Court Filings

The Eleventh Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default judgment entered for Deere Credit against Unger Texas Stone, LP and Shelia Unger. The court held this was a restricted appeal and reviewed only the clerk’s record, finding that Shelia — a non-lawyer — timely filed a letter that, in substance, amounted to an answer both for herself and for the limited partnership. Because that filing constituted an appearance, the defendants were entitled to notice of Deere Credit’s motion for default judgment and an opportunity to be heard; the trial court signed the default judgment without providing such notice, producing error apparent on the face of the record.

A Texas appellate court affirmed the convictions of Noel Amador-Castillo for continuous sexual abuse of a young child and attempted indecency with a child by contact. The jury had convicted him of continuous sexual abuse (multiple acts over years) and the lesser-included offense of attempted indecency by breast touching, and sentenced him to concurrent prison terms. The court rejected a double-jeopardy challenge because the breast-touching offense is distinct from the acts alleged as predicates for continuous sexual abuse. It also held the victim’s testimony was legally sufficient to support both convictions.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights to twin children R.H. and E.H. after reviewing an accelerated appeal challenging whether termination was in the children’s best interest. The court applied Texas statutory standards and Holley factors, giving deference to factfinder credibility determinations. It found clear-and-convincing evidence the mother’s persistent methamphetamine use, failure to comply with services and testing, association with an abusive partner, and instability endangered the children and made reunification unsafe. The children were bonded with and well-cared for by their maternal aunt and her husband.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s enforcement order and final judgment enforcing a divorce decree property award in favor of Pamela Sheehan. George Sheehan had spent or moved funds that the divorce decree had awarded from a specific bank account, so the trial court converted the award into a money judgment for $64,601.44 plus $6,200 in attorney’s fees. The appeals court held the enforcement judgment was a permissible enforcement remedy under the Family Code, not an unauthorized modification of the divorce decree, and the award of attorney’s fees was authorized.

The First District of Texas dismissed Trina Jones's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2 for failure to prosecute. The appellant's brief was due January 5, 2026, and after no brief was filed the court notified her on January 22, 2026, that the appeal could be dismissed unless the brief or an extension motion was filed by February 2, 2026. The appellant did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed Timothy Williams's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 for failure to prosecute. Williams failed to file his appellant brief by the February 20, 2026 deadline, did not file the brief or a motion for extension after a March 6, 2026 notice, and did not respond by the March 16, 2026 date given. The court therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot under applicable Texas appellate rules.

The court dismissed an appeal from a final judgment entered September 30, 2024 because the appellant filed his notice of appeal on July 1, 2025 — more than nine months after the judgment and well beyond the applicable deadlines. The court explained the general 30-day filing deadline, the circumstances that can extend it to 90 days, and the limited procedure for seeking an extension. The appellant was given notice that the appeal appeared untimely and did not respond, so the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals from five felony convictions for lack of jurisdiction because Brown validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements in each case. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to evidence in five trial causes, signed written waivers and advisals acknowledging he understood and waived appeal rights, and the trial court’s judgments reflected the waiver. Because the record affirmatively shows the waivers were knowing and voluntary and Brown admitted the waivers to this Court, the court concluded it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five criminal cases for lack of jurisdiction. Brown had pleaded guilty to theft-from-person in three cases and aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon in two others, and in each case he agreed as part of plea arrangements to waive his right to appeal. The trial-court paperwork and appellant’s own filings show he knowingly and voluntarily waived appeal rights, and the judgments expressly note appeals were waived. Because the record contains valid appeal waivers and no trial-court permission to appeal, the court dismissed the appeals.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five consolidated criminal cases because the trial-court record shows he validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to violations in three theft-from-person cases and pleaded guilty to two aggravated robbery cases; in each cause he signed documents and the judgments reflected an appeal waiver. Because the written certifications and filings demonstrate a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver and the trial court did not grant permission to appeal, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s consolidated appeals from five felony convictions for lack of jurisdiction. Brown pleaded guilty to theft-from-person in three cases and to aggravated robbery in two others, and in each case he signed plea paperwork and certifications expressly waiving his right to appeal. The court found the trial-court certifications and the record show a knowing, voluntary waiver of appeal and that the trial court did not grant permission to appeal, so the appellate court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five criminal cases because the trial-court record shows he validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to evidence in five felony cases, signed written waivers and advisals acknowledging he gave up his appeal rights, and the judgments expressly state appeal was waived. Because a valid, knowing, and voluntary waiver bars appeal absent trial-court permission, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas affirmed Nicholas Darris Marshall’s conviction and 12-year sentence for possession of between 4 and 200 grams of methamphetamine. Marshall pleaded guilty after the State waived two enhancement paragraphs; evidence at sentencing included police testimony, lab results showing 2.1152 grams of methamphetamine, and Marshall’s own testimony about how the drugs came to be in his car. The court held Marshall failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment challenge and, even if preserved, the sentence—being within the statutory 2–20 year range—was not grossly disproportionate under the relevant precedent.

Appellants Mark Goloby and Richard Vega sued Harris County commissioners, contending Commissioner Adrian Garcia resigned his county office when the Commissioners Court appointed him to the Gulf Coast Protection District (GCPD) board. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Commissioners Court’s appointment of one of its own members to the GCPD was void under the common-law self-appointment branch of the incompatibility doctrine, so Garcia never lawfully became a GCPD director and therefore did not resign his commissioner seat. Because Garcia remained an official-capacity county officer, governmental immunity barred the claims and the dismissal with prejudice was proper.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Maria Nava Hernandez's appeal from a final judgment entered October 20, 2025, for lack of jurisdiction because her notice of appeal was filed December 12, 2025 — more than the required 30 days and not saved by any timely post-judgment motion or Rule 26.3 extension. The court explained the 30-day deadline, the 90-day extension available only if a timely post-judgment motion is filed, and that the 15-day window to seek an extension under Rule 26.3 had passed. Because the notice was untimely and no jurisdictional basis existed, the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were denied as moot.

The First District of Texas affirmed a bench-trial judgment quieting title in favor of Linda Jean Willis. Pro se appellant Larry Dean White claimed ownership of a vacant lot by adverse possession after decades of mowing and maintenance, but the trial court found his proof insufficient. The appeals court held White failed to prove a required element—that his possession was hostile and exclusive such that it reasonably notified the true owner. Because the evidence did not establish all elements of adverse possession for the statutory period, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

The Texas First District Court of Appeals dismissed Kevin Williams's appeal from a December 8, 2025 judgment because he neither paid required appellate fees nor proved indigence for those costs, and he failed to adequately respond after being notified that the appeal was subject to dismissal. The court cited the applicable Texas rules and statutes governing appellate fees and procedure and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal for failure to comply with fee and response requirements, not a ruling on the merits of the underlying judgment.

The First District of Texas dismissed Jim Bob's appeal for failure to pay required appellate fees or to establish indigence. The court previously notified appellant that the appeal would be dismissed unless he either paid the fees or explained in writing why he should not be required to pay them. Because Jim Bob did not respond or pay, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions. The dismissal rested on the applicable Texas rules and statutes governing payment of appellate fees and the court’s authority to involuntarily dismiss for noncompliance.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s order revoking Q.W.’s probation and committing him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department for seven years. The juvenile had been placed on probation after pleading true to two counts of aggravated robbery. The State sought modification alleging truancy, a positive marijuana test, and unlawful carrying of a handgun. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Q.W. violated probation, including committing a new-law offense by being found with a handgun in a vehicle, and concluded the evidence supported revocation.

The Court of Appeals considered two appeals by John Lewis Jr. challenging a January 5, 2026 commitment to Kingwood Pines and an order authorizing medication. Appellant's counsel filed a notice of dismissal and the court treated it as a motion to dismiss. After abating the appeals for a hearing, the trial court docket showed appellant testified he no longer wished to pursue the appeals because he was no longer committed. The court lifted the abatement and granted the motion, dismissing both appeals and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed two appeals brought by John Lewis Jr. challenging (1) a January 5, 2026 writ committing him to Kingwood Pines for up to 45 days and (2) a January 5, 2026 order authorizing medication. Counsel had filed a notice of dismissal, which the court treated as a motion to dismiss. After the court ordered a hearing to confirm whether appellant abandoned the appeals, appellant testified he no longer wished to pursue them because he was no longer committed. The court lifted the abatement, granted the dismissal motion, and dismissed the appeals as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed Donald Wayne Herod’s pro se petition for writ of mandamus because it was a collateral attack on his final felony conviction and thus must be pursued through a post-conviction habeas application under Article 11.07 in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The court explained that mandamus is not the proper vehicle for challenging a final felony conviction and that only the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction over such post-conviction felony relief. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and any pending motions were denied as moot.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the City of Houston’s summary-judgment motion asserting governmental immunity after a parking-garage collision between a City-owned truck and the plaintiff’s car. The City argued its employee was off-duty and not acting in the course of employment, but the court held the undisputed fact that a City employee was driving a City-owned vehicle gave rise to a rebuttable presumption she was acting within the scope of employment. The City’s affidavit and records were conclusory and failed to conclusively rebut that presumption, so a fact issue remained.

The First District of Texas dismissed Ashlee Walker's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 for failure to prosecute after she did not file an appellate brief or respond to the court's notice and directive to file a brief and motion for extension. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring briefs and authorizing dismissal for failure to comply, and it also dismissed any pending motions as moot. The dismissal was issued as a memorandum opinion by a three-justice panel on April 16, 2026.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Angel Fuentes's appeal from a County Civil Court at Law in Harris County because the appellant failed to file a brief by the deadline, did not seek an extension, and did not respond to the court's notice that the brief was overdue. The court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and treated any outstanding motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a ruling on the merits of the underlying case.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal by Affordable Ready Mix.com and Grace Raven because they failed to establish indigence or pay the required appellate filing fee, and they did not respond to the Court's notice directing them to either pay or explain why they should not. The court cited Texas appellate rules and statutory fee provisions, concluded appellants did not comply with the Court's directive, and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court also dismissed any pending motions as moot.

The Fifteenth Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by With Strength We Lead 2018, LLC for want of prosecution because the appellant failed to file or pay for the clerk's record. The court notified appellant of intent to dismiss and granted a 30-day extension to arrange payment and file the record, warning that failure to do so by April 2, 2026 would result in dismissal. Because no clerk's record was filed and no proof of payment was shown, the court dismissed the appeal.

The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of U.S. Bank’s motion for new trial and upheld the default judgment in favor of Business Unlimited. Business Unlimited sued to quiet title after a lien sale and obtained a default judgment when U.S. Bank failed to answer. U.S. Bank sought a new trial under the three-part Craddock standard for setting aside defaults, claiming an administrative mistake and asserting meritorious defenses. The appellate court found U.S. Bank proved mistake but failed to adequately set up factual support for meritorious defenses, so the Craddock test was not satisfied and the denial of a new trial was not an abuse of discretion.

The court affirmed the trial court’s default judgment against U.S. Bank (USB) in a quiet-title action because USB failed to prove entitlement to a new trial under the Craddock standard. USB was served but did not answer, a default judgment was entered, and USB later sought a new trial supported by a late affidavit from a bank vice president. The court held the affidavit was conclusory and lacked personal knowledge about the registered agent’s handling of service, so USB did not show its failure to answer was an accident rather than intentional or due to conscious indifference.

The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) dismissed Tonia Lynn Edwards’s appeal for failure to pay the required $205 filing fee after giving notice under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court cited its prior notices (March 3 and March 18, 2026), the appellant’s noncompliance with procedural rules and a Texas Supreme Court fee order, and dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(c) and 43.2(f). The opinion also orders the appellant to pay all appellate costs.