Court Filings

The Tenth Court of Appeals reviewed Father's appeal of a trial court order terminating his parental rights to four children. Counsel filed an Anders brief concluding the appeal is frivolous, and Father submitted a pro se response. The appellate court conducted a full review of the record, found sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings that Father violated Family Code §161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and that termination was in the children’s best interest, and affirmed the termination order. The court denied counsel’s motions to withdraw because they did not show independent good cause under Texas law.

The Tenth Appellate District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s bill of review challenging a July 26, 2022 order that terminated his parental rights to A.A.C.C. The Department moved for traditional summary judgment, arguing a six-month statutory bar under Texas Family Code §161.211(a) prevents collateral or direct attacks on such termination orders. Appellant did not file any response to the summary judgment motion. The court held the Department met its burden by showing the termination was under §161.002(b) and the bill of review was filed well after the six-month deadline, so the petition was time-barred.

The Texas Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court order terminating both parents’ rights to infant Ivy after a jury found, by clear and convincing evidence, statutory grounds D, E, and N and that termination was in the child’s best interest. The Department of Family and Protective Services removed Ivy after she arrived at the hospital with a fractured femur, liver laceration, and bruising; testimony and medical opinions raised serious abuse concerns and showed parental instability and untreated mental-health issues. The court also upheld appointment of the Department as managing conservator and denied Mother’s mistrial claim about an improper juror communication.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas dismissed an unopposed voluntary motion by appellant D.E.P. to dismiss an appeal from a final order in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (child referred to by initials). The court found the motion complied with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1), that granting dismissal would not prejudice any party, and no appellate decision had been issued. The court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, declined to entertain a rehearing motion, and ordered issuance of its mandate immediately.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed a mandamus petition by Zachary Brice Knox challenging a temporary restraining order that denied him possession and access to a child. After the petition was filed, the trial court modified and partially vacated the TRO and set a hearing for temporary orders. Because the complained-of provisions were vacated, the appellate court found Knox’s complaints moot and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under the appellate rules.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s final order terminating a mother’s parental rights to her eight children. The appeals court reviewed the record after counsel filed an Anders brief concluding there were no nonfrivolous issues, independently reviewed the record, and agreed the mother’s appeal lacked merit. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother endangered the children through substance abuse, constructively abandoned them, and failed to complete court-ordered substance treatment, and that termination was in the children’s best interest. The appeals court denied counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the termination order.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s final order terminating a mother’s parental rights to her child. The appellate court found clear and convincing evidence that the mother endangered the child through substance abuse and related conduct, failed to comply with a court-ordered plan, and that termination was in the child’s best interest. Because the legislature repealed one statutory predicate ground after the proceedings began, the court modified the trial court’s written order to delete the now-void finding under subsection (O). The court denied counsel’s withdrawal and required counsel to pursue further appellate remedies if appropriate.

The court dismissed an appeal from a county court-at-law involving matters concerning M.P. and A.P. because the appellant failed to pay the required $205 filing fee after her claim of indigence was rejected by the trial court. The appellate court gave notice and a deadline to pay, warned dismissal would follow under the appellate rules, and the fee was not paid by the deadline. The court denied as moot the appellant's pending motions and ordered the appellant to pay all costs of the appeal.

The court granted the father's request to dismiss his own appeal in a child custody case. The Department of Family and Protective Services had removed the child and filed to terminate parental rights; instead the parties reached an agreed judgment appointing the Department permanent managing conservator while mother and father remained possessory conservators. The father, incarcerated at the time, initially appealed but after new appellate counsel secured a hearing and the father waived his motion for new trial and the appeal, he moved to dismiss the appeal, which the court granted under the appellate rules.

The appellate court dismissed Mother's appeal from a final order in a suit affecting the parent–child relationship because her notice of appeal was untimely. The trial court signed the final order on 2025-06-24, and the notice of appeal was required within 20 days (by 2025-07-14) for this accelerated appeal pathway. Mother did not file her notice until 2026-03-17, and she did not respond to the court's request to show grounds to retain the appeal. Because no timely notice or extension was filed, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeals of the Second Appellate District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s December 10, 2025 order terminating Father’s parental rights to A.M. The Department of Family and Protective Services had petitioned to terminate under multiple statutory grounds. Father challenged one predicate ground and alleged due-process defects in the Department’s timelines and service plan, but he did not challenge the other independent predicate findings or preserve the service-plan complaint for appeal. Because at least one unchallenged statutory ground and the best-interest finding supported termination, the appellate court affirmed.

The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Raymond T. DeMeritt’s motion to terminate child-support withholding. DeMeritt, declared the father in a 1985 legitimation decree, sought termination claiming he had overpaid and that garnishment was improper. The Office of the Attorney General submitted accounting reports showing DeMeritt owed arrears and interest; the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found DeMeritt owed $30,990.57 as of January 6, 2025. The appeals court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion, noting DeMeritt failed to rebut the OAG’s accounting or meet his burden of proof.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s modification appointing J.A.V.S. as sole managing conservator and C.R. as possessory conservator of two children. The mother, C.R., appealed but repeatedly failed to follow appellate briefing rules, including providing record citations and legal argument. The court struck her initial brief, accepted an inadequate amended brief, and found no reporter’s record for the November 20, 2025 modification hearing, so the appellate record did not show what evidence the trial court considered. Because C.R.’s submissions provided nothing for review, the court affirmed the modification order.

The Texas Sixth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights to her infant child, E.T. The Department removed the child shortly after birth when both tested positive for amphetamine and later showed Mother’s continued methamphetamine and other drug use, untreated bipolar disorder, failure to complete court-ordered services, and periods of incarceration and mental-health treatment. The court applied the statutory best-interest factors (Holley factors) and concluded that Mother’s instability, ongoing substance use, untreated mental-health issues, and failure to complete services supported a finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s Final Decree of Divorce between Chukwuemeka Carl Runyon and Bianca Bazile Runyon. After a bench trial, the trial court divided the community estate, appointed both parents joint managing conservators, gave the mother the right to determine the child’s primary residence (with a geographic restriction allowing residence in Brazos County or within 50 miles of Orlando, Florida), and ordered father to pay $1,840 per month in child support. The court found no abuse of discretion in the property division, the relocation decision, or the refusal to grant a child-support credit for travel expenses, given the record and applicable family-law standards.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights to twin children R.H. and E.H. after reviewing an accelerated appeal challenging whether termination was in the children’s best interest. The court applied Texas statutory standards and Holley factors, giving deference to factfinder credibility determinations. It found clear-and-convincing evidence the mother’s persistent methamphetamine use, failure to comply with services and testing, association with an abusive partner, and instability endangered the children and made reunification unsafe. The children were bonded with and well-cared for by their maternal aunt and her husband.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s enforcement order and final judgment enforcing a divorce decree property award in favor of Pamela Sheehan. George Sheehan had spent or moved funds that the divorce decree had awarded from a specific bank account, so the trial court converted the award into a money judgment for $64,601.44 plus $6,200 in attorney’s fees. The appeals court held the enforcement judgment was a permissible enforcement remedy under the Family Code, not an unauthorized modification of the divorce decree, and the award of attorney’s fees was authorized.

The Second Court of Appeals for Texas dismissed Father's accelerated appeal from a January 6, 2026 final order in a suit affecting the parent–child relationship because Father failed to file his appellate brief by the March 3, 2026 deadline and did not respond to the court's March 16, 2026 notice. The court gave Father until March 26, 2026 to file a brief and a motion explaining the delay but received no response. Citing Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure allowing dismissal for want of prosecution, the court dismissed the appeal on April 16, 2026.

The court affirmed a district court’s post-answer default order in a suit affecting the parent–child relationship, except it removed the portion changing the child’s last name. The mother sought sole managing conservatorship and child support; the father filed an answer but did not appear at trial. The trial court granted sole managing conservatorship and child support and ordered a name change. On appeal the father argued lack of notice, due process violations, recusal error, venue and evidentiary complaints. The appellate court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief, but the name change was unauthorized because no petition sought it, so that part was deleted and the order was otherwise affirmed.

The Court of Appeals of the Second Appellate District of Texas affirmed a trial court order terminating Father’s parental rights to A.S. after a bench trial. Mother had petitioned to terminate, alleging Father failed to support the child and that termination was in the child’s best interest. The appellate court found legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Father failed to provide support in accordance with his ability during the relevant twelve-month period and that termination was in A.S.’s best interest, noting the child’s distress over visits, the child’s improved well-being since visits stopped, and Father’s financial choices and reliance on his fiancée to pay household expenses.

The Texas Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to her child, T.C.-J., after the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services removed the child due to suspected prenatal and ongoing methamphetamine exposure. The jury found statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in the child’s best interest. The appellate court rejected Mother’s challenges because she failed to preserve complaints about the sufficiency of the best-interest evidence and about admission of prior Department history by not making the required trial objections or motions.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District conditionally granted mandamus relief to Heather Zermeno, who asked the court to vacate a temporary order appointing her and her husband joint managing conservators in their divorce case. The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion by appointing joint managing conservators despite credible evidence that the father committed family violence within two years of the divorce filing, which the Family Code prohibits for joint conservatorship. The appellate court ordered the trial judge to vacate the temporary joint-managing-conservator order and review conservatorship consistent with the statute.

The court affirmed a default final order terminating or modifying parental rights after Mother obtained substituted service and a default hearing while Father did not appear. Father filed a restricted appeal arguing substituted service and service returns were defective, certain certificates were filed prematurely, and the clerk failed to send notice of judgment. The court concluded Father met the procedural requirements for a restricted appeal, found his briefing on several points inadequate, and determined nothing in the record showed error on its face; therefore the trial court’s default final order was affirmed.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed an attempted appeal in a child-support modification case for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant filed a notice of appeal after the trial court had entered and then vacated an order dismissing his motion and granted a new trial date; no final, signed order was in the clerk’s record. The appellate court warned the appellant to show cause and to file any supplemental clerk’s record by a deadline, but the appellant did not respond. Because there was no final judgment or appealable order, the court dismissed the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights to four children. The Department had filed for termination after repeated removals tied to Mother’s chronic methamphetamine use and related instability, including leaving a child in a home with a person against whom a protective order had been obtained. The appellate court found the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support statutory grounds (D) and (E) — that Mother’s conduct and the children’s environment endangered their physical and emotional well‑being — and also held termination was in the children’s best interests based on the children’s repeated disruptions, their expressed desire to remain with relatives, and the relatives’ ability to provide permanency.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant A.C.'s attempted appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A.C., proceeding pro se, filed an application for a protective order and appealed after the trial court orally denied relief; the court later signed an order denying a temporary protective order and modifying visitation. Because A.C. acknowledged that related proceedings (a foreign custody/support registration from Ohio and a suit affecting the parent-child relationship) remain pending, the appellate court concluded the order was interlocutory and not immediately appealable under Texas law, and A.C. did not respond to a show-cause order.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order terminating the father’s parental rights to his six-year-old son, Z.A.A., and leaving the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) as sole managing conservator. DFPS sought termination so the child’s maternal great-grandfather, who had provided long-term stable care and planned to adopt, could become permanent conservator. The court found by clear-and-convincing evidence that DFPS made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with father and that termination was in the child’s best interest given father’s repeated incarcerations, criminal history, lack of contact, and the child’s improved stability in the great-grandfather’s home.

The Court of Appeals granted appellant Yousif H. Alazzawi’s motion for a new trial after finding that a significant and necessary portion of the reporter’s record was lost or rendered unusable without his fault. The missing material consists primarily of English translations of testimony given in Arabic that the court reporter could not transcribe from Zoom recordings. Because the missing portions are necessary to resolve Alazzawi’s appeal of the divorce decree and the protective order, and the parties could not agree on replacements, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded both the divorce decree and the protective order for a new trial.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Tyler Hernandez's appeal from a trial court's Final Decree of Divorce for want of prosecution. The clerk's record was due but not filed because Hernandez failed to arrange payment; the court directed him to pay by a deadline and warned the appeal would be dismissed if he did not. He failed to comply or to elect filing an appendix instead, so the appellate court dismissed the appeal under the appellate rules permitting dismissal for failure to prosecute.

The court issued a memorandum order in an appeal from a trial court’s termination of J.H.’s parental rights to R.D. because the court reporter failed to file the reporter’s record by the due date. Noting lack of communication from the reporter, the appellate court abated the appeal and remanded to the trial court to determine what remains to complete the record, why it is incomplete, how much time is needed, and whether a substitute reporter is required. The trial court must enter orders, include findings in a supplemental clerk’s record, and file that record by April 23, 2026, unless the reporter files the record first.