Court Filings

The Texas Third Court of Appeals reviewed Christopher Devontae Bennett’s appeal after the trial court adjudicated his guilt for sexual assault of a child and sentenced him to 18 years’ confinement following violations of court-ordered community supervision. Bennett’s appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw with an Anders brief stating the appeal is frivolous. The appellate court independently reviewed the record, found no arguable grounds for reversal, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the trial court’s adjudication and sentence. The court advised Bennett of his rights and noted he filed no pro se brief.

The Court of Appeals (Sixth District) affirmed the trial court's revocation of Roy Cletdell Robinson's community supervision for a state-jail felony possession conviction. Robinson was alleged to have failed to report for supervision (March–May 2025), failed to provide a valid address, failed to perform required community service, and failed to pay fines and costs. The court found the evidence (including testimony from Robinson and his supervision officer) sufficient by a preponderance to support revocation, and held Robinson forfeited his claim that his due-process rights were violated because he failed to timely object at the revocation hearing.

The Texas court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s revocation of Roy Cletdell Robinson’s five-year community supervision for evading arrest with a prior conviction. Robinson argued the evidence was insufficient to support revocation and that the trial court violated his due process rights by relying on hearsay probation officer testimony without a business records affidavit. The appellate court applied the same standards and analysis used in Robinson’s companion appeal, found no reversible error, and concluded the trial court properly revoked supervision. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

The court dismissed Devoris Antoine Newson’s attempted appeal from the trial court’s verbal denial of his pretrial habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court found no written order ruling on the habeas application in the record, and Texas law requires a written order to invoke appellate jurisdiction in habeas matters. The court also noted the underlying criminal charge was dismissed after Newson filed his habeas application, rendering the pretrial habeas petition moot. Because Newson did not show cause why the appeal should proceed, the court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The court dismissed Devoris Antoine Newson’s attempted appeal from the trial court’s verbal denial of his pretrial habeas application for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court explained that an oral pronouncement is not appealable absent a signed written order, and the record contained no written ruling. The court also noted the underlying criminal charge was dismissed after Newson filed his habeas application, rendering the habeas petition moot. Because there was no appealable written order and the case was dismissed, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The court dismissed Devoris Antoine Newson’s attempted appeal of a pretrial habeas corpus ruling for lack of jurisdiction. Newson sought review after an oral denial of his pretrial writ under Texas law, but no written trial-court order appears in the record. The court also found the issue moot because Newson entered a plea bargain, was tried and convicted, and therefore the pretrial relief he sought (including bail reduction) could no longer be granted. Because there was no appealable written order and the matter is moot, the appeal was dismissed.

The Texas Supreme Court (Justice Hawkins, joined by two justices) concurred with the Court’s opinion holding that the plaintiffs qualify as prevailing parties entitled to attorney’s fees under a specific Texas statute. The concurrence explains that although the trial court labeled the relief a "temporary injunction," the statutory scheme at issue makes such relief effectively final because disclosure of information cannot be undone. Because the defendants complied and the information was disclosed, the plaintiffs obtained ultimate relief and thus prevailed for fee-shifting purposes.

The Texas Supreme Court held that two former Webb Consolidated ISD board members who obtained a trial-court temporary injunction ordering the district to produce requested board materials qualified as "prevailing" under Texas Education Code § 11.1512(c-2) and may recover reasonable attorney’s fees for the relief obtained. The court explained that although temporary injunctions normally preserve the status quo and do not confer prevailing-party status, the injunction here effectively granted the only relief the statute authorizes — production of requested information — and the district complied. The court also held board members need not exhaust administrative remedies before suing under § 11.1512(c-2). The case is remanded for determination of recoverable fees limited to the injunction-related claims.

The Texas Supreme Court granted two petitions for review in competing claims over a 1933 deed that reserved an “undivided one-fourth of the usual one eighth” royalty. The court held the court of appeals erred in declining to address the presumed-grant doctrine on jurisdictional grounds, vacated the court of appeals’ merits decision, and remanded for reconsideration of both deed construction and the presumed-grant doctrine. The Court emphasized that the presumed-grant issue was fairly included in the permissive appeal and instructed the court of appeals to resolve both paths without expressing a view on the ultimate ownership outcome.

Justice Young dissented from the Court’s denial of a petition for writ of mandamus by Warwick Construction, Bustamante Construction, and DLC General Construction Services. The relators asked the trial court for limited reopening of discovery under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 190.5(b); the trial court denied that request and the relators sought mandamus relief. Justice Young would have stayed the upcoming trial so the Court could fully consider whether the denial of discovery implicated Rule 190.5(b) and risked mooting review. He explains that proceeding to trial could vitiate relators’ ability to present their case and waste judicial resources if an appellate remedy were later required.

The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus to direct the trial court to enter summary judgment for Bell Helicopter. The family of a pilot who died in a 2017 helicopter crash sued Bell, claiming the flight manual failed to warn adequately about flying with a loose engine cowling. Bell invoked the federal General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA), which bars suits against manufacturers brought more than 18 years after delivery unless a "new" part that is alleged to have caused the accident was added or replaced within 18 years. The Court held the manual revisions did not restart GARA’s 18-year clock because none of the changes constituted a new part alleged to have caused the crash.

The Texas Supreme Court dismissed interlocutory appeals and vacated three trial-court temporary injunctions that had barred the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) from investigating reports that minors received puberty blockers or hormone therapy for gender transition. The Court concluded the injunctions presented no live controversy because DFPS permanently closed most of the investigations and the remaining child reached majority, so there is no credible threat of future enforcement. A psychologist’s claim for injunctive relief likewise failed for lack of standing because her alleged injuries were speculative.

The Texas Supreme Court concurred that the preliminary injunctions entered in two consolidated suits should be dissolved. The Chief Justice agreed that the private families’ claims are moot and that PFLAG lacks standing, but concluded that Dr. Megan Mooney likely retains standing to pursue at least part of her challenge to the Department of Family and Protective Services’ reporting rule. Nevertheless, because Texas law now outlaws the challenged treatments and higher courts have upheld such bans, he would vacate the injunctions on the merits as the legal landscape forecloses the plaintiffs’ theories.

The Texas Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Tyrone Shepard for possession of a controlled substance (less than one gram) but modified the trial court judgment to correct clerical errors about plea and jury-waiver language. Shepard argued jury-charge error, improper reopening of the State's case, and denial of a speedy-trial motion. The court held the “on or about” instruction was a correct statement of law and not a comment on the evidence, that the trial court permissibly reopened the State’s case, and that the Barker factors did not show a constitutional speedy-trial violation given delays largely attributable to Shepard and minimal prejudice.

The Tenth Court of Appeals dismissed William Penn Dixon’s pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the intermediate appellate court lacks original habeas jurisdiction in criminal matters. Dixon had asked the court to order the trial court to act, hold a hearing, suppress evidence, and dismiss pending criminal charges alleging an illegal search. The court explained that jurisdiction to hear original criminal habeas petitions rests with the Court of Criminal Appeals, district courts, county courts, or judges in those courts, so the appellate court could not grant the requested relief and dismissed the filing for want of jurisdiction.

The Texas Tenth Court of Appeals considered an original petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Frances Spanos Shelton on June 26, 2025. The court reviewed the request and denied the petition. The short opinion states the procedural posture (an original mandamus proceeding), the parties, and the disposition without extended explanation or citations to legal standards or facts.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Elisha Holloway’s appeal from a county court judgment awarding possession and damages to The Julian at South Pointe because Holloway failed to file the required docketing statement and did not respond to the Court’s notices. The Clerk had set deadlines and warned that failure to comply could result in dismissal. Because no docketing statement or extension request was received, the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and for failure to follow a clerk’s directive, and it dismissed an emergency motion as moot.

The Court of Appeals reviewed Deandre Brooks’s appeal after the trial court adjudicated him guilty of evading arrest in a motor vehicle, revoked his community supervision, and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief concluding the appeal is frivolous; Brooks did not file a pro se response. The appellate court conducted an independent review, found no reversible error, but identified a nonreversible clerical error in the judgment’s listed court costs. The court modified the judgment to reflect $404 in costs, affirmed the judgment as modified, and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw.

The Court of Appeals dismissed an eviction appeal as moot after the appellants informed the court they no longer occupy the disputed property and do not oppose dismissal. The court noted that eviction proceedings in justice and county courts focus solely on the right to actual possession under Texas law and the civil rules. Because the appellants vacated the premises, the court vacated the county court judgment, dismissed the appeal and all pending motions, and provided no further relief on possession or related claims.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas dismissed an appeal brought by Mitternight Boiler Works, Inc. after Mitternight filed a motion to dismiss under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appellate court granted the motion prior to issuing any decision on the merits and dismissed the appeal, denying as moot all other pending motions. The dismissal was entered by per curiam opinion and the court noted the procedural rule authorizing dismissal on the appellant's motion.

The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Mireyda and Joel Gonzalez’s suit against the City of Vidor. The Gonzalezes claimed the City was vicariously liable for a police officer’s negligent driving that led to a crash, arguing the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) waived immunity because the officer acted recklessly and failed to use his siren. The Court of Appeals held the emergency exception to the TTCA applied: the officer was responding to an emergency, his use of lights but not a siren was justified under statutory exceptions, and the record did not show conscious indifference or reckless disregard that would waive immunity. The City’s plea to the jurisdiction was properly granted.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Ronald Sutherland’s suit for want of prosecution. Sutherland had sued Thomas Dean Stewart and Phillip Chapman for falsely reporting a 1966 Ford Mustang stolen and sought sanctions and a default judgment against Stewart for discovery failures. The trial court dismissed the case after Sutherland failed to appear for trial. The appeals court held Sutherland did not challenge the dismissal itself, and interlocutory denials of sanctions or default judgments cannot be reviewed separately once a final dismissal stands, so the dismissal is dispositive.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s final order terminating a mother’s parental rights to her eight children. The appeals court reviewed the record after counsel filed an Anders brief concluding there were no nonfrivolous issues, independently reviewed the record, and agreed the mother’s appeal lacked merit. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother endangered the children through substance abuse, constructively abandoned them, and failed to complete court-ordered substance treatment, and that termination was in the children’s best interest. The appeals court denied counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the termination order.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s final order terminating a mother’s parental rights to her child. The appellate court found clear and convincing evidence that the mother endangered the child through substance abuse and related conduct, failed to comply with a court-ordered plan, and that termination was in the child’s best interest. Because the legislature repealed one statutory predicate ground after the proceedings began, the court modified the trial court’s written order to delete the now-void finding under subsection (O). The court denied counsel’s withdrawal and required counsel to pursue further appellate remedies if appropriate.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s revocation of Austin Douglas Worley’s community supervision and three-year prison sentence. Worley, originally placed on deferred adjudication for evading arrest in 2017, faced a third motion to adjudicate alleging six violations including a new aggravated-assault offense, failures to report in writing, and unpaid fines and fees. The trial court found five violations true after testimony and evidence, adjudicated guilt, and sentenced him to three years’ confinement. The appellate court held the State met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence and that the revocation did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District granted the parties' joint motion to reinstate and dismiss an appeal brought by Rene Martinez from an order enforcing a Rule 11 settlement. After the case was abated for mediation, the parties executed a mediated settlement agreement and asked the court to dismiss the appeal. The court reinstated the appeal and dismissed it by joint motion, ordering costs taxed against the party that incurred them and noting that no motion for rehearing will be entertained.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Michael Marvin Tucker pleaded guilty to deadly conduct, received deferred adjudication and five years’ community supervision, but after the State moved to adjudicate he pleaded true to the allegations, the trial court adjudicated guilt and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief concluding there were no arguable grounds for appeal, the court conducted an independent review of the record, found no reversible error, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the conviction and sentence.

A Texas court of appeals affirmed Jose Luis Espinoza’s convictions for one count of continuous sexual abuse of a young child and two counts of indecency with a child by sexual contact. A jury convicted him and sentenced him to prison terms running concurrently. On appeal he raised nine issues—challenging sufficiency of the continuous-abuse duration element, double-jeopardy, admission of outcry testimony, extraneous-offense evidence, medical records, expert testimony on credibility, and cumulative error. The court rejected these arguments, finding the evidence legally sufficient, preserved or harmless errors where applicable, and no cumulative error warranting reversal.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Jason Kelsey’s petition for a bill of review seeking to set aside an agreed final divorce decree that awarded most marital assets to Maria Rocha. Kelsey, who signed the decree while incarcerated and proceeded pro se, claimed fraud, duress, lack of a valid marriage, and mischaracterization of his separate property. The trial court found he failed to prove a meritorious defense or that he was prevented by fraud, official mistake, or wrongful act from presenting a defense, and that his own negligence contributed to the outcome. The appellate court held those findings were supported and reviewed for abuse of discretion, so the denial was affirmed.

The Court of Appeals (Thirteenth District) denied Randall Bolivar’s petition for a writ of mandamus challenging several trial-court actions in cause no. 2021-DCL-05478. Bolivar argued the trial court abused its discretion by not deeming requests for admission admitted, by failing to provide notice and hearings on six motions, and by not signing a nonsuit order. The court held that mandamus is extraordinary relief and that Bolivar failed to meet his burden to show both a clear abuse of discretion and lack of an adequate appellate remedy, and the record provided was insufficient to support mandamus relief.