Court Filings

The court affirmed the trial court's judgment finding Marysville Animal Care Center, LLC breached an employment agreement with Dr. Cassie Wooden by failing to timely offer her either a partnership interest or a $45,000 bonus after three years of employment. The magistrate and trial court found the parties had orally modified Dr. Wooden’s work schedule to three clinic days per week by course of conduct, so the December 7, 2021 partnership offer conditioned on returning to four clinic days did not cure the earlier breach. The court rejected appellant’s challenges to factual findings, parol-evidence rulings, credibility determinations, and alleged bias.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the Franklin County trial court’s denial of Robert Lindsey’s amended petition for postconviction relief. Lindsey had been convicted of murder for stabbing his mother; he argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate potential prior abuse more fully, not consulting a domestic-violence expert, and failing to seek a no‑duty‑to‑retreat jury instruction. The appellate court found counsel’s investigation and strategic choices reasonable based on the record and Lindsey’s own statements, and held that even if some investigation was lacking, there was no reasonable probability the outcome would have changed.

The court dismissed relator Atravion Preston’s mandamus action seeking public records from the Lorain Correctional Institution and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. The magistrate concluded, and the court adopted that recommendation, that Preston failed to file with his complaint the written affirmation required by amended R.C. 149.43(C)(2). Because the statute mandates dismissal if that affirmation is not filed, the court granted respondents’ motion to dismiss, denied as moot the motion to strike, and dismissed the action without reaching the merits or statutory-damages arguments.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals denied Lorenza Barnette’s petition for a writ of mandamus and granted the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction’s motion for summary judgment. Barnette sought an order directing the Department to change its records to reflect that his June 28, 2021 entry imposed no prison sentence. The court concluded the 2011 judgment imposing two life-without-parole terms (plus additional consecutive terms) remains the operative sentence. The 2019 entry imposing post-release control was vacated on appeal and the 2021 entry only notified him of post-release control for kidnapping, not resentencing.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Claims and remanded for further proceedings in a public-records dispute. Michael Newman sought 13 categories of records from the Greater Columbus Arts Council (GCAC) and its Film Columbus division. The Court of Claims had granted disclosure for three financial items under R.C. 149.431 but denied the rest after finding GCAC was not the functional equivalent of a public office under the Public Records Act. The appellate court held the lower court failed to adequately weigh the totality of the Oriana House factors (especially government involvement) and remanded for a fuller functional-equivalency analysis, while affirming the ruling on annual reports as non-R.C. 149.431 records.

The Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Franklin County Common Pleas Court's grant of summary judgment to The Huntington National Bank in a breach-of-loan case. The bank sued Xiaowei He for unpaid balances under a June 15, 2021 loan; the trial court found He defaulted and owed $19,187.69. The appeals court rejected He’s arguments that the case should have been dismissed for lack of prosecution, that the bank lacked standing because it sold the loan, and that fraud by a third party relieved her of liability. The court held the loan was charged-off (not sold) and remained enforceable, and no genuine factual dispute precluded judgment.

The Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Franklin County trial court's July 21, 2025 judgment denying appellant Christina Bushong's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. The court held that the parties' November 17, 2023 memorandum of agreement did not itself dismiss the case because no journalized dismissal entry was filed, so the trial court retained jurisdiction to resolve the child-support issues. The court also found appellant failed to timely appeal the June 24, 2025 judgment adopting a magistrate's contempt decision, so the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review that portion of the proceedings.

The Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas’ grant of summary judgment to the Director of the Ohio Division of Cannabis Control. Bear River Dispensaries (appellant) sold its medical marijuana certificate before applying for an adult-use dispensary license under former R.C. 3780.10(B). The court held the statute unambiguously requires applicants to possess a medical certificate at the time of application, not merely have possessed one earlier, so the Division correctly denied appellant’s adult-use application and the trial court properly entered judgment for the Division.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the First District and remanded the case. The court held that Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution (the state right-to-counsel clause) did not apply to Morris’s preindictment investigatory interview, because that provision applies to trials in court. The court also considered whether Morris invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the recorded interrogation after an initial waiver. It concluded Morris did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke his federal right to counsel at the relevant point, so suppression under the federal Constitution was not required.

The Superior Court reversed a Philadelphia County trial court order that had denied Juliett Barzilayeva and Eugene Zwick’s petition to set aside a sheriff’s sale of real property. The panel held that the restitution order imposed in Montgomery County remained a criminal sentencing matter under the sentencing court’s continuing jurisdiction and that the procedures in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728 vested the county clerk (not a private victim) with authority to transmit certified restitution judgments for docketing. Because the Philadelphia filing and resulting judgment were outside the authorized procedure and thus void ab initio, the court struck the Philadelphia judgment and reversed the denial of the petition to set aside the sale.

The Superior Court opinion (dissenting) addresses a dispute over a Philadelphia sheriff’s sale of property owned by Juliett Barzilayeva and Eugene Zwick after a transferred civil judgment for restitution in favor of victim Otar Kosashvili. The Majority vacated the sale for jurisdictional defects; Judge Kunselman dissents and would have affirmed. He reasons that once a criminal restitution order is reduced to a civil judgment and entered by a prothonotary, the victim is the real party in interest and may transfer and enforce that judgment in another county. He also finds the Owners waived most procedural objections (notice, postponement, price) and that the record does not support setting aside the sale.

The Superior Court affirmed the Orphans’ Court decree that denied Jacob Singer’s petition to compel burial arrangements for his father, Irvin Michael Singer. The Orphans’ Court had stayed burial pending a hearing after Jacob alleged his brother and executor, David Singer, planned a private burial and excluded siblings. The Superior Court held that a valid will appointed David as executor and expressly directed burial in the family plot, and that Section 305 of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code is subject to a decedent’s valid will. Because the will gave the executor authority over burial, Jacob’s majority-next-of-kin argument failed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that when a contract is governed by the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act (HICPA), a consumer may rescind the home-improvement contract within three business days by giving actual notice of cancellation to the contractor even if that notice is not in writing. The Office of Attorney General sued Gillece for refusing to honor timely oral or other non-written cancellations; the trial court granted partial summary judgment and issued an injunction, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded HICPA’s specific, later-enacted consumer-protection rescission rule controls over any general written-notice language in the older UTPCPL.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected Gillece’s argument that a consumer’s oral cancellation of a home-improvement contract is ineffective unless followed by written notice. The court concluded that the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act and the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law are meant to protect consumers, and that requiring written follow-up would undermine that purpose when a seller knows a consumer asked to cancel. The court therefore held sellers must honor an oral cancellation for contracts covered by the home‑improvement law and emphasized best practices of documenting cancellations in writing.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's order on April 30, 2026, resolving an appeal brought by Elliot-Todd Parker Koger and Todd Elliott Koger Sr. (the "Koger Family") against multiple state entities and officials including the Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency and county court officers. The Supreme Court issued a short per curiam order that simply states the Commonwealth Court's decision is affirmed, without extended opinion or additional reasoning in this document. The procedural posture shows this appeal follows the Commonwealth Court's September 5, 2025 order in a matter previously litigated and identified at this Court's earlier docket entries.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court and trial court orders dismissing Clearfield County’s lawsuit against construction professionals as time-barred by the 12-year construction statute of repose, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536. The County argued the common-law doctrine nullum tempus (no time runs against the sovereign) should toll the repose period, but the Court held nullum tempus cannot be used to defeat a statute of repose. Because a statute of repose abolishes causes of action after a fixed period and is not subject to tolling, the County’s claims, filed decades after construction finished, were jurisdictionally barred.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision that the Borough of West Chester’s municipal “stream protection fee” is a local tax, not a fee for service. The Borough had enacted the charge to fund stormwater management and compliance with federal and state stormwater regulations; universities (PASSHE and West Chester University) challenged it as an unlawful tax on exempt entities or as an improper fee. The Court held the Borough acted in its public capacity, providing a general public benefit and lacking a voluntary contractual relationship with property owners, so the charge functions as a tax from which the universities are immune.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice concurred with the majority in holding that the Borough’s stormwater charge functions as a tax rather than a fee because the proceeds fund broad, community-wide projects (tree planting, street sweeping, regrading alleys, rain gardens, curb extensions) that benefit the public generally rather than providing specific, measurable services to West Chester University. The concurrence explains that when charges fund generalized environmental and beautification projects remote from the university, the nexus to runoff from university property is too thin to qualify as a fee. The justice reserved judgment on different fact patterns where proceeds are spent solely on direct stormwater remediation or where charges are closely tied to individual property runoff.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice in this concurring and dissenting opinion would reverse the Commonwealth Court’s ruling that West Chester Borough’s stormwater ‘‘stream protection fee’’ is a tax exempting the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education (West Chester University). The justice reasons the University voluntarily uses the Borough stormwater system, receives a discrete benefit from that use, and therefore could be required to pay a fee rather than be immune as a sovereign entity. Because the Commonwealth Court did not analyze whether the charge is proportional to the benefit received, the justice would remand for further factual development on proportionality.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania justice concurs in part and dissents in part from the majority in an appeal by the Borough of West Chester concerning a municipal stormwater charge imposed on the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education and West Chester University. The justice agrees that the lower court correctly assigned the burden of proof to the Borough on cross-motions for summary judgment, but disagrees with the majority’s conclusion that the charge is a tax. The justice would hold the charge is a fee because it funds a service that benefits the University, can reasonably be allocated by impervious surface area, and may cover costs reasonably related to operating and maintaining stormwater management.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated part of the Commonwealth Court's order that had sustained a preliminary objection to Christopher Rogalski's request for a writ of mandamus to remove disciplinary information from Department of Education websites. The Supreme Court directed the Commonwealth Court to reconsider that preliminary objection in light of its recent decision in T.G.A. v. Department of Education, 348 A.3d 1043 (Pa. 2025). All other parts of the Commonwealth Court's order were affirmed, and jurisdiction over the case was relinquished.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and held that the judicially created "positive steps" test cannot disqualify an unemployment benefits claimant for self-employment when the claimant has not actually performed services for wages. The case involved a claimant who, after leaving employment, formed a business entity, created a website, and spent money advertising but had not yet performed services or received earnings. The Court ruled that Section 4(l)(2)(B) of the Unemployment Compensation Law requires proof that services were performed for wages before applying the control and independence inquiry, so aspirational or preparatory acts alone cannot bar benefits.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Middle District, issued an order on April 30, 2026, quashing Pedro Luis Gavilan-Cruz’s Notice of Appeal. The court relied on Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 910(a)(5), indicating that the appeal did not comply with the requirement that only the questions in the jurisdictional statement (or those fairly comprised therein) will ordinarily be considered. As a result, the court declined to consider the appeal and dismissed the appeal process by quashing the notice.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court and upheld the trial court’s denial of the Commonwealth’s motion to nolle prosequi charges of negligent simple assault against former officer Stuart Harrison. The Commonwealth argued its key eyewitness had died and, without that testimony, it could not prove criminal negligence beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held the trial court applied the correct Reinhart standard — evaluating whether the Commonwealth’s stated reasons were valid and reasonable — and found other available witnesses provided sufficient evidence to allow trial, so the nolle prosequi was not justified.

Justice Dougherty concurred in part and dissented in part from the Court’s decision affirming the Superior Court’s judgment in Commonwealth v. Harrison. He would have reversed the Superior Court’s published opinion and remanded for application of this Court’s binding precedent (particularly Commonwealth v. Reinhart and Commonwealth v. DiPasquale) governing judicial review of a prosecutor’s motion to nolle prosequi. He criticizes the Superior Court for adopting a de novo standard for review and the majority for affirming on an alternate ground and addressing issues the Commonwealth did not raise, while warning about separation-of-powers concerns and unresolved practical consequences of the decision.

The appellate court reviewed a foreclosure action by Associated Bank against defendants including John Morrison. The court held that a 1995 quitclaim deed conveyed immediate title to Morrison and his siblings as tenants in common while reserving a life estate to the grantor, Rosa McShan. Because McShan had the authority to encumber only her life estate, the 2007 mortgage only attached to that life estate and was extinguished on her death. The court reversed the trial court’s grant of foreclosure and vacated related orders as to Morrison’s interest, but it affirmed denial of Morrison’s Consumer Fraud Act claim.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Part's April 4, 2025 order reinstating and enforcing child support arrears owed by Shawn J. Harris to his ex-wife, Della M. Bournes. The court found New Jersey properly registered and enforced a Texas child-support order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), and that a November/October 2024 administrative USSO that closed enforcement improperly vacated arrears. Because the anti-retroactivity statute does not bar cancelling or reinstating arrears tied to a child's emancipation and Harris never obtained a retroactive reduction by court motion, the judge correctly reinstated arrears and denied Harris's cross-motion.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the denial of defendant 494 Eighth Avenue LLC’s summary judgment motion in a personal-injury sidewalk-trip case. Plaintiff said she tripped on an uneven sidewalk near a disassembled police barricade and testified the height differential was about one to one-and-a-half inches. The court held the defendant failed to show the alleged defect was trivial as a matter of law because the submitted photos and affidavit were inconclusive and the superintendent’s estimate was not a measured fact. Plaintiff’s testimony and possible violation of the NYC Administrative Code created questions of fact for trial.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's May 21, 2025 order and granted Mary Trump's motion to compel discovery from Donald Trump in a breach-of-settlement-agreement case. Mary Trump asserted an affirmative defense of fraudulent inducement based on alleged false asset valuations in a 2001 settlement agreement. The court held that because the requested materials relate to that affirmative defense they are discoverable under CPLR 3101(a), which requires liberal disclosure of matter material and necessary to prepare for trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the decision.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a lower court order in a malpractice/insurance dispute. It dismissed the third cause of action against Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company (MLMIC) but otherwise affirmed denial of motions to dismiss. The court held that plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged facts supporting a punitive-damages demand against MLMIC and that the legal-malpractice claim against defense counsel Marshall Dennehey and Kevin Ryan should proceed because the complaint plausibly alleges breach of care and causation tied to a failure to inform the insured of settlement offers and a conflict of interest.