Court Filings

The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed Marcelino Rebollar’s convictions and sentences. After a jury convicted Rebollar of two counts of aggravated child molestation and one count of child molestation, he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence for one aggravated-child-molestation count, trial counsel’s effectiveness for not requesting a lesser-attempt charge, and the constitutionality of consecutive life sentences. The court found the evidence sufficient, concluded counsel’s choices were reasonable trial strategy and not shown to be deficient, and held the sentencing claim was unpreserved because it was not raised at sentencing. The convictions and sentences were affirmed.

The Court of Appeals granted the appellant's motion to remand so the trial court can consider a request to incorporate records from two separate cases into the record of this appeal. Previously, the court denied the appellant's motions to supplement the record because there was no trial-court order adopting or incorporating the other cases' records into this case. The remand allows the trial court to rule on a motion to incorporate those documents; if the trial court grants it and the appellant timely files a new notice of appeal, the matter will be re-docketed as a new appeal after the record is transmitted.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Claims’ grant of summary judgment for the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (BWC). The dispute concerned whether a $120 fee for an independent medical reviewer that BWC included in its subrogation demand was released by a prior settlement. The appellate court held the settlement’s release of subrogation rights did not bar Thomas’s claim for reimbursement because the fee was not part of the statutory subrogation interest and BWC was statutorily required to pay costs of medical reviews itself. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals reviewed Johnnie J. Wappner’s convictions for felonious assault, felony murder, and reckless homicide following a jury trial. The court held that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense-of-others for Wappner’s intentional act of striking the victim and on accident for his separate act of shooting the victim; both defenses could apply to different acts alleged by the prosecution. Because that instructional error was not harmless and affected Wappner’s felonious assault and felony murder convictions, those convictions were reversed and the case remanded for a new trial as to those counts; the reckless homicide conviction was affirmed.

The court denied Keimarkus Woodard’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking a new parole-revocation hearing, an acquittal of alleged parole violations, and removal from post-release control. The Tenth District adopted the magistrate’s findings that the Ohio Adult Parole Authority (OAPA) complied with due process and that the hearing officer’s findings that Woodard violated conditions of supervision were supported by substantial evidence (including agent testimony and a seized packet testing positive for fentanyl). The court concluded Woodard failed to show OAPA had a clear legal duty to find him not guilty or that OAPA abused its discretion.

The Court of Appeals denied Thomas Jones’ request for a writ of mandamus seeking to force Judge Lisa L. Sadler to serve him with an entry of dismissal and to rescind a bill for court costs. The court adopted the magistrate’s decision and granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss, finding that the duty to serve judgment and note service on the docket lies with the clerk of court under Civ.R. 58(B), not with the judge. The court also held Jones has an adequate remedy at law (e.g., Civ.R. 60(B) or appeal) and thus cannot meet mandamus requirements.

The court dismissed Prince Charles Cotten Sr.’s procedendo petition as moot. Cotten sought an order requiring Franklin County Common Pleas Judge Carl A. Aveni to proceed to judgment in Cotten’s underlying civil case, alleging delay and failure to rule on a motion. The magistrate and appellate panel found the trial judge had already dismissed Cotten’s complaint without prejudice on August 11, 2025 (thereby resolving pending motions), so there was no remaining duty to compel. Because the act Cotten sought had been performed, the procedendo claim was moot and the motion to dismiss was sustained.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. The appeal challenged (1) the municipal court’s grant of leave to amend a counterclaim and transfer to common pleas court, (2) the common pleas court’s grant of additional time under Civ.R. 56(F) for discovery, and (3) denial of plaintiff-appellant Castro’s motion for summary judgment. The appellate court held the municipal court properly transferred the case because the amended counterclaim exceeded its $15,000 jurisdictional limit, the trial court did not abuse discretion in granting a Civ.R. 56(F) continuance, and genuine disputes of material fact (about the terms and performance of an oral agreement concerning sewer-line work) precluded summary judgment.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the convictions of Travis Ratcliff because the trial court misinformed him at his plea-change hearing about the nature and maximum length of the prison terms he faced. Ratcliff had pleaded guilty to seven counts, including two second-degree felonies that, under Ohio law after the Reagan Tokes Act, carry mandatory indefinite sentences. The trial judge told Ratcliff those counts carried definite two-to-eight year terms and the written plea form repeated that error. The appeals court concluded this was a complete failure to comply with Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(a) and vacated the pleas without requiring a showing of prejudice.

The Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Fulton County Common Pleas Court’s June 5, 2025 judgments sentencing James Pontious to an aggregate 24-month prison term. Pontious was convicted after a bench trial of tampering with evidence for submitting an Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous meeting sign-in sheet he knew to be false and intended to mislead his probation officer. The appeals court rejected arguments that trial errors, discovery violations, admission of testimony, insufficiency and weight of the evidence, and Miranda problems required reversal, finding any evidentiary errors harmless and the proof sufficient and not against the manifest weight.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Perry County Domestic Relations Court’s ruling that the pending divorce action abated when the husband (plaintiff) died before any adjudication on the merits. The couple originally filed for dissolution with a separation agreement, the matter was converted to divorce, but no evidentiary hearing or decree occurred before the husband’s death. Because no judicial decision existed that could be journalized after death, the appeals court held the trial court lacked authority to continue the divorce and properly closed the case.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order allowing the Department of Water Resources (DWR) to enter private properties under California’s precondemnation entry statutes to conduct environmental, cultural, and geological investigations for the Delta Conveyance Project. The court held that those statutes authorize any public entity that is authorized to acquire property by eminent domain to perform such testing without first satisfying separate Water Code “project approval” provisions that apply to commencing a classic condemnation. The court relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Property Reserve I, finding the statutes constitutionally adequate.

The Court of Appeal affirmed a trial-court order awarding attorney’s fees to respondent Ponani Sukumar after the court dismissed appellant Afshin Zand’s cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Zand argued the anti-SLAPP ruling and subsequent fee awards were void or procedurally defective, but the appellate panel held those contentions were meritless, largely barred by law of the case or forfeited, and improper collateral attacks. The panel also found the appeal frivolous and imposed $10,000 in sanctions payable to the clerk, granted Sukumar appellate fees under section 425.16(c)(1) to be fixed on remand, and remanded to determine certain fee amounts.

The Court of Appeals granted appellant Yousif H. Alazzawi’s motion for a new trial after finding that a significant and necessary portion of the reporter’s record was lost or rendered unusable without his fault. The missing material consists primarily of English translations of testimony given in Arabic that the court reporter could not transcribe from Zoom recordings. Because the missing portions are necessary to resolve Alazzawi’s appeal of the divorce decree and the protective order, and the parties could not agree on replacements, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded both the divorce decree and the protective order for a new trial.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas dismissed Katherine Wesley King’s appeal from a Denton County default judgment because she failed to file her appellate brief. The appellant’s brief was due March 9, 2026; the court notified her on March 16 that the appeal could be dismissed if no brief arrived by March 26, 2026. King did not file a brief or otherwise communicate with the court, so the panel dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Tyler Hernandez's appeal from a trial court's Final Decree of Divorce for want of prosecution. The clerk's record was due but not filed because Hernandez failed to arrange payment; the court directed him to pay by a deadline and warned the appeal would be dismissed if he did not. He failed to comply or to elect filing an appendix instead, so the appellate court dismissed the appeal under the appellate rules permitting dismissal for failure to prosecute.

The court issued a memorandum order in an appeal from a trial court’s termination of J.H.’s parental rights to R.D. because the court reporter failed to file the reporter’s record by the due date. Noting lack of communication from the reporter, the appellate court abated the appeal and remanded to the trial court to determine what remains to complete the record, why it is incomplete, how much time is needed, and whether a substitute reporter is required. The trial court must enter orders, include findings in a supplemental clerk’s record, and file that record by April 23, 2026, unless the reporter files the record first.

The court affirmed the trial court’s revocation of Edward Bobby Martinez’s community supervision for indecency with a child by sexual contact and the imposition of his ten-year sentence, but it modified the judgment and bill of costs to remove language permitting future assessment of court-appointed attorney’s fees. The court held that Martinez’s refusal to submit to an instant-offense polygraph—required by his sex-offender treatment—constituted a violation of supervision because his Fifth Amendment privilege no longer applied to the final, adjudicated offense. Because Martinez has been found indigent, the court deleted any prospective attorney-fee assessment.

The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the superior court's dismissal of a putative class complaint by absent class member Destiny Corbin against Life Care Centers. Corbin filed claims for unpaid meal periods five days after a separate, court-approved class settlement (Atkinson) resolved claims about unpaid COVID-19 testing and screening time. The court held that the scope of preclusion depends on the settling parties’ intent; because the Atkinson settlement and its notices released only claims related to COVID-19 testing and screening for absent class members, it did not bar Corbin’s distinct meal-period claims. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals reviewed a challenge to the Department of Natural Resources’ (DNR) determination of nonsignificance for the Wishbone Timber Sale, a proposed harvest of about 100 acres within a larger sustainable harvest plan. The court held the DNS was not clearly erroneous and struck the lower court’s order requiring a site-specific climate impact assessment. However, it held DNR must perform an alternatives analysis under RCW 43.21C.030(2)(e) because the sale presents an actual choice of uses for the trees at the sale site. The case is partially reversed, partially affirmed, and remanded for that limited compliance.

The Georgia Court of Appeals issued an order on April 13, 2026, denying Maria Theresa Pagano's emergency motion for a stay pending appeal in her case against Citizens Bank, N.A. The order is brief and procedural: the court considered the emergency motion and declined to grant a stay. No accompanying opinion explaining the court's reasoning or factual findings was provided in the document.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Progressive Mountain Insurance Company’s attempt to appeal a trial court order awarding attorney fees as a discovery sanction because the order was not final. The trial court reserved the amount of fees for a later hearing, so the case remained pending below. Progressive did not seek interlocutory review under the statutory procedure (OCGA § 5-6-34(b)) by obtaining a certificate of immediate review. Because Progressive failed to follow the required interlocutory appeal steps, the Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted Applicant Katrina Cooper's motion to withdraw her application for discretionary appeal in case A26D0439. The court ordered that the application is deemed withdrawn and issued a formal minute entry reflecting that decision on April 13, 2026. There is no opinion on the merits because the procedural request to withdraw was uncontested and dispositive of the application.

The Court of Appeals dismissed its own consideration of Xavier Demon Walker’s discretionary application and transferred the matter to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Walker was convicted of felony murder and other crimes, and the trial court denied his new-trial motion. Because felony murder carries a possible death penalty and the Georgia Constitution gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction over cases where death was imposed or could be imposed, the Court of Appeals concluded it lacks jurisdiction and transferred the application to the Supreme Court for disposition.

The Court of Appeals dismissed a direct appeal by plaintiffs Whitney Garland and Thomas Nichols from a trial-court order awarding attorney fees to defendant Provectus Unum, LLC. The plaintiffs had voluntarily dismissed their contract lawsuit, but the trial court reopened the case because Provectus had a pending counterclaim for fees and then awarded fees under Georgia law. The Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because appeals of fee awards under OCGA § 9-15-14 must proceed by discretionary application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(10), and the plaintiffs did not follow that procedure.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed L. Lin Wood’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The underlying civil trial court entered a $9,661,177 judgment for the plaintiffs and granted a supersedeas bond on November 5, 2025. Wood filed a motion for reconsideration on November 12 and a notice of appeal on December 9, 2025. The Court held that the notice of appeal was untimely as to the November 5 order because it was filed 34 days later, and that the later denial of the reconsideration motion is not directly appealable and does not extend the appeal deadline.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Kreslyn Barron Odum’s application for discretionary appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of her motion to set aside an order requiring her to pay half of a guardian ad litem’s fees. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because the underlying custody case remains pending and the order is interlocutory. Odum failed to follow interlocutory appeal procedures, including obtaining a certificate of immediate review from the trial court, so the discretionary-appeal process could not cure that jurisdictional defect.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Brittany Jackson's appeal from a judgment in favor of Bay Street Homes arising from a dispossessory action because Jackson filed her notice of appeal 21 days after the trial court's order denying her motion for new trial, instead of within the seven-day deadline that applies to dispossessory cases. The court explained that although possession became moot, the underlying action remained a dispossessory proceeding seeking past-due rent, so the special seven-day appeal window under OCGA § 44-7-56 controlled. Because timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, the court lacked authority to hear the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an application for discretionary appeal filed by Stephen Arthur Vance from a domestic-relations case (LC No. 24V0055). After review, the court denied the application for discretionary appeal on April 13, 2026. The order is a short procedural ruling and does not address the merits of the underlying dispute; it simply declines to grant permission for the case to proceed to the Court of Appeals for full appellate review.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Husband’s direct appeal from a final divorce judgment for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that appeals in divorce and related domestic relations matters must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review under OCGA § 5-6-35, and that compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional. Because Husband did not follow the required discretionary-appeal procedure, the Court of Appeals concluded it could not consider the appeal and dismissed the case.