Court Filings

The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio granted a joint motion to dismiss and dismissed a petition for writ of mandamus filed by Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon Logistics, Inc., Amazon Flex, and Amazon.com Services, LLC. The petition was originally filed March 10, 2026, and the court had set an April 7, 2026 deadline for responses. After the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss, the court granted the motion under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and dismissed the mandamus proceeding. No merits decision was reached.

A jury convicted Gabriel Gallegos of continuous sexual abuse of a child and two counts of indecency with a child. On appeal to the Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio), Gallegos argued the evidence was insufficient for one indecency count, alleged multiple jury-charge errors, and contested assessment of court costs. The court upheld the convictions, finding Amy Doe’s outcry and other evidence sufficient for the indecency conviction, that any potential jury-charge defects did not cause the egregious harm required to reverse unpreserved errors, and that Gallegos forfeited his complaint about the court-cost inquiry by not objecting at sentencing.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed Edward Arnold Few’s convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by exposure. Few challenged multiple trial rulings — late disclosure of cell-phone extraction reports, admission of photos/videos from phones, hearsay/outcry testimony, extraneous-offense testimony, a ChildSafe interview video excerpt, and a double-jeopardy claim. The court rejected each argument, finding Few waived many objections by failing to timely and specifically object at trial, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under the applicable evidentiary rules and statutory provisions, and that the two convictions punished distinct acts involving different body parts (anus vs. genitals).

Justice Meza dissents from the court’s judgment in Carlos Zepeda Gonzales’s appeal for online solicitation of a minor. She agrees with the disposition reached but would abate and remand for the trial court to clarify and, if necessary, reform its written judgment. The written judgment contains inconsistent or omitted findings (unchecked registration box, wrong or missing fine/costs/fees, and no clear Chapter 62 registration pronouncement), while the record shows the trial court orally referenced an inapplicable 42A.054 (formerly 3g) finding. Because of these irreconcilable conflicts, she would send the case back to correct the record and ensure mandatory registration findings are properly made and reflected.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment sentencing Carlos Zepeda Gonzales to nine years’ imprisonment and a $5,000 fine after the court adjudicated guilt on an online solicitation of a minor conviction following violations of deferred adjudication. Gonzales argued his sentence was excessive, that the court improperly made a “42A” finding affecting parole, and that the court failed to inquire into his ability to pay costs. The appellate court found each complaint forfeited for failure to object at trial and explained that, even if preserved, the sentence was within the statutory range and not grossly disproportionate.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment convicting Paul Dillon Brown of possession with intent to deliver fentanyl and sentencing him to life imprisonment. Brown argued the appointment order incorrectly found he could pay for counsel and that his life sentence was cruel and unusual. The court held no modification to the appointment order was needed because Brown later retained private counsel and was not ordered to pay appointed-counsel fees. The Eighth Amendment claim was not considered because Brown failed to present his motion for new trial to the trial court, so the issue was unpreserved.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth District of Texas affirmed the conviction of Jacoby Latraille Brown, who pleaded guilty to failure to comply with sex-offender registration requirements and was sentenced to eight years in prison. Counsel filed an Anders brief concluding there were no nonfrivolous appellate issues; the court independently reviewed the record and found no reversible error. The court did find nonreversible errors in the bill of costs: a prematurely assessed $60 time-payment fee, which it struck under Dulin, and a contested assessment of $682.50 in attorney fees, which the concurrence would also delete but the majority did not.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment revoking Gary Ladale Criston's community supervision for possession offenses and sentencing him to five years' imprisonment with a $1,550 fine. Criston had originally pleaded guilty to possessing less than one gram of cocaine and received a ten-year sentence suspended in favor of five years' community supervision. After the State alleged multiple violations, the trial court found the allegations true and revoked supervision. Counsel filed an Anders brief asserting no arguable appellate issues; the appellate court independently reviewed the record and found no reversible error, granted counsel's motion to withdraw, and affirmed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Russell Carl Nast’s direct appeal of the trial court’s October 8, 2025 order confirming an arbitration award and granting a divorce because appeals in divorce cases must proceed by discretionary-appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2). The court concluded the proper procedure was an application for discretionary appeal, and that procedure is jurisdictional, so the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the direct appeal. The court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the respondent’s request for a frivolous-appeal penalty.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Tamera Montgomery’s appeal of a trial court order granting summary judgment to Milton Ruben Toyota of Augusta because Montgomery failed to file her appellant brief by the April 13, 2026 deadline and did not request an extension. The appeal had been docketed March 23, 2026, and under Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) the court dismissed for failure to prosecute. The order is procedural — the appellate court did not address the merits of the summary judgment ruling.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an attempted direct appeal by Olufeyijimi Awofadeju from a final divorce decree entered December 22, 2025. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because appeals in divorce and other domestic relations matters require a discretionary-appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35, and the appellant did not follow that procedure. Because use of the discretionary-appeal process is jurisdictional, the improperly filed direct appeal could not proceed and was dismissed on April 22, 2026.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the appellee's motion to remand the case Downey Trees, Inc. v. Stephens to the State Court of Forsyth County. The clerk was ordered to remand the matter, and the order allows either party to file a new notice of appeal within 30 days after resolution of a pending motion to enforce settlement. The decision is procedural and simply returns the case to the state court for further proceedings rather than addressing the underlying merits.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an application for discretionary appeal filed by Nathaniel Blackmon, III in case A26D0445 (LC 19FM3068) and denied the application on April 22, 2026. The order is a short administrative disposition: the court declined to grant permission for the case to be heard as a discretionary appeal. No opinion or reasoning is provided in the document beyond the denial itself.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s award of legal custody of two-year-old D.W. to the child’s paternal grandmother and her partner. The juvenile court had previously adjudicated D.W. dependent and placed the child in temporary custody after concerns about Mother’s methamphetamine use, unstable housing, and association with a drug-using boyfriend. The appellate court found the record shows Mother failed to comply with her case plan (substance use and mental health treatment, drug screens, and housing stability), while custodians provided a stable, supportive home and facilitated parental visitation. The court concluded the award was supported by the greater weight of the evidence and was in the child’s best interest.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Akron Municipal Court conviction of Clifford Atkinson for domestic violence. Atkinson argued on appeal that the City presented insufficient evidence that the victim, L.H., was a family or household member. The appellate court reviewed the record de novo, applied Ohio precedent defining "cohabitation" and family/household status, and concluded L.H.'s testimony that Atkinson had lived with her for about a month or two, that they were boyfriend/girlfriend, and that she provided transportation and support, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the relationship met the ordinance's definition. The conviction and sentence were therefore affirmed.

The First District Court of Appeals reversed defendant-appellant Joshua Mounts’s felony-murder conviction and remanded for a new trial. Mounts had reopened his direct appeal under App.R. 26(B) to claim ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The court found trial counsel performed deficiently by abandoning key expert testimony (Dr. Wiens) about histology slides, failing to object to undisclosed expert opinion testimony from Dr. Makoroff, and not objecting to improper prosecutorial remarks in closing. Because those errors undermined confidence in the verdict and appellate counsel should have raised them, the conviction was reversed and the cause remanded.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded consolidated medical-malpractice and related tort judgments against Dr. Abubakar Durrani and the Center for Advanced Spine Technologies. The jury had found for three plaintiffs on negligence, lack of informed consent, battery, and fraud and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The court held consolidation was proper, expert testimony and jury instructions were allowable, and prejudgment interest was properly awarded; but it vacated the awards for future medical expenses as unsupported and remanded to calculate statutory setoffs against plaintiffs’ settlements with other tortfeasors.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Odraye G. Jones’s pro se appeal from an April 2, 2026 trial-court entry requiring the State to disclose exculpatory evidence. The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction because the trial court’s order was interlocutory and not a final, appealable order under Ohio law. The court also concluded, alternatively, that Jones lacked standing because the trial court’s ruling granted him the relief he sought, so he was not an aggrieved party. All pending motions were ruled moot and the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Odraye G. Jones’s pro se appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Jones had appealed a March 13, 2026 trial-court entry denying his motions to dismiss a death-penalty specification. The appellate court held the denial was an interlocutory order that did not qualify as a final, appealable order under Ohio law and R.C. 2505.02(B), so it could not be reviewed now. Because no final judgment disposed of all claims, the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were overruled as moot.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed Tonya Redmond’s conviction for felonious assault with a firearm specification and her aggregate seven-to-nine year prison sentence. Redmond was convicted after a jury trial for shooting a 62-year-old man who had been housing her; she claimed the gun discharged accidentally while she was trying to turn on a light. The appellate court rejected her challenges to limits on displaying a written definition of “knowingly” during opening statement, found the trial court erred in declining to instruct that accident can negate knowledge but held that error harmless, and concluded the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence given contradictory testimony and other evidence suggesting a knowing shooting.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s August 28, 2025 denial of Charles McRae’s motion for leave to file an untimely petition for postconviction relief. McRae sought to challenge his 2023 convictions and sentence based on various ineffective-assistance, plea, competency, and record-related claims. The appellate court held the petition was untimely under R.C. 2953.21, McRae did not show he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts or rely on a new retroactive right under R.C. 2953.23, and his claims were barred by res judicata. The court also found no evidentiary materials showing entitlement to a hearing.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed Martin Holloman’s convictions after a jury trial for failure to comply with a police order and theft. Holloman argued the trial court should have instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of duress because he fled when an officer allegedly used force during an attempted arrest. The appellate court held the evidence did not support duress: Holloman initiated the struggle by pulling away and reentering his vehicle, any alleged force was not constant or imminent, and his fear of future harm was not objectively reasonable. The court therefore found no abuse of discretion in refusing the instruction.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Ryan Karr's pro se complaint against the Estate of Dianna Sayre and Joseph Aaron Sayre. Karr had alleged perjury, abuse of a disabled person, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other misconduct tied to a prior CPO proceeding, but his nine-page complaint failed to plead distinct causes of action, facts, dates, or the elements required to give defendants adequate notice. The appellate court held the complaint did not satisfy Civ.R. 8(A) and affirmed dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), noting Karr also failed to meaningfully brief his assignments of error on appeal.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed part of the First District Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated the municipal trial court’s denial of J.B.’s applications to seal five misdemeanor convictions prosecuted by the county. J.B. sought sealing of seven misdemeanor convictions; two prosecuted by the city were sealed by the court of appeals and not appealed. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding J.B. had not shown rehabilitation and that the government’s interest in public records outweighed hers. The Court rejected the court of appeals’ substitutions of judgment and novel limitations on what a trial court may consider under R.C. 2953.32.

The Ohio Supreme Court held that Nationwide Energy Partners (NEP), a company that purchases electricity and resells it to apartment tenants using equipment it installs and maintains, is an "electric light company" and therefore a public utility subject to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO). The court concluded tenants qualify as "consumers" under R.C. 4905.03(C) and that NEP is plainly engaged in the business of supplying electricity because it buys power, sets resale prices, bills tenants, and may disconnect service. The Court reversed PUCO’s jurisdictional ruling and remanded for further proceedings on the remaining claims and tariff issues.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed Edward Zealor’s convictions for fifty counts of possessing child sexual abuse material. Zealor had moved to suppress evidence obtained after the Commonwealth used administrative subpoenas under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5743.1 to obtain subscriber and router log information tying his shared IP/port to torrent files containing child pornography. The court held Zealor lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber, payment, and IP/port/torrent connection data, and even if some non‑constitutional statutory overreach occurred, suppression is not an available remedy under the Act. The convictions and sentence were therefore affirmed.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the dismissal of Jason Harding’s first PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing. Harding sought post-conviction relief asserting layered ineffective-assistance claims (trial, direct-appeal, and PCRA counsel) and other errors stemming from trial events (jury delay/mistrial, admission of a statement to police, counsel’s witness choices, and his decision to testify). The court found the claims either procedurally waived, meritless, or unprejudicial: the delay did not prejudice Harding, his custodial statement was a spontaneous utterance not requiring Miranda warnings, failure to call a particular witness would not have helped his self-defense case, and his decision to testify was knowing and voluntary.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Hakime Cooper’s conviction and sentence after a bench trial. Cooper was convicted of retaliation against a witness/victim and harassment for threatening the victim in a courthouse hallway after the victim testified against her. The court held the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence because Cooper and two companions together made multiple threats, satisfying the statute’s requirement of a course of conduct or repeated threatening acts. The court therefore upheld Cooper’s six- to twelve-month sentence for retaliation; no additional penalty was imposed for harassment.

The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the Cook County circuit court’s dismissal with prejudice of United Equitable Insurance Company’s 2022 declaratory judgment complaint. UEIC sought a declaration it owed no coverage beyond a $25,000 policy limit and that it breached no duties to its insured; Walker moved to dismiss arguing res judicata and lack of an actual controversy. The court held the policy limit was undisputed and that UEIC improperly sought retrospective clearance from liability for alleged past bad-faith conduct—matters properly litigated in Walker’s separate bad-faith lawsuit—so there was no justiciable controversy for a declaratory judgment.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff Myles Watson's employment-discrimination suit against the Metropolitan Transit Authority and NYCTA. The Supreme Court had dismissed the case based on a broad release the plaintiff signed after disciplinary proceedings, but the appellate court found factual disputes about the circumstances of signing and therefore rejected dismissal on that ground. The court nonetheless affirmed because the complaint failed to state a viable disability discrimination claim under New York State law and the evidence showed no available safe and reasonable accommodation under the New York City law; the hostile-work-environment claim was also inadequately pleaded.