Court Filings

The Ohio appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s July 3, 2025 order granting Allen County Children Services Board permanent custody of J.H., a child born in August 2023. The Agency originally removed J.H. at birth after the mother tested positive for multiple controlled substances and the child suffered withdrawal; J.H. remained in Agency care for over a year. The court found clear and convincing evidence that reunification was not likely within a reasonable time, that J.H. was bonded to his foster family, and that permanent custody was in the child’s best interest. The mother’s request for a short extension to obtain housing was denied as an abuse of discretion did not occur.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals granted the State's motion for reconsideration, vacated its earlier February 27, 2026 opinion, and affirmed the trial court's judgment revoking Jeffrey Heath's community control and imposing prison terms totaling 12–15 years. The court held that the trial court's September 2023 sentencing sufficiently notified Heath that prison terms (up to 20 years total across the counts) could be imposed upon violation of community control, and that the court properly reserved prison terms consistent with current R.C. 2929.19(B)(4). The court also held consecutive sentences were permissible under the circumstances because there was no existing prison term at the time the reserved terms were imposed.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Stark County Probate Court’s finding that attorney Gerald B. Golub was in indirect civil contempt for failing to return $43,560 he paid himself in attorney fees from four related estates without prior probate-court approval. The appellate court held the contempt finding was proper because the May 15, 2024 order requiring return of the fees had been previously affirmed and disallowed for further review, and Golub made no effort to comply or seek court approval or other relief. The court concluded the probate judge did not abuse her discretion and that coercive remedies (periodic payments, execution) were appropriate.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed Terry L. Bickerstaff’s conviction for third-degree felony assault arising from an incident in a Mansfield Correctional Institution segregation recreation cell. The jury found that Bickerstaff swung through the bars at a corrections officer, J.N., and the court held the State presented sufficient evidence that he attempted to cause physical harm and that the victim suffered at least minor physical injury. The court relied on statutory language that assault includes attempts and on the victim’s testimony and bodycam footage to conclude a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

A Wayne County jury convicted Brodey I. Murbarger of first-degree murder for the death of Megan Nichols; the court sentenced him to a 50-year term with 3 years of mandatory supervised release. On appeal Murbarger argued the court erred by denying a change of venue and funding for a phone-survey expert, that he was entitled to a Miller/Harris-type hearing because he was a young adult at the time of the crime, and that multiple murder convictions violated the one-act, one-crime rule. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and most rulings, held the venue and expert denials were not an abuse of discretion, declined to grant a Miller-type remedy on direct appeal, but vacated two duplicate murder convictions and ordered the mittimus corrected.

The appellate court affirmed the Cook County circuit court’s dismissal of Neighbors Against a Marijuana Dispensary (NAMD)’s administrative-review complaint challenging the Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals’ grant of a special use permit to MariGrow to operate a cannabis dispensary. The court held NAMD lacked statutory standing because it failed to show any member owned property within 250 feet, had not entered an appearance and objected at the Board hearing, and the membership evidence NAMD sought to add was outside the administrative record. The court also found no due-process or equal-protection violation and upheld denial of NAMD’s untimely motion to amend.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division's denial without prejudice of R.G.C.'s second application to expunge her criminal record under New Jersey's "clean slate" law. The court held that although more than ten years had passed since her conviction, petitioner failed to prove her large unpaid restitution obligation was not "willful noncompliance." Because she offered no competent, credibly documented evidence of inability to pay (despite claiming deportation, illness, and poverty), the court found her post-release nonpayment was a deliberate choice and therefore denied expungement.

The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded defendant Jose Gerardo Espiritu’s conviction for sexual offenses because the trial court failed to follow the process required by Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 during jury selection. Defense counsel objected when the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror who identified herself as a nurse. The trial court accepted the prosecutor’s stated reason (that the juror was a nurse) without determining whether that reason was a presumptively invalid ground under section 231.7(e)(10). Because the court did not make the required inquiry into presumptively invalid categories, the appellate court reversed and ordered a new trial.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied an application to correct the record under Pa.R.A.P. 1926 and affirmed the Commonwealth Court's March 31, 2026 order concerning the nomination petition of Karl Morris as the Democratic candidate for the Third Congressional District. The matter was an appeal by Karl Morris from the Commonwealth Court decision; the Supreme Court reviewed the procedural request to alter the record and declined it, leaving the lower court's decision intact.

The City of Edinburg filed a petition for writ of mandamus claiming the trial court abused its discretion by freezing discovery deadlines. The city later moved to withdraw the petition because the parties reached an agreement about the disputed discovery, rendering the mandamus request moot. The court treated the withdrawal as a motion to dismiss, found the matter moot under controlling authority, and dismissed the petition for writ of mandamus.

The court denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Anderson & Associates, PLLC seeking to overturn a trial court order of December 5, 2025 that redistributed an attorney fee award. The court explained mandamus requires showing both that the trial court abused its discretion and that there is no adequate remedy by appeal, or that the order is void. The court concluded the relator has an adequate remedy by appeal, withdrew its prior order requesting responses from the real parties in interest, and denied the petition and emergency relief.

The First District Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court’s final decree terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to four minor children. The parents argued lack of jurisdiction due to timing and challenged the sufficiency of evidence on reasonable efforts, predicate grounds, and best interest. The appellate court held the earlier trial commencement was not a sham, so jurisdiction was proper. The court found clear-and-convincing evidence that both parents engaged in conduct and allowed conditions that endangered the children (Family Code §161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)) and that termination served the children’s best interests given parental substance abuse, violence, instability, probation violations, incarceration, and the children’s special needs.

The Court dismissed William Berry Waters III’s appeal because the notice of appeal was filed on his behalf by a non-lawyer and Waters failed to cure the deficiency by filing a signed amended notice after being notified. Texas law prohibits non-lawyers from representing others or preparing pleadings, and a notice of appeal filed in a representative capacity by a non-attorney is ineffective. The clerk repeatedly asked Waters to file a signed amended notice but he did not do so, so the court dismissed the appeal under its procedural rule allowing dismissal for failure to comply with rules or clerk notices.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals reversed the county court’s no-evidence summary judgment that had dismissed Samantha Lopez’s claim that she and Felix Lengyel were informally married. Lopez alleged an informal marriage based on an agreement to be married, living together, and holding themselves out as married. The appeals court found Lopez presented more than a minimal amount of evidence on (1) an agreement to be married (her deposition and hearing testimony that they agreed to represent themselves as married to permit travel to Canada) and (2) holding out (testimony that family, housekeepers, and others treated them as married and that they represented to the Canadian government they were married). The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Court dismissed Practical Technology, Inc.'s interlocutory appeal because the notice of appeal and appellant's brief were signed only by a person who is not a licensed attorney. The same non-attorney had previously filed a mandamus petition in this Court and the Court had dismissed that petition for lack of an attorney appearance. The Court gave Practical Technology time to respond to the appellee's motion to dismiss and rejected a late-filed extension because it was submitted by the same non-attorney. Because no licensed attorney ever appeared and no cure was shown, the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution.

A jury convicted Jordan Stephens of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated after police stopped his truck following a citizen’s 911 call reporting erratic driving. Officers observed signs of intoxication (odor of alcohol, glassy eyes), found empty alcohol bottles in the vehicle, and administered standardized field sobriety tests on which Stephens performed poorly. Stephens argued on appeal that errors in test administration and other explanations could account for observations, but the court found the combined evidence — eyewitness report of dangerous driving, officer observations, test performance, admissions about drinking, and refusal of blood testing — sufficient to support the conviction and affirmed.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals, in an original mandamus proceeding arising from Travis County, denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. The court issued a brief memorandum opinion concluding the petitioner was not entitled to the extraordinary relief sought and cited the appellate rule governing disposition. No further explanation or relief was provided in the opinion, and the denial resolves the petition without granting any mandamus relief.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied Sonny Delgado's petition for a writ of mandamus and dismissed his emergency motion for temporary relief as moot. The court issued a brief memorandum opinion stating only the disposition and citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. No substantive opinion or reasoning was provided in the document beyond the procedural rulings and the filing date.

The Court of Appeals of the Eighth District of Texas affirmed a trial court judgment that terminated the father's parental rights to his child, J.K.C. After a bench trial the trial court found termination was in the child's best interest and that the Department of Family and Protective Services proved grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (N). Appellate counsel reviewed the record under Anders procedures and the court conducted an independent review, finding no non-frivolous issues to support reversal. The court also denied counsel's motion to withdraw, preserving the father's right to appointed counsel through further review.

The Court of Appeals of the Eighth District of Texas denied Ruben Dario Almela's petition for a writ of mandamus. Almela filed the petition on April 6, 2026 seeking extraordinary relief, but the court concluded he failed to demonstrate entitlement to that relief. The court therefore denied the petition and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The opinion is brief and affirms the denial without issuing further instructions or relief.

The Texas Second Court of Appeals considered Miceala Hurtado’s original mandamus petition seeking extraordinary relief from an order of the 325th District Court of Tarrant County. After review, the appellate court concluded mandamus relief was not warranted and denied the petition in a brief per curiam memorandum opinion. No extended reasoning or factual discussion appears in the opinion; the court simply states it considered the petition and determined relief should be denied.

The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed William Freeman’s convictions on four counts of child molestation. Freeman had initially been appointed counsel but requested to represent himself; the trial court held a thorough Faretta hearing, found his waiver of counsel knowing and voluntary, and later an amended indictment added two additional like charges. Freeman argued on appeal the court should have re-inquired after the amended indictment and failed to ensure he understood the risks of self-representation. The appellate court found the original Faretta hearing adequate, no post-waiver request for counsel was made, and the amended charges did not change the nature or maximum exposure, so the waiver remained valid.

The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court’s judgment that had affirmed the City of Atlanta Board of Zoning Adjustment’s denial of Beacon Media’s permit to erect a freestanding billboard. Beacon applied for a permit, the City initially denied it, then granted it, and an adjacent landowner, Jamestown, appealed to the BZA and succeeded. The appeals court held Jamestown lacked standing under Georgia’s substantial-interest-aggrieved-citizen test because it did not show any special harm unique from other similarly situated property owners. Because Jamestown lacked standing, the court reversed the superior court’s affirmance of the BZA decision.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the appellant's motion to remand this criminal appeal to the trial court so the trial court can complete the appellate record. The trial court is directed to add exhibits that were properly admitted at the October 4, 2022 hearing. After the exhibits are filed or the trial court issues an order that the exhibits are unavailable, the Fulton County Superior Court Clerk must transmit the full record, transcripts, and exhibits back to the Court of Appeals for re-docketing under the existing notice of appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an application for discretionary appeal by Xiaodong Guan from a civil action (LC No. 25CV000342) and denied the application on April 10, 2026. The order is brief and purely procedural: the court exercised its discretion and declined to grant review, so no merits decision on the underlying dispute between the named parties was made. The denial leaves the lower court's judgment or order intact and concludes this court's involvement unless the applicant pursues another available remedy.

The First District Court of Appeals reviewed two juvenile cases against T.B. after police stopped him and three companions for jaywalking and found a handgun on his person following a frisk. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s denial of suppression and the concealed-weapons adjudication, concluding the frisk was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion, the gun was properly authenticated, and was shown operable. But the court reversed the jaywalking adjudication because the juvenile court abused its discretion by implicitly denying T.B.’s timely pre-disposition motion to withdraw his plea without explanation. The matter was remanded for withdrawal of the jaywalking plea.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court’s denial of J.D.’s motion to expunge records of his 2018 involuntary-commitment. The court held that the probate court lacked statutory or inherent authority to expunge those civil commitment records, and that prior appellate decision in the same case prevented relitigation of the inherent-authority argument. The court also rejected J.D.’s statutory claims: the five-day hearing requirement in R.C. 5122.141 did not trigger mandatory expungement because a hearing occurred within the deadline, and R.C. 2953.32 governs criminal-conviction expungement, not civil commitment records.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Xerion Advanced Battery Corp. and Northwoods Blvd., LLC and its denial of summary judgment for Certa Vandalia, LLC. The dispute concerned whether Northwoods’ late payment of a $2,000 cure fee allowed Certa to declare a default and terminate a purchase and sale agreement. The court concluded the contract was ambiguous about whether Certa had to give written notice before declaring a default for failure to pay the cure fee, and the parties’ prior conduct showed Certa had not consistently enforced strict, notice-free defaults. Because Certa failed to give the required notice, Northwoods did not materially breach and forfeiture would be inequitable.

The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part the Darke County Common Pleas Court judgment in an administrative zoning appeal. The trial court had reversed the Board of Zoning Appeals as to Building A (finding it properly permitted) and affirmed as to Buildings B and C (finding they lacked agricultural exemptions). The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion regarding Building A — the record showed Surber obtained an agricultural exemption and obtained a refund of the commercial permit fee, voiding the permit — so the Board’s decision as to Building A is reinstated. The trial court’s findings about Buildings B and C were affirmed because their primary uses were nonagricultural.

The Ohio Second District Court of Appeals affirmed Nancy Jean Taylor’s 30-month prison sentence for felony theft from a person in a protected class. Taylor had pleaded guilty to stealing $7,504 from an elderly client and received a presentence investigation and restitution hearing. She argued on appeal that the trial court misapplied sentencing factors and that the sentence was excessive. The appeals court held the sentence was within the statutory range, the trial court indicated it considered the required sentencing statutes, and therefore the sentence was not contrary to law.