Court Filings

The Ohio Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s rulings in the death-penalty case of State v. Myers. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision to allow Myers to file a motion for a new trial, but it reversed the trial court’s grants of a new trial and of postconviction relief. The appellate court held the trial court abused its discretion and applied incorrect legal standards when it granted a new trial based on recently obtained DNA and forensic critiques, and the court lacked jurisdiction to grant postconviction relief because it failed to follow statutory gatekeeping procedures and applied the wrong legal tests.

The Ohio Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the Montgomery County trial court's ruling overruling Jonathan Search's objections to a magistrate's decision about parenting time and medical-expense accounting. Father had sought contempt findings, enforcement, and suspension of child support, and filed a self-prepared transcript with his objections. The appellate court held the parenting-time claims moot because the child reached age 18 before the trial court ruled, found no reversible error in the trial court rejecting the uncertified transcript and adopting the magistrate's findings, and determined the dismissal without prejudice of the medical-expense claim left no final order for appeal.

The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the Miami County Common Pleas Court's adoption of a magistrate’s decision that denied Latrisha McGhee’s post-decree motions concerning child custody, visitation, and related relief, and that suspended her parenting time. The appellate court held the appeal despite McGhee proceeding pro se, finding her appellate brief failed to comply with Ohio Appellate Rule 16 and did not present coherent arguments showing trial-court error. Because meaningful review was impossible, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment adopting the magistrate’s decision.

The Second District Court of Appeals reversed the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court’s dismissal of Thomas Coddington’s complaint seeking return of equipment allegedly wrongfully withheld after his father’s death. The trial court had dismissed the case as time-barred by the probate creditor-claim statute, R.C. 2117.06. The appellate court held that Coddington’s allegation of ownership and wrongful withholding places his claim outside the probate presentment requirement, so the trial court erred to the extent it dismissed under R.C. 2117.06. The case is remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of other defenses the trial court did not address.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the Columbiana County Common Pleas Court judgment convicting Davante L. Jackson after he entered a no-contest plea to multiple drug and evidence-tampering charges. Jackson argued his trial counsel was ineffective for withdrawing a suppression motion without his knowledge and that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. The appeals court found the record does not show deficient performance or prejudice from counsel’s withdrawal of the motion, and the trial court substantially complied with plea procedures and ensured Jackson understood his rights and the plea consequences. The conviction and sentence (total 5½ to 7½ years) were affirmed.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Kenneth Lewis’s postconviction application for DNA testing of a long-sleeved shirt recovered after a 2020 pawnshop robbery. The court concluded a prior DNA test by BCI was definitive because it showed Lewis was the major contributor of DNA on the shirt, and Lewis did not present evidence that prior testing was unreliable or that new testing would be outcome determinative. The court also relied on strong corroborating evidence (surveillance video, eyewitnesses, officer recovery of the shirt, license plate identification, cash and items on Lewis, and a jailhouse confession).

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed a Massillon Municipal Court judgment awarding Mancan, Inc. damages, interest, and attorney fees after Al’s Auto Services defaulted by not timely answering a breach-of-contract complaint. Mancan provided a temporary employee who was hired by Al’s Auto within a 180-day prohibited period; Mancan sued and secured a magistrate’s default judgment after a hearing. Al’s Auto did not file objections to the magistrate’s decision and failed to include a hearing transcript on appeal, so the appellate court reviewed only for plain error and found none, affirming the judgment.

The Ohio Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Adams County Board of Elections to hold a hearing within ten days on Christopher Hicks’s October 3, 2025 challenge to Prosecuting Attorney Aaron Haslam’s voter registration. The court ruled that Hicks, a qualified Ohio elector, has statutory standing under R.C. 3503.24(A). It held that res judicata and issue preclusion do not bar this action because no prior quasi-judicial hearing adjudicated the residency issue. The board abused its discretion and clearly disregarded R.C. 3503.24(B) by denying the challenge without a hearing when its records were insufficient to resolve material factual disputes about residency.

The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth District Court of Appeals' dismissal of inmate Robert Bates’s mandamus complaint seeking the names of certain prison officers under the Public Records Act. The appellate court dismissed the case because Bates’s accompanying affidavit of prior civil actions did not strictly comply with R.C. 2969.25(A): he failed to list the name of each party to several prior lawsuits. The Supreme Court held that R.C. 2969.25(A) is mandatory, requires strict compliance, and permits sua sponte dismissal for noncompliance, so dismissal was proper and the merits were not reached.

The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the Board of Professional Conduct’s findings that attorney Jack Herchel VanBibber committed multiple ethics violations while a prior disciplinary matter was pending. The court found that he neglected a client’s custody matter, knowingly made false statements to a tribunal, solicited a client’s significant other for sex via electronic messages, and failed to cooperate and made false statements during disciplinary investigations. Considering aggravating factors (prior discipline, multiple offenses, dishonesty, lack of cooperation, and harm to others) and limited mitigation, the court suspended him from practice for two years and taxed costs to him.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the juvenile court's November 7, 2025 order that declined to terminate court supervision of dependent adult N.L. at age 21 and ordered York County Children and Youth Services (CYS) to fund N.L.’s placement until social security benefits were obtained. The juvenile court found that although CYS had developed a transition plan, the plan lacked an enforceable funding source because N.L.’s guardian had not secured benefits. The Superior Court held that a dependency court may continue supervision past 21 when a transition plan is not complete, particularly when income to support placement is not in place.

The Superior Court considered James Smith’s challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for two convictions of unlawful contact with a minor after the Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of Commonwealth v. Strunk. The Court concluded Smith’s verbal statements to the victims — instructing them to perform oral sex and directing one to lie on a table immediately before assaulting her — were communications that induced or otherwise furthered sexual exploitation and therefore satisfied the statute’s communicative requirement. The court affirmed Smith’s convictions and judgment of sentence.

The Superior Court affirmed Jonathan Rivera’s convictions and sentence following his second jury trial for multiple sexual offenses against four minor girls. Rivera argued the trial court vindictively imposed a longer sentence after he successfully appealed his first convictions and that applying a later-enacted felony grading to one corruption-of-minors count violated the ex post facto clauses. The court found a presumption of vindictiveness attached but held it was rebutted by objective new information at resentencing (an SVP designation, victims’ updated testimony and impact, and Rivera’s trial testimony showing lack of remorse). The court also found the record supported offenses occurring after the statute’s effective date, so no ex post facto violation occurred.

The Superior Court reviewed a trial court’s pretrial evidence rulings in the Commonwealth’s vehicular homicide prosecution of Joshua A. Rivera. The panel affirmed some exclusions and reversed others: it upheld exclusion of body-camera audio and a Facebook video, but reversed the exclusion of non-numeric lay descriptions of driving by certain eyewitnesses and reversal of the exclusion of drug-related items found in Rivera’s impounded vehicle. The court reasoned that in a criminal case where the prosecution must prove state of mind, lay witnesses may give contextual, non-numeric testimony about driving, and items found pursuant to a lawful warrant were relevant and not rendered inadmissible by the time gap while the car was impounded.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the conviction of appellant Damien Mancuso because the prosecution failed to fix the date of the charged sexual offense with reasonable certainty, violating his due process rights. The court recognized the difficulties victims may face in reporting historic sexual abuse and the Legislature’s elimination or extension of limitations for many child sexual offenses, but held that the Commonwealth must still narrow the timeframe enough to allow a fair defense. The concurrence joined the majority and emphasized that an overly broad date range in distant-past allegations is fundamentally unfair to defendants.

Three brothers were tried jointly and convicted of sexual offenses against a single complainant from events when she was a minor. The Superior Court reversed Damien’s sentence because the Commonwealth failed to specify the date of his alleged offense with sufficient particularity. The Court reversed Rian’s sentence and ordered a new trial because consolidation of his trial with Damien’s was an abuse of discretion and prosecutorial closing remarks improperly invited guilt by association. The Court affirmed Sean’s convictions but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing because his convictions for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and indecent assault must merge for sentencing.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied appellants' challenge and affirmed the Commonwealth Court's April 2, 2026 order. The Court granted the appellants' request to supplement the record but upheld the lower court's decision that the candidate Al Buchtan’s nomination petition stands. The Court also ordered that Buchtan’s petition be treated as amended to list his legal residence as 100 Betty Boulevard, Carmichaels, Pennsylvania 15320, Greene County. Three justices recorded their dissent; a full opinion will follow explaining the detailed rationale.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Valladares had earlier vacated a 2007 aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) conviction as void under Aguilar, and he argued the sentencing court relied on that prior conviction when imposing a 70-year sentence for a 2009 murder conviction. The court held Valladares established cause because, when he filed his first postconviction petition in 2014, controlling caselaw prevented him from raising the vacatur claim, and he established prejudice because the sentencing record shows the court and prosecution relied on the void conviction.

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed a trial-court denial of Chancellor Aaron’s successive postconviction petition and ordered a new trial. Aaron had been convicted of first-degree murder in 2005 based largely on eyewitness testimony from Daniel Wesley. On remand the court found Wesley’s posttrial recantation and corroborating statements (including a 2017 affidavit and a 2018 State investigative report confirming the affidavit) were new, material, and sufficiently conclusive to undermine confidence in the guilty verdict. Because there was no physical evidence and the State’s case rested on witness testimony that later changed, the court concluded a retrial was warranted.

A jury in McLean County convicted Kevon Moon of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and obstructing justice based on circumstantial evidence tying him and co-defendant James to firearms and conduct surrounding an October 12, 2020 shooting. On appeal Moon argued (1) ineffective assistance for not objecting when the State impeached its own witness with prior recorded inconsistent statements, (2) that a video showing him rapping and dancing with a firearm was unduly prejudicial, and (3) it was error to allow a lead detective to sit at the State’s counsel table. The appellate court affirmed, finding the recorded statements were admissible as substantive evidence, the video was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial, and the court properly exercised its discretion to permit the detective at counsel table.

The Appellate Division reversed defendant Christopher Reynoso's convictions for murder, attempted murder, and weapons offenses and remanded for a new trial because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his initial waiver of Miranda rights and subsequent pre-invocation statements were voluntary. The court found several police-controlled circumstances undermined voluntariness: the mother's limited English and inadequate translation, denial of a private post-warning consultation between defendant and his mother, and a detective's statement implying negative consequences if defendant asked for a lawyer. Those factors, taken together, overcame evidence the interrogation was calm and included breaks, requiring reversal and suppression error remediation.

The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the Texas Department of Public Safety lawfully terminated Texas Ranger Robert Christopher Callaway after an incident at his daughter’s high school in which he threatened counselors and other officers while carrying his badge, handcuffs, and a firearm. Callaway claimed his conduct was caused by PTSD and sued for disability discrimination under the Texas Labor Code. The Court held that Section 21.105 excludes from Chapter 21 protection disabilities that impair an individual’s ability to reasonably perform the job, and concluded Callaway’s PTSD objectively impaired his ability to perform DPS duties, so his discrimination claim fails as a matter of law.

The Texas Supreme Court decided that a 1984 pole-attachment contract between Spectrum (successor) and CPS Energy incorporates later-enacted statutory limits on pole-attachment rates. The Court held the agreement’s clear promise to “at all times observe and comply with . . . all laws” and that the contract is “subject to” such laws means legislative changes affecting the parties’ rights and obligations become enforceable under the contract. Because CPS charged and collected higher rates from Spectrum while collecting less from AT&T, Spectrum may pursue its breach-of-contract claim alleging violations of the Public Utility Regulatory Act. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded to the trial court.

The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus relief directing the trial court to vacate its new-trial order and enter judgment on an 11–1 defense verdict in a medical-negligence suit. After a jury found Dr. Lapuerta not liable for Jose Torres’s eventual ray amputation, the trial court granted a new trial based on perceived error in a “loss of chance” jury instruction and possible juror confusion. The Supreme Court held the trial court misapplied controlling Texas law about loss-of-chance instructions, noted an improper juror letter that could have influenced the result, and concluded the record did not show the instruction probably caused an improper judgment.

The Texas Supreme Court denied a mandamus petition challenging a trial court order that disqualified defendants’ counsel because a legal assistant who formerly worked for the plaintiffs later worked on the same case for the defendants’ firm without having been instructed to avoid the matter. The Court reaffirmed a longstanding bright-line rule that side-switching nonlawyers must be admonished not to work on matters from their prior employment before they commence work on a later-arising conflict, and that institutional screening measures must also be shown. The Court held the plaintiffs timely sought disqualification and that the absence of the required admonition justified disqualification.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated summary judgment for H-E-B in a slip-and-fall premises-liability case. The plaintiff slipped on a clear liquid puddle in a grocery aisle and sued H-E-B, alleging the store knew or should have known of the hazard. The Court held that to raise a fact issue on constructive notice a plaintiff must present some evidence about how long the dangerous condition existed at the time and place of injury. Because the record lacked any evidence on the puddle’s duration, H-E-B could not be charged with constructive knowledge and summary judgment was proper.

The Texas Supreme Court resolved a dispute over how to value a nonparticipating royalty reserved in a 1960 deed. The court held the deed’s phrase “produced from the above described acreage” fixes the valuation point at the wellhead, and the phrase “free of cost forever” refers only to exemption from exploration and production costs. Because the deed lacks language shifting valuation to processed, downstream sales or expressly adding postproduction costs to the royalty base, postproduction costs may be deducted from downstream proceeds to determine the value of the raw minerals at the well. The court reversed the court of appeals and rendered partial summary judgment for the operator, remanding for further proceedings consistent with that interpretation.

Justice Young filed a short opinion respecting the Court’s denial of rehearing in a petition for review concerning the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA). He explains that the Court has rarely authoritatively construed TUFTA and that many lower and federal courts have had to make independent interpretations. Justice Young concluded this particular case is a poor vehicle to resolve the broader statutory question—whether terminating a contract right to future payments can be a fraudulent transfer—because the record is highly fact-specific. For those reasons the Court denied rehearing and declined to take the case for further guidance on TUFTA.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and ordered the County to meet and confer with the Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association (PPOA) about the County’s decision to outsource security work. PPOA had sought a writ of mandate after ERCOM and the superior court concluded the parties’ memorandum of understanding (MOU) waived PPOA’s bargaining rights as to such reorganization decisions. The appellate court held the MOU did not contain a clear and unmistakable waiver of the statutory right to meet and confer about outsourcing, because the MOU’s notice and management-rights language was ambiguous and did not explicitly waive MMBA rights.

The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for Ghilotti Construction in a suit by ironworker Leonardo Cordero, who was injured while working for subcontractor Camblin Steel on a bridge project. The trial court granted summary judgment based on the Privette doctrine, which presumes a hirer of an independent contractor delegates responsibility for workplace safety to the contractor. The appellate court held California safety regulations (including Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 1711) do not create a nondelegable duty that defeats Privette, and Cordero failed to raise a triable issue that Ghilotti retained and exercised control over Camblin’s work in a way that affirmatively contributed to the injury.