Court Filings

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights to twin children R.H. and E.H. after reviewing an accelerated appeal challenging whether termination was in the children’s best interest. The court applied Texas statutory standards and Holley factors, giving deference to factfinder credibility determinations. It found clear-and-convincing evidence the mother’s persistent methamphetamine use, failure to comply with services and testing, association with an abusive partner, and instability endangered the children and made reunification unsafe. The children were bonded with and well-cared for by their maternal aunt and her husband.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s enforcement order and final judgment enforcing a divorce decree property award in favor of Pamela Sheehan. George Sheehan had spent or moved funds that the divorce decree had awarded from a specific bank account, so the trial court converted the award into a money judgment for $64,601.44 plus $6,200 in attorney’s fees. The appeals court held the enforcement judgment was a permissible enforcement remedy under the Family Code, not an unauthorized modification of the divorce decree, and the award of attorney’s fees was authorized.

The First District of Texas affirmed Nicholas Darris Marshall’s conviction and 12-year sentence for possession of between 4 and 200 grams of methamphetamine. Marshall pleaded guilty after the State waived two enhancement paragraphs; evidence at sentencing included police testimony, lab results showing 2.1152 grams of methamphetamine, and Marshall’s own testimony about how the drugs came to be in his car. The court held Marshall failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment challenge and, even if preserved, the sentence—being within the statutory 2–20 year range—was not grossly disproportionate under the relevant precedent.

Appellants Mark Goloby and Richard Vega sued Harris County commissioners, contending Commissioner Adrian Garcia resigned his county office when the Commissioners Court appointed him to the Gulf Coast Protection District (GCPD) board. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Commissioners Court’s appointment of one of its own members to the GCPD was void under the common-law self-appointment branch of the incompatibility doctrine, so Garcia never lawfully became a GCPD director and therefore did not resign his commissioner seat. Because Garcia remained an official-capacity county officer, governmental immunity barred the claims and the dismissal with prejudice was proper.

The First District of Texas affirmed a bench-trial judgment quieting title in favor of Linda Jean Willis. Pro se appellant Larry Dean White claimed ownership of a vacant lot by adverse possession after decades of mowing and maintenance, but the trial court found his proof insufficient. The appeals court held White failed to prove a required element—that his possession was hostile and exclusive such that it reasonably notified the true owner. Because the evidence did not establish all elements of adverse possession for the statutory period, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s order revoking Q.W.’s probation and committing him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department for seven years. The juvenile had been placed on probation after pleading true to two counts of aggravated robbery. The State sought modification alleging truancy, a positive marijuana test, and unlawful carrying of a handgun. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Q.W. violated probation, including committing a new-law offense by being found with a handgun in a vehicle, and concluded the evidence supported revocation.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the City of Houston’s summary-judgment motion asserting governmental immunity after a parking-garage collision between a City-owned truck and the plaintiff’s car. The City argued its employee was off-duty and not acting in the course of employment, but the court held the undisputed fact that a City employee was driving a City-owned vehicle gave rise to a rebuttable presumption she was acting within the scope of employment. The City’s affidavit and records were conclusory and failed to conclusively rebut that presumption, so a fact issue remained.

The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of U.S. Bank’s motion for new trial and upheld the default judgment in favor of Business Unlimited. Business Unlimited sued to quiet title after a lien sale and obtained a default judgment when U.S. Bank failed to answer. U.S. Bank sought a new trial under the three-part Craddock standard for setting aside defaults, claiming an administrative mistake and asserting meritorious defenses. The appellate court found U.S. Bank proved mistake but failed to adequately set up factual support for meritorious defenses, so the Craddock test was not satisfied and the denial of a new trial was not an abuse of discretion.

The court affirmed the trial court’s default judgment against U.S. Bank (USB) in a quiet-title action because USB failed to prove entitlement to a new trial under the Craddock standard. USB was served but did not answer, a default judgment was entered, and USB later sought a new trial supported by a late affidavit from a bank vice president. The court held the affidavit was conclusory and lacked personal knowledge about the registered agent’s handling of service, so USB did not show its failure to answer was an accident rather than intentional or due to conscious indifference.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment for attorneys Leslie Hyman and Pullman, Cappuccio & Pullen, LLP in Susan Harriman’s legal-malpractice suit. Harriman sued claiming the lawyers mishandled a 2017 hearing to unseal certain sealed court records and that their actions forced her into an unfavorable settlement in an underlying defamation case. The appellees moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment arguing Harriman offered no proof that their conduct proximately caused her damages. The appellate court held Harriman produced only speculation and no more than a scintilla of evidence on proximate cause, so summary judgment was proper.

The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) affirmed Reginald Dewayne Taylor’s conviction for possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine (4–200 grams) and the jury’s punishment verdict of 35 years’ imprisonment. The court rejected Taylor’s three appellate challenges: (1) the trial court properly denied his motions to suppress because the search-warrant affidavits and reasonable inferences supplied a substantial basis for probable cause to search two residences and vehicles; (2) Instagram records were properly authenticated through a records certificate and corroborating testimony and circumstances; and (3) including a limiting instruction listing all permissible Rule 404(b) purposes was not reversible error and in any event benefited Taylor. The court affirmed the judgment.

The court reviewed an appeal by Oliver Perry Harris from the trial court’s revocation of his deferred adjudication and seven-year sentence after the court found a supervision violation true. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief concluding the appeal was frivolous. After its independent review, the appellate court found no arguable grounds for reversal but identified an unsupported $1,743.00 reparations assessment in the written judgment and related inmate trust withdrawal order. The court deleted that reparations assessment from the judgment and the withdrawal order, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the judgment as modified.

The Second Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court’s adjudication of guilt and three-year prison sentence for Joey Sullivan. Sullivan had been placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision after pleading guilty to evading arrest with a vehicle. The State later petitioned to adjudicate, alleging Sullivan fled from a peace officer; after a hearing the trial court found the violation true, adjudicated guilt, and imposed sentence. Sullivan’s appointed appellate attorneys concluded the appeal was frivolous, submitted an Anders brief, and the court agreed there were no arguable grounds for relief.

The Second Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed a juvenile court's order committing D.A. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department after a modification hearing. D.A. had admitted to delinquent conduct, was placed on probation, then repeatedly absconded and violated probation terms; the juvenile court found she violated lawful orders and made the required findings to commit her. On appeal she argued the trial court refused to consider the full range of dispositions by denying a psychological evaluation and prejudging the case. The appellate court found no preserved due-process complaint about the evaluation and no evidence the court predetermined disposition, so it affirmed.

The Court of Appeals of the Second Appellate District of Texas affirmed a trial court order terminating Father’s parental rights to A.S. after a bench trial. Mother had petitioned to terminate, alleging Father failed to support the child and that termination was in the child’s best interest. The appellate court found legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Father failed to provide support in accordance with his ability during the relevant twelve-month period and that termination was in A.S.’s best interest, noting the child’s distress over visits, the child’s improved well-being since visits stopped, and Father’s financial choices and reliance on his fiancée to pay household expenses.

The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment committing Edward Lincoln Goff as a sexually violent predator under the Texas SVP Act. On appeal Goff argued the evidence was legally insufficient to show he currently suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to commit predatory sexual violence. The appellate court reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury, relied chiefly on the jury’s credibility determinations, and found the expert testimony (diagnosing pedophilic disorder and identifying risk factors) plus Goff’s history of multiple child-victim offenses, continued offending after detection, lack of insight, and certain coercive acts supported the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court affirmed the trial court’s final divorce decree enforcing a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) that divided the marital estate. The wife, Soo Jin, argued the MSA should be set aside because she signed under duress and did not sign voluntarily, citing health issues, language barriers, a panic attack, and pressure from counsel and the mediator. The appellate court held the MSA met Texas Family Code §6.602 requirements and found competent evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Soo Jin’s testimony did not show fraud, coercion, or incapacity that would void the agreement. The judgment enforcing the MSA was affirmed.

The Texas Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to her child, T.C.-J., after the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services removed the child due to suspected prenatal and ongoing methamphetamine exposure. The jury found statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in the child’s best interest. The appellate court rejected Mother’s challenges because she failed to preserve complaints about the sufficiency of the best-interest evidence and about admission of prior Department history by not making the required trial objections or motions.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed Tyler Stafford’s convictions and sentences after he pleaded guilty in three Cuyahoga County cases, including a third-degree count for having weapons while under disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). Stafford argued the statute was facially unconstitutional based on this court’s prior Philpotts decision and that counsel was ineffective for advising the plea. The court held Philpotts had been stayed by the Ohio Supreme Court when Stafford pled, so the statute remained valid; and the record did not show counsel was deficient or that Stafford suffered prejudice. The convictions and aggregate sentence were affirmed.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed Lorinzo Sampson’s total 36-month prison sentence after he pled guilty to attempted having weapons while under disability in two separate cases. The court rejected Sampson’s claims that the trial judge was biased, that the sentence was unlawful, and that he was improperly denied the right to hire counsel. The court found the judge’s courtroom comments and scheduling decisions did not demonstrate bias, that the record shows the court considered sentencing statutes and explained its reasons, and that the denial of a last-minute continuance to hire new counsel was a permissible exercise of discretion.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of Marlon Lewis’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle after a traffic stop. Police smelled burnt marijuana, Lewis admitted he had smoked in the car earlier, and an officer then searched the reachable area and found used blunts and a bag containing a firearm. The appellate court concluded that, given Ohio law at the time, smoking marijuana in a vehicle did not constitute a statutory criminal offense for a driver, so there was no probable cause to justify the warrantless search under the automobile exception.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Tajul Islam’s motion to continue a domestic-relations hearing and related rulings. Islam’s counsel was unavailable due to a criminal trial and Islam argued this denied him counsel and due process when the hearing proceeded in his absence. The appellate court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the late continuance request, that no constitutional right to counsel existed in this civil contempt/post-decree proceeding, and that Islam failed to show cumulative error or timely objections. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights and awarding permanent custody of twin infants A.N. and L.N. to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (CCDCFS). The agency had sought permanent custody in its original complaint after the children were removed at birth because of Mother’s unresolved mental-health problems, inconsistent engagement with services, and prior involuntary termination of parental rights to older siblings. The appellate court found the juvenile court’s findings supported by clear and convincing evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Citywide RX after Citywide prevailed on contract claims against multiple nursing-home defendants, including Selfridge Leasing. Citywide sought $434,252.95 in fees (primarily for a New York law firm plus local counsel); the trial court found Citywide the prevailing party under the contract’s fee provision, reviewed affidavits and itemized bills, and held the rates and hours reasonable. On appeal Selfridge argued the fees were excessive and duplicative, but the court rejected new arguments raised for the first time on appeal and found no genuine issue of material fact.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s November 20, 2025 denial of Letwan E. Cherry’s motion to vacate his six-to-nine year prison sentence for trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound. Cherry argued his sentence was void under Apprendi/Alleyne and Ohio authorities, but the appellate court held his sentence was an authorized indefinite term within the statutory range and that judicial factfinding to select a minimum within that range does not violate the Sixth Amendment. Several other challenges raised on appeal were tied to a later post-sentencing motion and thus were not properly before the court.

The Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Pike County Common Pleas Court's denial of a motion to set aside a sheriff's sale of real property sold for delinquent taxes. Gary Damron argued he (and other known heirs) did not receive proper notice because the Notice of Sale was sent by email to his then-attorney during the holiday period rather than by regular mail. The appellate court held service on Damron's attorney by e-mail complied with Civ.R. 5(B)(2)(f), was complete upon transmission, and was reasonably calculated to provide notice, so the trial court did not err in denying the motion to set aside the sale.

The Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed Walter Jackson’s convictions and sentence following his March 2023 jury trial and May 15, 2023 sentencing in Scioto County Common Pleas Court. Jackson was convicted on a 12-count indictment (drug trafficking/possession, weapons offenses, and related counts with firearm specifications). He raised five assignments of error including ineffective assistance, absence from trial, failure to merge allied offenses, improper consecutive sentences, and insufficiency/manifest-weight challenges. The court found the record supported the convictions and the consecutive sentences, and that the evidence (including circumstantial evidence and forensic lab results) was sufficient and not against the manifest weight.

The New Jersey Supreme Court held that historical cell site location information (CSLI) involves technical and specialized knowledge and therefore must be presented to a jury by a qualified expert under N.J.R.E. 702. The case arose from defendant Jule Hannah’s murder conviction where a detective testified as a lay witness mapping cell towers from phone records; the Appellate Division had reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. The Court found CSLI interpretation goes beyond ordinary juror knowledge, that the detective’s lay testimony and the prosecutor’s closing remarks risked misleading the jury, and that limiting instructions were insufficient to cure the error.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed Supreme Court's April 24, 2024 order denying Feifei Gu's motions to vacate a prior July 28, 2023 dismissal and for sanctions, while noting the court had effectively granted leave to reargue and then adhered to its prior dismissal. The court found the complaint was properly dismissed because Gu failed to file the mandatory notice of claim under General Municipal Law §§ 50-e and 50-i before suing the District Attorney's Office and two prosecutors, a defect that deprives the court of jurisdiction. The court also rejected Gu's fraud and misconduct claims as conclusory and unsupported.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed Supreme Court's order granting plaintiff Lloyd's partial summary judgment that defendant Southwest Marine must defend Lloyd's insured, Arsenal Scaffold Inc., as an additional insured in an underlying personal-injury action and reimburse Lloyd's defense costs. The court held that facts known to defendant created a reasonable possibility of coverage, so the duty to defend was triggered even though defendant's named insured (JGR Services) was not a direct defendant in the underlying suit. The court rejected Southwest Marine's contrary arguments and affirmed the denial of its cross-motion for summary judgment.