Court Filings

The Appellate Division reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment about whether two individuals (Maloney and Stern) must indemnify plaintiffs under two paragraphs of limited joinders tied to a joint venture agreement (JVA). The court affirmed the lower court in holding that paragraph (ii) does not obligate Maloney and Stern to indemnify plaintiffs for first-party claims, but it vacated the declaration and denied summary judgment as to paragraph (i) because that paragraph is ambiguous about covering first-party claims. The court relied on Delaware law requiring a clear statement to extend indemnities to first-party claims and found disputed issues of contractual interpretation for paragraph (i).

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed Supreme Court's denial of defendant Riding High Dude Ranch's motion for summary judgment in a negligence suit by plaintiff Kerry Small. Small alleged a wrangler negligently pushed her leg over a horse while mounting in June 2021, causing knee injuries requiring surgery. The court found defendant met its initial burden showing Small assumed ordinary risks of horseback riding, but Small raised triable issues that the wrangler applied excessive force in a manner contrary to ranch training and protocols, which could have unreasonably increased the risk and caused her injury. Those factual disputes preclude summary judgment.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed the Workers' Compensation Board's decision awarding benefits for an occupational disease to Samuel Davis, a brick mason who alleged repetitive-trauma injuries to both hands/wrists and knees. The Board credited treating physician Dr. Hecht's opinion linking Davis's long history of repetitive masonry duties to his diagnoses, despite conflicting opinions from the carrier's consultant. The court also upheld a $500 penalty the Board imposed (reduced from $2,500) against the carrier for unilaterally conducting a third deposition of Dr. Hecht while an administrative appeal was pending, finding that the deposition constituted a frivolous proceeding.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed Supreme Court's denial of defendants' summary judgment motions in a wrongful-death/medical malpractice suit. Plaintiff sued after her husband presented to the emergency department with left-sided back pain and difficulty breathing and later died of a heart attack four days after discharge. Defendants submitted expert affidavits saying care met the standard and testing would not have changed the outcome; plaintiff produced expert opinions that an EKG and troponin should have been ordered and that timely testing/treatment would likely have prevented death. The court found disputed issues of fact on breach and causation and rejected defendants' claim plaintiff raised a new theory of recovery.

The Court of Appeals held that the federal Graves Amendment preempts New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (which imposed vicarious liability on rental companies) but does not preempt VTL § 370's independent requirement that rental car companies carry minimum amounts of insurance. The court concluded that Section 370, insofar as prior New York precedent read it to require rental companies to provide primary insurance coverage to renters up to the statutory minimums, is preempted by the Graves Amendment's prohibition on vicarious liability; however, the statute’s separate obligation that rental companies maintain specified minimum insurance limits survives. The Appellate Division's order affirming summary disposition was therefore affirmed.

The court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment declaring valid and enforceable a 2018 contract conveying a 25% interest in income-producing property to two law firms (later assigned to HPGM, LLC). Price’s attempt to defeat summary judgment relied on untimely, stricken amended pleadings and did not respond with evidence to many no-evidence challenges to her originally pleaded claims and defenses. The court also upheld the award of approximately $300,000 in attorney’s fees to HPGM, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion given HPGM’s billing records and counsel’s testimony about rates, services, and the receivership and bankruptcy work that advanced the declaratory claim.

The court dismissed pro se appellant Isabelle Edwards’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Edwards sought review of the trial court’s August 5, 2025 order granting KFS Lewisville LLC’s motion to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a and awarding attorneys’ fees, but the trial court expressly stated the fee amount had not yet been determined and that its order was not final. The appellate court concluded the order neither finally disposed of every claim nor was an appealable interlocutory order, so the appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction after Edwards failed to respond to the court’s notice to show grounds to continue the appeal.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed Rae Neel’s suit against the City of Hurst for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Neel sued after tripping on an uneven section of public sidewalk and the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The appeals court held the sidewalk condition was not a “special defect” and, under the premises-defect standard, Neel’s own deposition showed she knew of the sidewalk’s condition before the fall, defeating her claim of lack of knowledge and preserving the City’s immunity.

The court considered Anthony Lopez’s appeal after the trial court granted summary judgment dismissing his dram-shop, respondeat superior assault, negligence, and gross-negligence claims against CBE Extreme Nightlife FW, LLC (Old School Texas). The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of Lopez’s negligence and gross-negligence claims because they were preempted by the Texas Dram Shop Act and affirmed dismissal of the respondeat superior assault claim because Lopez failed to challenge every ground supporting summary judgment. The court reversed summary judgment on the dram-shop claim, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence that Lopez’s extreme intoxication proximately caused his eye injury, and remanded for further proceedings.

The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of appellants’ motion to dissolve a temporary injunction. Highland Village Management (HVM) had obtained a temporary injunction preventing appellants from using or transferring funds or property allegedly taken from HVM. Appellants argued on appeal that HVM failed to prove irreparable injury and that newly revealed facts required dissolution. The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction to revisit the original injunction and found appellants presented no new evidence or changed circumstances at the dissolution hearings, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dissolve the injunction.

The First District of Texas dismissed Star Construction Services, Sandra Scherer (d/b/a Star Construction Services), and Robert Scherer’s appeal because the appellants neither established indigence nor paid required appellate fees and failed to respond to the court’s notice. The court cited Texas rules and statutes governing fee payment and its authority to dismiss for nonpayment and failure to prosecute. Because appellants did not timely explain why they should not pay or actually pay the fees, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment and remanded. The dispute concerned interpretation and enforcement of a settlement agreement between M-I L.L.C. and Texas International Terminals (TXIT) about lease and materials-handling payments and removal of equipment. The trial court had added CPI-based price adjustments and ordered M-I to remove certain equipment, relying on extrinsic course-of-dealing evidence. The appellate court held the settlement language was unambiguous, forbade using extrinsic evidence to rewrite the agreement, and concluded the trial court improperly added and altered terms instead of enforcing the agreement as written.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas denied Houston Pipe Line Company LP's petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate a trial court order that granted a plea to the jurisdiction. The appellate court declined to disturb the trial court's decision, lifted its prior stay issued October 7, 2025, and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The court issued a short per curiam memorandum opinion denying relief without extended discussion.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal brought by Blackbuck Petroleum PropCo I LLC and AGP Energy Services LLC from a trial court order denying their motion to compel arbitration. The parties executed a mediated settlement and a signed settlement, release, and confidentiality agreement that expressly resolved all past and present claims, including the pending appeal, and required dismissals with prejudice. Appellees moved to dismiss the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure; appellants did not oppose. The court granted the unopposed motion and dismissed the appeal, taxing costs against the appellants.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal in a dispute between John Dickerson and Atlas Sand Company, LLC after the parties jointly moved to dismiss. The parties agreed each would bear their own appellate costs as permitted by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court granted the joint motion and dismissed the appeals without reaching the merits of the underlying dispute.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a trial-court judgment ordering specific performance of a written buy-sell agreement requiring Joann Crawford to convey a parcel to Buffalo Creek Properties, LLC (an assignee of Trails End). The trial court found Buffalo Creek ready, willing, and able to perform, that Crawford breached the contract and conveyed the property with knowledge of the pending suit and lis pendens, and it adjusted the sale proceeds for liens, taxes, life-estate compensation, costs, and fees. The appellate court presumed the trial record supported the findings (Crawford failed to timely request the reporter’s record) and found no reversible error in the trial court’s award or its accounting adjustments.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied a petition for a writ of mandamus brought by Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. and TD Ameritrade, Inc. challenging a lower-court action in Travis County. The court issued a short memorandum opinion simply stating the petition is denied and citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. No extended reasoning or factual background appears in the document; the decision is a procedural denial of extraordinary relief rather than a merits ruling on underlying claims.

The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a lower-court judgment in favor of Otavio Metzker against Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company. The appeal arose from Broward County circuit court proceedings (case no. 062020CA020823AXXXCE). The appellate panel, in a per curiam opinion with concurrence by all judges, issued a simple affirmance without extended opinion. The decision is subject to possible change if a timely motion for rehearing is filed and resolved.

The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a lower-court judgment in a civil dispute between appellants Adem H. Adem and Upper Jets Maintenance, LLC and appellee N898PA, LLC. The appeal arose from a case litigated in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County. The appellate panel issued a brief per curiam decision simply stating “Affirmed,” indicating the court found no reversible error in the trial court’s proceedings or judgment. The opinion was unanimous and notes the decision is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved.

The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District of Florida, affirmed a county court judgment in a dispute between Well Done Mitigation as assignee of Danielle Harvard and Citizens Property Insurance Corporation. The appeal (No. 4D2025-0802) arose from Broward County Circuit Court, and the panel, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the lower court's decision without published opinion. The court noted the decision is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved. No further published reasoning appears in the short opinion.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision in a civil case between Valerie Williams (appellant) and Horace Williams (appellee). The appeal arose from a Broward County circuit court matter (case no. 062023CA015644AXXXCE). The appellate panel, writing per curiam, concluded the trial court's ruling should stand and issued a short dispositive opinion simply stating "Affirmed." The court noted the decision is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved.

The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed a nonfinal interlocutory order from the Circuit Court for Palm Beach County in a dispute between condominium associations and multiple defendants, including homebuilder Lennar Homes, LLC and individual appellees. The appellate panel issued a single-line per curiam decision: Affirmed. The opinion contains no extended reasoning in the published slip and notes the decision is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved.

The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed an appeal by Olga Quijano and Jose Luis De Vivo from a Broward Circuit Court judgment involving HSBC Bank National Association. The panel issued a short per curiam opinion that affirmed the lower court's decision. No detailed reasoning or factual discussion appears in the published entry; the opinion simply states the judgment is affirmed and notes parties may file a timely motion for rehearing. All three judges concurred.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a lower-court judgment in a dispute between My Harrison Corp. (appellant) and Home Tower Condominium, Inc. (appellee). The appeal arose from a Broward County Circuit Court case (No. 062024CA016458AXXXCE). The appellate panel issued a per curiam opinion, with Judges Levine, Conner, and Shepherd concurring, and entered judgment affirming the trial court. The opinion is short and does not state the underlying factual or legal reasoning in the published entry.

The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in a dispute between G.T. Construction and Development, Inc. (appellant) and Century Tile and Marble, Inc. (appellee). The panel issued a per curiam opinion, with Judges Levine, Conner, and Shepherd concurring, and noted the decision is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved. No substantive reasoning, facts, or legal analysis appears in the published entry beyond the affirmance.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Allamanda Gardens Condominium Inc. and Sheldon R. Rosenthal in an appeal brought by Alexandria Investment, LLC. The appeal arose from a Broward County circuit court case (No. 062022CA004954AXXXCE). The appellate panel issued a per curiam opinion simply stating 'Affirmed' without elaborating on the reasoning in the published entry. The decision is subject to any timely motion for rehearing before it becomes final.

The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Wells Fargo USA Holdings, Inc. in an appeal brought by 5307 CWELT-2008. The appeal arose from a Broward County circuit court case (062016CA004032AXXXCE). The appellate panel issued a short per curiam opinion simply stating “Affirmed,” with no published opinion or extended reasoning included in the decision summary. The court noted the decision is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved.

The Court of Appeals dismissed EZ Automotive and Towing SVC LLC's appeal from the trial court's summary judgment because the judgment was not final or appealable. Recaman Auto Group obtained summary judgment on its declaratory-judgment claim about ownership of a Chevrolet Silverado, but the trial court expressly left Recaman's request for attorney’s fees undecided. Because the fee claim remained pending and the order lacked finality language, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas struck Kevin McBride’s appellate brief for failure to substantially comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure after multiple notices and an opportunity to cure. McBride’s March 30, 2026 brief was deficient—containing conclusory, bulleted statements without citation to the record or legal authority—so the court treated the filing as if no brief had been filed and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court explained that liberal construction of procedural rules does not require the court to perform a party’s legal research or factual hunting.

The court reviewed an appeal by Y.S., who filed a petition to change her minor child’s name and a sworn Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs. The trial court ordered her to pay reduced costs of $400 after an interview with county staff, but did not hold a formal oral evidentiary hearing or make detailed findings required by Rule 145. The appellate court concluded the record contained uncontroverted evidence that Y.S. could not afford court costs, that the trial court failed to follow Rule 145 procedures, and therefore reversed the order and directed the trial court to allow Y.S. to proceed without paying costs or fees.