.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department denied plaintiff-appellant Hoi Trinh's motion for reargument or for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals in his action against defendant-respondent Joseph Thien Nguyen. The court's one-paragraph memorandum and order, issued April 24, 2026, simply denies both requested forms of relief, leaving the prior appellate disposition in place and refusing further review by the state's highest court or reconsideration by this panel.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a Supreme Court order in a medical malpractice and wrongful death case that compelled defendants TLC Health Network and Lake Shore Health Care Center to produce electronic medical record audit trails and related discovery. The court concluded the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion because new deposition evidence—developed after an earlier appeal—suggested audit-trail data might exist, had not been fully disclosed, and that defendants' representatives lacked knowledge about retention policies. The appellate court held the new evidence justified additional discovery and found no conflict with its prior decision.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed Supreme Court's denial of Deutsche Bank's summary judgment motion in a mortgage foreclosure. The loan was originated by Ameriquest, later placed into a trust under a pooling and servicing agreement that named Deutsche Bank as trustee, and an assignment to Deutsche Bank was executed in 2009 by the servicer acting under a limited power of attorney. The appellate court held Deutsche Bank met its burden to show standing by producing the assignment and mortgage documents, and directed the trial court to appoint a referee to compute the amount due.

The Appellate Division modified a Supreme Court order in a breach-of-contract dispute over who must pay an additional tax attributable to a cell tower installed on plaintiffs' property. Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted defendant's cross-motion to dismiss; the Appellate Division affirmed in part by denying defendant's cross-motion and reinstating the complaint. The court held the lease language about who pays "real estate taxes and assessments" versus "personal property taxes on the Communications Facility" is ambiguous, so the parties did not meet their burdens to show a single reasonable interpretation and summary judgment was improper.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to multiple defendants and reinstated the City of Rome’s amended complaint. The City sued after a chlorine gas leak at a new water filtration facility damaged property; defendants were involved in design and construction. Supreme Court had held the plant operator’s removal of a frosted chlorine tank was a superseding, unforeseeable event absolving defendants. The appellate court ruled defendants failed to prove that the operator’s conduct broke the causal chain, so summary judgment was improper and issues of foreseeability must go to a factfinder.

The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court and granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in full. Plaintiff sued for breach of an option agreement that allegedly gave him an exclusive right to repurchase company interests; he attempted to exercise the option in November 2023. The court held the written option was clear and expired on December 31, 2020 (and could only be extended by plaintiff before that date), so the attempted exercise was untimely and there was no breach. The court rejected plaintiff's alternative strained reading that the option barred any sale or never expired.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department denied plaintiff James R. Caputo’s motion for reargument or for permission to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals in his action against multiple defendants including Nathan Holt and others. The court issued a brief memorandum and order on April 24, 2026, declining both reliefs without published opinion. No change was made to the underlying appellate disposition by this decision; the motion was simply denied.

The Appellate Division affirmed a trial court order that, after reargument, denied plaintiff’s challenge to defendant’s motion (converted to summary judgment) dismissing certain claims and awarding defendant unpaid alternative rent. The dispute arose from a lease cotenancy clause requiring a single anchor tenant; when the anchor space was filled by two tenants, the landlord sought full rent while the tenant claimed entitlement to an offset under the cotenancy provision. The court held the tenant could enforce the alternative rent under the lease amendments and that the landlord could not rely on an estoppel certificate to negate that rent offset obligation.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a jury verdict in favor of defendants in a medical malpractice case and granted a new trial. Plaintiffs alleged the radiologist defendant failed to identify a potentially cancerous abnormality on chest X-rays. The court held the trial judge erroneously gave an "error in judgment" jury instruction, which is appropriate only when a doctor chooses among several medically acceptable alternatives. Because the evidence showed only an alleged failure to meet the standard of care (a failure to diagnose), giving that charge risked confusing the jury and was not harmless, requiring reversal and reinstatement of the complaint.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, denied the plaintiff's motion for reargument and denied leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals in the case where Joseph D. Burgdorf sought further review of a prior decision against Betsy Ross Nursing and Rehabilitation Center and various individual defendants. The court affirmed its earlier disposition by refusing to revisit the matter or permit an appeal to New York’s highest court. No extended opinion or new legal analysis was provided in this memorandum and order.

The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to defendants and dismissing plaintiff Shawn Broton's second amended complaint. Broton, formerly Deputy Chief of Syracuse Police, alleged constitutional and statutory claims after being denied reinstatement to a rank-and-file position in December 2017 and after an ethics investigation later found his allegations unfounded. The court held most claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations because they accrued on the December 18, 2017 denial, and alternatively found no triable issues of fact as to defendants’ entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a trial court order denying summary judgment to defendants Dr. Saurin Popat and Delaware Medical Group in a medical malpractice suit brought by Meg and Brian Bray. The court found defendants initially showed they met the standard of care, but plaintiffs submitted an expert affirmation—establishing medical licensure and board certification in endocrine surgery—that raised triable issues as to whether Dr. Popat's assessment, diagnosis, and treatment fell below the accepted standard. Because the parties’ experts conflicted, summary judgment was inappropriate and the case must proceed.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department unanimously affirmed a Supreme Court (Steuben County) order that denied plaintiff Maura Bianco's motion for summary judgment in her suit against defendant Jacqueline S. Johnson. The appellate court reviewed the lower court's December 27, 2024 order and concluded there were issues precluding summary disposition, so the matter remains for further proceedings in the trial court. The appellate decision was issued April 24, 2026 and affirmed without costs.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a trial court judgment awarding Amber Well Drilling money damages based on a jury verdict in quantum meruit. The court held that the written home-improvement contract failed to comply with General Business Law § 771, so the contractor could not enforce the contract for breach or recover contractually stipulated interest and attorneys' fees. The court nonetheless allowed recovery for completed work under unjust enrichment/quasi-contract and awarded prejudgment interest at a statutory/alternative rate. Plaintiff's broader arguments to revisit precedent and to sever the fee/interest clause were rejected.

The Texas Tenth Court of Appeals denied Gregory G. Idom’s original petition for a writ of mandamus and his emergency motion for a stay. The filing, received April 23, 2026, sought extraordinary relief from the appellate court, but the court declined to grant the requested mandamus or stay. The brief opinion contains the court's disposition without published reasoning and was issued April 24, 2026.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed a mandamus petition by Zachary Brice Knox challenging a temporary restraining order that denied him possession and access to a child. After the petition was filed, the trial court modified and partially vacated the TRO and set a hearing for temporary orders. Because the complained-of provisions were vacated, the appellate court found Knox’s complaints moot and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under the appellate rules.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied Jeffrey Lee Gaston’s pro se petition requesting habeas and mandamus relief to compel speedy trial on pending Hays County charges. The court found jurisdictional and procedural defects: Gaston filed in the wrong court, failed to supply the certified record or supporting documents required for mandamus or habeas review, and cited authorities showing his usual remedy is direct appeal rather than pretrial habeas. Because he did not meet his burden to show entitlement to extraordinary relief, the court denied the petition without prejudice.

A jury convicted Eric Lon Jones of delivery of methamphetamine (4–200 grams) in Williamson County and assessed 45 years and a $10,000 fine. On appeal Jones argued the jury charge erred by (1) failing to include a venue instruction under former article 13.04 (venue for offenses committed on or within 400 yards of county boundaries) and (2) failing to define “preponderance of the evidence.” The Court of Appeals held there was no error: article 13.04 was not applicable where the offense and prosecution occurred in the same county and the evidence locating the buy in Williamson County was undisputed, and the court was not required to define “preponderance of the evidence.” The conviction was affirmed.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals reviewed Christopher Devontae Bennett’s appeal after the trial court adjudicated his guilt for sexual assault of a child and sentenced him to 18 years’ confinement following violations of court-ordered community supervision. Bennett’s appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw with an Anders brief stating the appeal is frivolous. The appellate court independently reviewed the record, found no arguable grounds for reversal, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the trial court’s adjudication and sentence. The court advised Bennett of his rights and noted he filed no pro se brief.

The Court of Appeals (Sixth District) affirmed the trial court's revocation of Roy Cletdell Robinson's community supervision for a state-jail felony possession conviction. Robinson was alleged to have failed to report for supervision (March–May 2025), failed to provide a valid address, failed to perform required community service, and failed to pay fines and costs. The court found the evidence (including testimony from Robinson and his supervision officer) sufficient by a preponderance to support revocation, and held Robinson forfeited his claim that his due-process rights were violated because he failed to timely object at the revocation hearing.

The Texas court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s revocation of Roy Cletdell Robinson’s five-year community supervision for evading arrest with a prior conviction. Robinson argued the evidence was insufficient to support revocation and that the trial court violated his due process rights by relying on hearsay probation officer testimony without a business records affidavit. The appellate court applied the same standards and analysis used in Robinson’s companion appeal, found no reversible error, and concluded the trial court properly revoked supervision. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

The court dismissed Devoris Antoine Newson’s attempted appeal from the trial court’s verbal denial of his pretrial habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court found no written order ruling on the habeas application in the record, and Texas law requires a written order to invoke appellate jurisdiction in habeas matters. The court also noted the underlying criminal charge was dismissed after Newson filed his habeas application, rendering the pretrial habeas petition moot. Because Newson did not show cause why the appeal should proceed, the court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The court dismissed Devoris Antoine Newson’s attempted appeal from the trial court’s verbal denial of his pretrial habeas application for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court explained that an oral pronouncement is not appealable absent a signed written order, and the record contained no written ruling. The court also noted the underlying criminal charge was dismissed after Newson filed his habeas application, rendering the habeas petition moot. Because there was no appealable written order and the case was dismissed, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The court dismissed Devoris Antoine Newson’s attempted appeal of a pretrial habeas corpus ruling for lack of jurisdiction. Newson sought review after an oral denial of his pretrial writ under Texas law, but no written trial-court order appears in the record. The court also found the issue moot because Newson entered a plea bargain, was tried and convicted, and therefore the pretrial relief he sought (including bail reduction) could no longer be granted. Because there was no appealable written order and the matter is moot, the appeal was dismissed.

The Texas Supreme Court (Justice Hawkins, joined by two justices) concurred with the Court’s opinion holding that the plaintiffs qualify as prevailing parties entitled to attorney’s fees under a specific Texas statute. The concurrence explains that although the trial court labeled the relief a "temporary injunction," the statutory scheme at issue makes such relief effectively final because disclosure of information cannot be undone. Because the defendants complied and the information was disclosed, the plaintiffs obtained ultimate relief and thus prevailed for fee-shifting purposes.

The Texas Supreme Court held that two former Webb Consolidated ISD board members who obtained a trial-court temporary injunction ordering the district to produce requested board materials qualified as "prevailing" under Texas Education Code § 11.1512(c-2) and may recover reasonable attorney’s fees for the relief obtained. The court explained that although temporary injunctions normally preserve the status quo and do not confer prevailing-party status, the injunction here effectively granted the only relief the statute authorizes — production of requested information — and the district complied. The court also held board members need not exhaust administrative remedies before suing under § 11.1512(c-2). The case is remanded for determination of recoverable fees limited to the injunction-related claims.