Court Filings

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Thelma Peake's late request to file her appellate brief after the deadline and quashed her appeal in a dispute over Shaun Griffith’s nomination petition for Pennsylvania’s 3rd Congressional District. The court acted on an application for leave to file the brief nunc pro tunc and concluded the application must be denied. Because Peake failed to file a timely brief, the Court ended the appeal without reaching the merits of the underlying nomination-petition dispute.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Thelma Peake's late request to file her appellate brief out of time and quashed her appeal for failure to file a timely brief in a case challenging the nomination petition of Shaun Griffith for Pennsylvania's 3rd Congressional District. The court's order, issued per curiam, concluded that leave to file nunc pro tunc was not warranted and that the procedural default (no timely brief) required dismissal of the appeal. No substantive merits were reached because the appeal was disposed of on procedural grounds.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed Charles Flaherty’s convictions and sentences after review of multiple claims. The court rejected Flaherty’s challenges to evidentiary rulings, denials of pretrial motions asserting self-defense immunity and speedy trial violations, and the claim that the trial court failed to conduct a Faretta hearing. The appellate court also upheld sentences for two counts of attempted second-degree murder, finding no reversible error, but noted the defendant may still raise an improper reclassification sentencing claim in a post-conviction proceeding.

The Florida Supreme Court denied Chadwick Willacy’s requests for public records and related relief after the Governor signed his death warrant. Willacy had sought records from FDOC and other state agencies about Florida’s lethal-injection protocol and interagency communications; the circuit court denied those motions and refused rehearing or in camera review. The Supreme Court treated his appeal as a Rule 9.142(c) petition, found Willacy failed to show the records were tied to a colorable postconviction claim (and were therefore an impermissible fishing expedition), and denied his petition and his habeas petition, dismissed his appeal of an extension request, and denied oral argument.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Victor Valley Community College District in Jessie Walton’s suit alleging sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and related claims. The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion by excluding counsel’s curable declaration defect, and erred in holding Walton lacked FEHA standing, failed Government Claims Act notice, and could not show the District acted with deliberate indifference under Education Code section 66270. The court ordered the trial court to vacate its summary judgment, grant summary adjudication only on Walton’s Civil Code claim she did not contest, and deny summary adjudication on the remaining claims for trial setting.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court judgment denying The Retail Property Trust’s request to have its Brea Mall property reassessed under Revenue and Taxation Code section 170(a)(1) based on COVID-19 related closures and restricted access. The assessor summarily denied the trust’s calamity applications, the Assessment Appeals Board upheld that denial, and the trial court concluded as a matter of law that section 170(a)(1) requires physical damage to property (direct or indirect) before reassessment relief is available. The appellate court agreed, finding neither government closure orders nor the virus itself constitute the required physical damage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed as moot the appeal by Sebastian C., who challenged a juvenile court’s denial of his request to transfer from a secure youth treatment facility to his adult sister’s home as a "less restrictive program" under Welfare & Institutions Code section 875. The appellate court concluded that clarification of the statutory meaning was warranted: a family home can qualify as a less restrictive program when supervision and services are provided or coordinated by a community-based nonresidential program. Because Sebastian was later placed in less restrictive settings and the challenged order no longer affects him, the court dismissed the appeal without deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in this case.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Josue Antonio Gurrola’s conviction for first-degree sexual assault of a child. Gurrola argued on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony from a clinical supervisor at a children’s advocacy center about the victim’s therapy, symptoms, and feelings during the guilt-innocence phase. The appeals court concluded Gurrola failed to preserve that complaint because he did not make contemporaneous, sufficiently specific objections at each contested point or obtain a running objection, so the court declined to address the merits and affirmed the conviction and sentence.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Jessica Marklund Johansson. The court issued a short memorandum opinion stating only the denial and citing the appellate rule permitting such disposition. No substantive analysis or factual background appears in the opinion; the denial resolves the original mandamus proceeding brought from Travis County without granting the extraordinary relief sought.

The Texas Court of Appeals, Third District, granted appellant Chadwick Edward Lambert’s joint motion to dismiss his criminal appeal. The motion was signed by Lambert and his appellate counsel and cited Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). Because the motion complied with the rule, the court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. The decision is a brief memorandum opinion filed April 14, 2026, and the dismissal was entered on appellant’s motion.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ruben Dario Almela’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and also granted attorney’s fees but did not set the fee amount, so the order did not resolve all claims or parties and was not a final, appealable judgment. The appellate court previously questioned jurisdiction and gave Almela time to show cause; he did not respond. Because the judgment was not final and Almela failed to justify appellate jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals of the Seventh District of Texas affirmed Tara Zoe Rios’s conviction for driving while intoxicated with a child passenger. Rios asserted she wanted to represent herself at a pretrial hearing but also demanded trial proceed that day; the visiting judge declined to allow self-representation that day and offered either to proceed to trial with appointed counsel or revisit self-representation later. Rios chose to proceed with counsel and went to trial, where she was convicted. The court held the trial judge did not abuse discretion and Rios effectively waived self-representation; assessed fines and costs were waived for indigence.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Terry Akwue’s appeal from a small claims judgment because his notice of appeal was untimely. The trial court entered final judgment on September 26, 2025; Akwue filed a motion for new trial which extended his deadline to December 26, 2025, but he did not file his notice of appeal until January 7, 2026. The appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction for a late-filed notice, gave Akwue notice that the appeal would be dismissed, received no response, and therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences of Justin Wayne Ortego, who was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a young child and three counts of indecency by contact based largely on text-message evidence recovered by his estranged wife and testimony from the victim. Ortego argued the phone evidence should have been suppressed and that the trial court erred by denying requests to have two defense witnesses testify remotely by Zoom. The court upheld the denial of suppression and concluded there is no general statutory, rule-based, or constitutional right to admit live remote testimony absent a specific statutory exception or proper procedure, so exclusion did not constitute reversible error.

The Court of Appeals of the First District of Texas affirmed the convictions of Justin Wayne Ortego for continuous sexual abuse of a young child and three counts of indecency by contact. Ortego challenged (1) denial of his motion to suppress text-message evidence his former partner, Jennifer, retrieved from his phone and (2) the trial court’s refusal to allow two defense witnesses to testify remotely via Zoom. The court held the phone-search evidence was admissible and that no statutory, rule-based, or constitutional right compelled admission of live remote testimony here, so exclusion was within the trial court’s discretion.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant Justin Wayne Ortego’s convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a young child and three counts of indecency by contact, and the trial court’s sentence (life plus three 20-year terms). The defendant challenged (1) denial of his motion to suppress evidence his wife found on his phone and (2) denial of his requests to have two defense witnesses testify remotely by Zoom. The court held the wife’s search did not trigger suppression and that trial courts have no general, enforceable right to admit live remote testimony absent a rule or statute, so denying Zoom testimony was not an abuse of discretion.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of Justin Wayne Ortego for continuous sexual abuse of a child and three counts of indecency by contact. Ortego challenged (1) the denial of his motion to suppress evidence his wife found on his phone and the trial court’s refusal to give an Article 38.23 jury instruction, and (2) the denial of his requests to have two defense witnesses testify remotely by Zoom. The court held the phone-search evidence was admissible and that there is no general statutory, rule-based, or constitutional right to require live remote testimony in criminal trials absent a specific statutory exception or agreement of the parties, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reviewed Jordan Potts’s conviction for murder and the Anders brief filed by his appointed counsel asserting the appeal is frivolous. After independent review of the full record and noting Potts received notice and the chance to file a pro se response (he did not), the court concluded there are no arguable grounds for reversal. The court affirmed the trial-court judgment sentencing Potts to 45 years, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and directed counsel to notify Potts of the result and file proof of that notice.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order terminating the father’s parental rights to his six-year-old son, Z.A.A., and leaving the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) as sole managing conservator. DFPS sought termination so the child’s maternal great-grandfather, who had provided long-term stable care and planned to adopt, could become permanent conservator. The court found by clear-and-convincing evidence that DFPS made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with father and that termination was in the child’s best interest given father’s repeated incarcerations, criminal history, lack of contact, and the child’s improved stability in the great-grandfather’s home.

The Court of Appeals denied a petition for a writ of mandamus from Anjeneya Vijay Cheruvu, who sought to overturn a March 19, 2026 trial-court order holding him in contempt for possession or access in a Fort Bend County child-protection case. Cheruvu argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the contempt order. The appellate court concluded he did not meet the heavy burden required for mandamus relief, so it refused to direct the trial court to vacate the contempt order and dismissed any pending motions as moot.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a trespass to try title suit. Houston International Management & Trade, Inc. (HIM) claimed ownership of 23 commercial lots by adverse possession, but a jury found HIM had not possessed the property peaceably and adversely for the statutory period and instead found a verbal management agreement existed between HIM and the record owners (the Peacock parties). The court held there was some evidence supporting the jury’s findings, rejected HIM’s challenges to JNOV, new trial claims, and factual-sufficiency complaints, and affirmed the hold that the Peacock parties own the properties.

The First District of Texas dismissed Terran Doral Green’s appeal of the trial court’s February 24, 2026 denial of his pro se pretrial habeas application as moot. Green, who had filed a pro se habeas application challenging a limitations issue while represented in the trial court, was denied in a handwritten ruling. By the time of appeal, he had been convicted and sentenced (judgment signed March 4, 2026), so he was no longer in pretrial confinement. Because the habeas relief sought was tied to pretrial release, the court concluded there was no live controversy and dismissed the appeal and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Christina Keller's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2, Harris County, because she failed to provide or pay for the reporter’s record and then failed to file her appellate brief by the court-ordered deadline. The court notified Keller of the missing reporter’s record and limited consideration to issues not requiring that record, gave her time to file a brief, warned that dismissal could follow, and received no response. The court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Court of Appeals dismissed this interlocutory appeal because the parties informed the court they reached a settlement and filed a joint motion to dismiss. Both parties agreed to bear their own appellate costs, counsel signed the motion, and no cross-appeal was filed. The court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, ordered costs taxed against the parties who incurred them, and denied as moot any pending motions.

The court reviewed Corey Morrell’s suit against the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) after an enforcement order assessing penalties for scrap tires on his land. The trial court dismissed all claims for lack of jurisdiction. The appeals court held that the trial court erred only as to Morrell’s Public Information Act mandamus claim because the TCEQ withheld responsive records and did not prove an exception to disclosure. The court affirmed dismissal of Morrell’s other claims (challenging the order as void/ultra vires and a challenge to a scrap-tire rule) because they were untimely, lacked merit, or lacked standing, and remanded the PIA claim for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Roy Boone Bright's appeal from the trial court's denial of a December 2025 motion that sought to vacate his 2019 convictions and recidivist sentence. The court held Bright had no right to appeal because his filing improperly attempted to collaterally attack the validity of his convictions through a post-conviction motion that is not a permitted procedure in a criminal case. The court relied on Georgia Supreme Court precedent establishing that such efforts to set aside convictions by post-conviction motion are not appealable and therefore must be dismissed.

The Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction over Levi Jerome Marshall, Jr.'s appeal from the trial court's dismissal of his 2024 habeas corpus petition as untimely and successive. Because the Georgia Constitution grants the Supreme Court of Georgia exclusive appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus matters, the Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Georgia Supreme Court for disposition. The order is procedural and does not address the merits of Marshall's habeas claims.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Antique Fields’ application for discretionary review of a magistrate court writ of possession because the application was filed too late. The magistrate court entered judgment on 2026-02-27, and Antique Fields filed for review on 2026-03-24, which exceeded the seven-day deadline for filing under Georgia law. The Court explained that its jurisdiction to review magistrate court orders exists only after review by a state or superior court, and because the application was untimely and filing deadlines are jurisdictional, the Court could not transfer the matter and therefore dismissed the application.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an Application for Discretionary Appeal filed by Tyrone Pinkston, Sr. in case number A26D0449 arising from LC number 25DR02094 and denied the application on April 14, 2026. The court issued a brief administrative order without opinion, simply stating that the request for discretionary review is denied. No substantive reasoning or discussion of the underlying family-law dispute is provided in the order.

The Georgia Court of Appeals denied FPL Foods, LLC's application for discretionary appeal in the case FPL Foods, LLC et al v. Terrie Martinez-Tello. The order is brief: the court considered the application and denied it, which means the intermediate court's decision stands and the Court of Appeals will not review the matter on the discretionary docket. No substantive reasoning or opinion explaining the denial is provided in the document.