Court Filings

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed part of a trial court order in a parenting-plan relocation case because the trial court granted permanent relocation relief after a hearing that had been noticed only for temporary relief. The appellant had requested both temporary and permanent relief, but the notice for the July 17, 2024 hearing specified only temporary relief. The appellate court held that granting permanent relief without proper notice violated due process. The court affirmed the temporary relief, reversed the permanent-relief portion, and remanded for a proper final hearing on permanent relocation.

The Sixth District reversed a county court's orders that had set aside a default final judgment for possession and dismissed an eviction complaint. Landlord Wayne Rickert sued tenants Karen and Erin Valencia for nonpayment of rent under an oral month-to-month tenancy and obtained a default final judgment after the tenants failed to timely pay the rent allegedly due on September 1. The appellate court held the tenants waived defenses other than payment by not paying alleged rent when due or timely moving to have the rent determined, so the trial court erred in vacating the default and dismissing the complaint. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal dismissed Molly Dorsey’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court found the trial court’s December 6, 2024 orders (an Amended Order of Summary Administration and an Amended Order Determining Homestead Status) were final, but Dorsey filed her notice of appeal on February 12, 2025—outside the 30-day deadline. Because no timely appeal of any final order was filed, the appellate court also lacked jurisdiction over earlier nonfinal orders and motions. The court rejected attempts to toll the appeal period and concluded the appeal must be dismissed.

The Sixth District reversed a trial-court judgment that had enforced a 1973 deed addendum requiring Riviera’s land to be used as a golf course. The trial court had concluded the restriction remained enforceable because it was preserved by a 1990 affidavit (the Gifford Affidavit). The appellate court held the affidavit was not a muniment of title and therefore could not preserve the pre-root restriction under Florida’s Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA). Because no muniment preserved the restriction, MRTA extinguished it; the case is remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for Riviera.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision in a family/domestic case (circuit court for Polk County) in which Ernie Blazeff appealed from an order involving Vladimir Ohayon. The appellate court issued a brief per curiam opinion simply stating 'AFFIRMED' and citing Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.315(a). No additional factual findings or substantive reasoning are provided in the opinion; the panel unanimously concurred. The clerk notes the opinion is not final until the rehearing period expires.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a dispute between Dr. Gary Boraks, LLC (as assignee of Runnell D. Curry) and the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association (FIGA). The court held that FIGA is not generally liable for attorney’s fees under section 627.428 and may only be assessed fees under the limited exception in section 631.70 when FIGA affirmatively denies a covered claim other than by delay. The court relied on statutory text and precedent limiting FIGA’s obligations to policy limits (up to statutory caps), interest as provided, and attorney’s fees only in that narrow circumstance.

The Court of Appeal granted petitioner Michelle Paknad’s second writ of mandate ordering the Santa Clara Superior Court to vacate its prior order that accepted Intuitive Surgical’s redactions of investigator Andrea Smethurst’s reports and related investigative materials. The court held Intuitive had waived attorney-client privilege and work-product protection by placing the scope and adequacy of the investigations at issue in defending Paknad’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims. The court directed the trial court to conduct further in camera review and to disclose all factual findings and other information relevant to the investigations’ scope or adequacy, even if that material would otherwise qualify as core work product.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment rejecting challenges by Western Manufactured Housing Communities Association and Rincon Valley Mobilehome Park. Western argued (1) that during a declared state of emergency the statutory definition of “rental price” allows routine annual CPI rent increases despite Penal Code § 396’s 10% cap, and (2) that after the emergency owners may “recoup” denied CPI increases by resetting future baseline rents. The court held the statute must be read to fix the baseline rental amount as of the emergency declaration, so the 10% cap applies, and Santa Rosa’s rent ordinance does not compel the post-emergency recoupment Western sought.

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial court order that had authorized involuntary antipsychotic medication for defendant C.F., who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity. At the renewal hearing the trial court proceeded without a court reporter because defense counsel failed to request the no-cost reporter available under local rules; the hearing lasted about 13 minutes and the transcript of testimony is therefore missing. The appellate court found defense counsel’s failure to secure a reporter was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial because it eliminated any meaningful appellate review, and because the medication order will expire before a settled statement could be produced, the case is remanded for a new hearing.

The Court of Appeal granted a peremptory writ directing the Contra Costa County Superior Court to vacate its minute order that denied a petition for mandate brought by four teachers challenging West Contra Costa Unified School District’s staffing practices. The trial court had denied the writ based on the District’s claim it was impossible to fully staff classrooms with credentialed teachers. The appellate court held the District failed to prove it had exhausted statutory procedures (including seeking waivers from state entities) before asserting impossibility, so the defense was premature and the denial of the writ was reversed for entry of an order denying the petition.

The Court of Appeals dismissed William Antoine Thomas’s appeal from a conviction entered pursuant to a plea bargain because the trial-court certification, signed by the judge, Thomas, and his trial counsel, states the case is a plea-bargain case, that the defendant has no right of appeal, and that Thomas waived his right to appeal. The State moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the court granted the motion, holding the certification deprived it of jurisdiction to hear the appeal under applicable Texas appellate rules and precedent.

A jury convicted Tyriq Bradford of aggravated sexual assault of a child and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Bradford appealed, arguing the trial court erred by admitting three out-of-court statements by the six-year-old victim identifying him, over hearsay and confrontation objections. The court concluded the statements were admissible as excited utterances and also were non-testimonial, and that the victim’s presence and limited testimony at trial satisfied confrontation requirements. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion on hearsay and the Confrontation Clause was not violated, the conviction was affirmed.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered forfeiture of a 2007 Lincoln Navigator. The State sought forfeiture after R.C. Scott was arrested while driving the Navigator and later pled guilty to evading and third-or-more driving-while-intoxicated charges. The court held the State proved the vehicle was contraband under Chapter 59 because Scott had three prior DWI convictions and used the vehicle in a qualifying felony, and that Scott was an equitable owner despite the vehicle titled to his parents. Because Scott was an owner, the parents could not prevail on the innocent-owner defense.

The Texas Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s default judgment against appellant Nicholas Lind in a suit by investors M3 Fort Worth Developer, LLC and The YoungESTone, LLC. M3 and YO invested in residential development projects run by Serene and Windridge, paid management and construction fees, and sued after projects stalled. Lind was served with the original petition but not the first amended petition; the trial court entered default judgment and later a damages judgment. The appellate court held lack of re-service was not error because the amended petition did not seek more onerous relief, and any challenge to sufficiency of evidence failed because securities claims under the Texas Securities Act do not require proof of loss causation.

The Texas appellate court reinstated an appeal previously suspended by the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, reviewed a motion showing the debtor received a Chapter 7 discharge, and concluded the discharge mooted the dispute between John Deere and Bradley Irwin. Because the bankruptcy discharge voided the underlying debt and barred collection, there was no live controversy for the court to resolve. The court therefore vacated the trial court’s judgment and its prior appellate opinion and judgment, and dismissed the case as moot.

The Court of Appeals reviewed James Chadleigh Schrotel’s conviction for misdemeanor assault causing bodily injury against a family member. The court upheld the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction but found reversible error in jury selection: a prospective juror (venireperson six) admitted a bias favoring victims of family violence and could not guarantee that bias would not affect his decision. The trial court denied the defendant’s challenge for cause and also denied an additional peremptory strike, resulting in an objectionable juror sitting. Because that denial was erroneous and harmful, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s Final Decree of Divorce between Chukwuemeka Carl Runyon and Bianca Bazile Runyon. After a bench trial, the trial court divided the community estate, appointed both parents joint managing conservators, gave the mother the right to determine the child’s primary residence (with a geographic restriction allowing residence in Brazos County or within 50 miles of Orlando, Florida), and ordered father to pay $1,840 per month in child support. The court found no abuse of discretion in the property division, the relocation decision, or the refusal to grant a child-support credit for travel expenses, given the record and applicable family-law standards.

The Texas Tenth Court of Appeals denied Shawn Eric McGee’s petition for a writ of mandamus filed April 10, 2026. The court issued a short memorandum opinion stating the petition is denied and that motions included with the petition are dismissed as moot. The opinion notes that the relator also attempted to file a notice of appeal in the same document and reminds that a separate notice of appeal must be filed when a proceeding becomes final in the trial court. The decision was delivered and filed April 16, 2026.

The defendant, Ethan Alexander Herrera, appealed a conviction for aggravated robbery. On April 13, 2026, Herrera filed a signed, voluntary motion to dismiss his appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a short memorandum explaining the dismissal was pursuant to the rule permitting voluntary dismissal when requested by an appellant and properly signed.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Tenth Appellate District) affirmed Dana Loment Pettigrew’s convictions for two counts of indecency with a child by contact and exposure. Pettigrew challenged admission of extraneous-offense testimony from L.H. under article 38.37 (as-applied facial challenge, Rule 403 balancing, and jury instruction) and claimed his counsel denied him the right to testify at the guilt-innocence phase. The court held the statute was not unconstitutional as applied, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403, the article 38.37 jury instruction was proper, and Pettigrew failed to show prejudice from counsel’s failure to reopen the evidence; thus the convictions and sentences were affirmed.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas dismissed Stacey Sprung’s pending appeal after Sprung filed a motion to dismiss under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The motion was filed before the court issued a decision, and the court granted it under the governing rule, resulting in dismissal of the appeal. The opinion is a short, per curiam memorandum noting submission and opinion dates and the panel that considered the matter.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a bench-trial judgment awarding Douglas Fuhrman $187,244 plus $30,782.58 in attorney’s fees after he sued his ex-wife, Nancy Fuhrman, for breach of the 2020 agreed divorce decree’s tax-allocation provisions. The trial court found the decree was a valid contract, Douglas performed (Deloitte prepared and filed the 2020 returns), Nancy breached by failing to pay her allocated share, and Douglas suffered damages. The appellate court held the record (tax returns, expert testimony, decree language) provided legally and factually sufficient support for the trial court’s findings and legal conclusions.

The court dismissed a pending civil appeal after the parties jointly moved to dismiss under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appeal arose from the County Court at Law No. 1 in Jefferson County (trial cause No. 25CCCV0301). Because the joint motion was filed before the court issued a decision, the Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a brief memorandum disposing of the case without further analysis.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas dismissed Leo Roger Dugas’s appeal of a trial-court take-nothing judgment in a quiet-title suit against Ryan Edward Reuter. Dugas filed an initial brief that lacked legal authority and a corrected brief that failed to comply with numerous appellate rules. After warning and allowing an opportunity to amend, the court determined Dugas did not file a proper brief and proceeded on the clerk’s record, then dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court therefore did not reach the merits of the underlying title dispute.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s temporary injunction preventing four former CRNA employees from providing CRNA services within 20 miles of any location where they worked for their former employer, Anesthesia Associates, for three years. Anesthesia Associates sued after the CRNAs resigned and began working for a competitor at a local hospital, alleging breach of noncompetition and irreparable harm. The appellate court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion: the employer showed a legitimate protectable interest (goodwill, specialized training, credentialing), probable success on the claim at trial, and probable irreparable injury that could not be adequately remedied by money damages.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed Victor Rolando Corpus’s convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a child and indecency with a child. Corpus sought a continuance at trial because subpoenaed psychiatric/hospital records for a State witness had not arrived. The trial court denied the oral motion after efforts to locate the records and the court’s concern that delay could be indefinite. The appeals court held Corpus waived the complaint because the continuance motion was unsworn and, alternatively, that the court did not abuse its discretion because the missing records were not shown to be unexpectedly unavailable or likely to be obtained with a finite delay, and Corpus showed no harm from the denial.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default judgment entered for Deere Credit against Unger Texas Stone, LP and Shelia Unger. The court held this was a restricted appeal and reviewed only the clerk’s record, finding that Shelia — a non-lawyer — timely filed a letter that, in substance, amounted to an answer both for herself and for the limited partnership. Because that filing constituted an appearance, the defendants were entitled to notice of Deere Credit’s motion for default judgment and an opportunity to be heard; the trial court signed the default judgment without providing such notice, producing error apparent on the face of the record.

A Texas appellate court affirmed the convictions of Noel Amador-Castillo for continuous sexual abuse of a young child and attempted indecency with a child by contact. The jury had convicted him of continuous sexual abuse (multiple acts over years) and the lesser-included offense of attempted indecency by breast touching, and sentenced him to concurrent prison terms. The court rejected a double-jeopardy challenge because the breast-touching offense is distinct from the acts alleged as predicates for continuous sexual abuse. It also held the victim’s testimony was legally sufficient to support both convictions.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights to twin children R.H. and E.H. after reviewing an accelerated appeal challenging whether termination was in the children’s best interest. The court applied Texas statutory standards and Holley factors, giving deference to factfinder credibility determinations. It found clear-and-convincing evidence the mother’s persistent methamphetamine use, failure to comply with services and testing, association with an abusive partner, and instability endangered the children and made reunification unsafe. The children were bonded with and well-cared for by their maternal aunt and her husband.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s enforcement order and final judgment enforcing a divorce decree property award in favor of Pamela Sheehan. George Sheehan had spent or moved funds that the divorce decree had awarded from a specific bank account, so the trial court converted the award into a money judgment for $64,601.44 plus $6,200 in attorney’s fees. The appeals court held the enforcement judgment was a permissible enforcement remedy under the Family Code, not an unauthorized modification of the divorce decree, and the award of attorney’s fees was authorized.