Court Filings

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five criminal cases for lack of jurisdiction. Brown had pleaded guilty to theft-from-person in three cases and aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon in two others, and in each case he agreed as part of plea arrangements to waive his right to appeal. The trial-court paperwork and appellant’s own filings show he knowingly and voluntarily waived appeal rights, and the judgments expressly note appeals were waived. Because the record contains valid appeal waivers and no trial-court permission to appeal, the court dismissed the appeals.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five consolidated criminal cases because the trial-court record shows he validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to violations in three theft-from-person cases and pleaded guilty to two aggravated robbery cases; in each cause he signed documents and the judgments reflected an appeal waiver. Because the written certifications and filings demonstrate a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver and the trial court did not grant permission to appeal, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s consolidated appeals from five felony convictions for lack of jurisdiction. Brown pleaded guilty to theft-from-person in three cases and to aggravated robbery in two others, and in each case he signed plea paperwork and certifications expressly waiving his right to appeal. The court found the trial-court certifications and the record show a knowing, voluntary waiver of appeal and that the trial court did not grant permission to appeal, so the appellate court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five criminal cases because the trial-court record shows he validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to evidence in five felony cases, signed written waivers and advisals acknowledging he gave up his appeal rights, and the judgments expressly state appeal was waived. Because a valid, knowing, and voluntary waiver bars appeal absent trial-court permission, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas affirmed Nicholas Darris Marshall’s conviction and 12-year sentence for possession of between 4 and 200 grams of methamphetamine. Marshall pleaded guilty after the State waived two enhancement paragraphs; evidence at sentencing included police testimony, lab results showing 2.1152 grams of methamphetamine, and Marshall’s own testimony about how the drugs came to be in his car. The court held Marshall failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment challenge and, even if preserved, the sentence—being within the statutory 2–20 year range—was not grossly disproportionate under the relevant precedent.

Appellants Mark Goloby and Richard Vega sued Harris County commissioners, contending Commissioner Adrian Garcia resigned his county office when the Commissioners Court appointed him to the Gulf Coast Protection District (GCPD) board. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Commissioners Court’s appointment of one of its own members to the GCPD was void under the common-law self-appointment branch of the incompatibility doctrine, so Garcia never lawfully became a GCPD director and therefore did not resign his commissioner seat. Because Garcia remained an official-capacity county officer, governmental immunity barred the claims and the dismissal with prejudice was proper.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Maria Nava Hernandez's appeal from a final judgment entered October 20, 2025, for lack of jurisdiction because her notice of appeal was filed December 12, 2025 — more than the required 30 days and not saved by any timely post-judgment motion or Rule 26.3 extension. The court explained the 30-day deadline, the 90-day extension available only if a timely post-judgment motion is filed, and that the 15-day window to seek an extension under Rule 26.3 had passed. Because the notice was untimely and no jurisdictional basis existed, the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were denied as moot.

The First District of Texas affirmed a bench-trial judgment quieting title in favor of Linda Jean Willis. Pro se appellant Larry Dean White claimed ownership of a vacant lot by adverse possession after decades of mowing and maintenance, but the trial court found his proof insufficient. The appeals court held White failed to prove a required element—that his possession was hostile and exclusive such that it reasonably notified the true owner. Because the evidence did not establish all elements of adverse possession for the statutory period, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

The Texas First District Court of Appeals dismissed Kevin Williams's appeal from a December 8, 2025 judgment because he neither paid required appellate fees nor proved indigence for those costs, and he failed to adequately respond after being notified that the appeal was subject to dismissal. The court cited the applicable Texas rules and statutes governing appellate fees and procedure and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal for failure to comply with fee and response requirements, not a ruling on the merits of the underlying judgment.

The First District of Texas dismissed Jim Bob's appeal for failure to pay required appellate fees or to establish indigence. The court previously notified appellant that the appeal would be dismissed unless he either paid the fees or explained in writing why he should not be required to pay them. Because Jim Bob did not respond or pay, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions. The dismissal rested on the applicable Texas rules and statutes governing payment of appellate fees and the court’s authority to involuntarily dismiss for noncompliance.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s order revoking Q.W.’s probation and committing him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department for seven years. The juvenile had been placed on probation after pleading true to two counts of aggravated robbery. The State sought modification alleging truancy, a positive marijuana test, and unlawful carrying of a handgun. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Q.W. violated probation, including committing a new-law offense by being found with a handgun in a vehicle, and concluded the evidence supported revocation.

The Court of Appeals considered two appeals by John Lewis Jr. challenging a January 5, 2026 commitment to Kingwood Pines and an order authorizing medication. Appellant's counsel filed a notice of dismissal and the court treated it as a motion to dismiss. After abating the appeals for a hearing, the trial court docket showed appellant testified he no longer wished to pursue the appeals because he was no longer committed. The court lifted the abatement and granted the motion, dismissing both appeals and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed two appeals brought by John Lewis Jr. challenging (1) a January 5, 2026 writ committing him to Kingwood Pines for up to 45 days and (2) a January 5, 2026 order authorizing medication. Counsel had filed a notice of dismissal, which the court treated as a motion to dismiss. After the court ordered a hearing to confirm whether appellant abandoned the appeals, appellant testified he no longer wished to pursue them because he was no longer committed. The court lifted the abatement, granted the dismissal motion, and dismissed the appeals as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed Donald Wayne Herod’s pro se petition for writ of mandamus because it was a collateral attack on his final felony conviction and thus must be pursued through a post-conviction habeas application under Article 11.07 in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The court explained that mandamus is not the proper vehicle for challenging a final felony conviction and that only the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction over such post-conviction felony relief. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and any pending motions were denied as moot.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the City of Houston’s summary-judgment motion asserting governmental immunity after a parking-garage collision between a City-owned truck and the plaintiff’s car. The City argued its employee was off-duty and not acting in the course of employment, but the court held the undisputed fact that a City employee was driving a City-owned vehicle gave rise to a rebuttable presumption she was acting within the scope of employment. The City’s affidavit and records were conclusory and failed to conclusively rebut that presumption, so a fact issue remained.

The First District of Texas dismissed Ashlee Walker's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 for failure to prosecute after she did not file an appellate brief or respond to the court's notice and directive to file a brief and motion for extension. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring briefs and authorizing dismissal for failure to comply, and it also dismissed any pending motions as moot. The dismissal was issued as a memorandum opinion by a three-justice panel on April 16, 2026.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Angel Fuentes's appeal from a County Civil Court at Law in Harris County because the appellant failed to file a brief by the deadline, did not seek an extension, and did not respond to the court's notice that the brief was overdue. The court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and treated any outstanding motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a ruling on the merits of the underlying case.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal by Affordable Ready Mix.com and Grace Raven because they failed to establish indigence or pay the required appellate filing fee, and they did not respond to the Court's notice directing them to either pay or explain why they should not. The court cited Texas appellate rules and statutory fee provisions, concluded appellants did not comply with the Court's directive, and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court also dismissed any pending motions as moot.

The Fifteenth Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by With Strength We Lead 2018, LLC for want of prosecution because the appellant failed to file or pay for the clerk's record. The court notified appellant of intent to dismiss and granted a 30-day extension to arrange payment and file the record, warning that failure to do so by April 2, 2026 would result in dismissal. Because no clerk's record was filed and no proof of payment was shown, the court dismissed the appeal.

The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of U.S. Bank’s motion for new trial and upheld the default judgment in favor of Business Unlimited. Business Unlimited sued to quiet title after a lien sale and obtained a default judgment when U.S. Bank failed to answer. U.S. Bank sought a new trial under the three-part Craddock standard for setting aside defaults, claiming an administrative mistake and asserting meritorious defenses. The appellate court found U.S. Bank proved mistake but failed to adequately set up factual support for meritorious defenses, so the Craddock test was not satisfied and the denial of a new trial was not an abuse of discretion.

The court affirmed the trial court’s default judgment against U.S. Bank (USB) in a quiet-title action because USB failed to prove entitlement to a new trial under the Craddock standard. USB was served but did not answer, a default judgment was entered, and USB later sought a new trial supported by a late affidavit from a bank vice president. The court held the affidavit was conclusory and lacked personal knowledge about the registered agent’s handling of service, so USB did not show its failure to answer was an accident rather than intentional or due to conscious indifference.

The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) dismissed Tonia Lynn Edwards’s appeal for failure to pay the required $205 filing fee after giving notice under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court cited its prior notices (March 3 and March 18, 2026), the appellant’s noncompliance with procedural rules and a Texas Supreme Court fee order, and dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(c) and 43.2(f). The opinion also orders the appellant to pay all appellate costs.

The court reversed a trial-court order that denied the employer’s motion to compel arbitration and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration and stay the case. Josh Adams sued his former employer, The Bridge Strategy & Technology Consulting, LLC, for unpaid cash and phantom-stock commissions. Bridge moved to compel arbitration under an employment agreement clause that referenced wage-related statutes and the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court of Appeals held the arbitration clause was governed by the federal act, that the phrase “wages” reasonably includes commissions, and that the clause’s broad “arising from/relating to” language covers Adams’s claims.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment for attorneys Leslie Hyman and Pullman, Cappuccio & Pullen, LLP in Susan Harriman’s legal-malpractice suit. Harriman sued claiming the lawyers mishandled a 2017 hearing to unseal certain sealed court records and that their actions forced her into an unfavorable settlement in an underlying defamation case. The appellees moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment arguing Harriman offered no proof that their conduct proximately caused her damages. The appellate court held Harriman produced only speculation and no more than a scintilla of evidence on proximate cause, so summary judgment was proper.

The Second Court of Appeals at Fort Worth dismissed Sergio Guadal Maresmartinez’s appeal of his convictions for two counts of sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child because his notice of appeal was untimely. His sentence was imposed June 29, 2023, and without a motion for new trial his notice of appeal was due July 31, 2023. He filed his notice on February 27, 2026. The court concluded that timely filing of a notice of appeal is essential to its jurisdiction and that Maresmartinez’s response did not show any grounds for continuing the appeal or authorization for an out-of-time appeal.

The court dismissed Ross Thomas Brantley’s pro se appeal for lack of jurisdiction because there was no signed trial-court order denying his statutory request for postconviction DNA testing (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 64.01). The appellate court gave Brantley ten days to show grounds to continue the appeal but received no response. Citing its rules and prior precedent, the court concluded there was no appealable order and therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) affirmed Reginald Dewayne Taylor’s conviction for possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine (4–200 grams) and the jury’s punishment verdict of 35 years’ imprisonment. The court rejected Taylor’s three appellate challenges: (1) the trial court properly denied his motions to suppress because the search-warrant affidavits and reasonable inferences supplied a substantial basis for probable cause to search two residences and vehicles; (2) Instagram records were properly authenticated through a records certificate and corroborating testimony and circumstances; and (3) including a limiting instruction listing all permissible Rule 404(b) purposes was not reversible error and in any event benefited Taylor. The court affirmed the judgment.

The court reviewed an appeal by Oliver Perry Harris from the trial court’s revocation of his deferred adjudication and seven-year sentence after the court found a supervision violation true. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief concluding the appeal was frivolous. After its independent review, the appellate court found no arguable grounds for reversal but identified an unsupported $1,743.00 reparations assessment in the written judgment and related inmate trust withdrawal order. The court deleted that reparations assessment from the judgment and the withdrawal order, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the judgment as modified.

The Second Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court’s adjudication of guilt and three-year prison sentence for Joey Sullivan. Sullivan had been placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision after pleading guilty to evading arrest with a vehicle. The State later petitioned to adjudicate, alleging Sullivan fled from a peace officer; after a hearing the trial court found the violation true, adjudicated guilt, and imposed sentence. Sullivan’s appointed appellate attorneys concluded the appeal was frivolous, submitted an Anders brief, and the court agreed there were no arguable grounds for relief.

The Second Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed a juvenile court's order committing D.A. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department after a modification hearing. D.A. had admitted to delinquent conduct, was placed on probation, then repeatedly absconded and violated probation terms; the juvenile court found she violated lawful orders and made the required findings to commit her. On appeal she argued the trial court refused to consider the full range of dispositions by denying a psychological evaluation and prejudging the case. The appellate court found no preserved due-process complaint about the evaluation and no evidence the court predetermined disposition, so it affirmed.