Court Filings

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reviewed a nonfinal trial-court order in a landlord-tenant dispute. The court affirmed the portions of the order that related to the landlord’s summary proceedings for possession, but dismissed the appeal as to the trial court’s determination on a tenants’ motion to determine rents for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The panel held that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii) limits interlocutory appeals to orders determining the right to immediate possession, and an order resolving rents is not an enumerated, appealable nonfinal order.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court's judgment in the criminal case of Terrelle A. Tullis. The appeal was taken pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2). The court concluded that a life sentence is clear and definite in meaning and upheld the sentencing outcome, relying on Ratliff v. State to support that the Legislature intends a life sentence to keep a defendant in prison for the remainder of life.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court's decision in the criminal case of Lace Melitta Heflin. The appeal was considered under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2). The court relied on Ratliff v. State to conclude that a statutory life sentence is sufficiently definite and means the defendant is intended to remain in prison for the rest of her life, so no error warranted reversal.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision in appellant Edgar E. Oliver's appeal from a Collier County circuit court order. The panel, writing per curiam, held that a statutory sentence of life imprisonment is intended by the Legislature to keep a defendant in prison for the remainder of his life, citing Ratliff v. State. No further factual discussion or modification of the sentence was provided; the appeal was disposed of by a short opinion affirming the lower court.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal granted the Department of Revenue’s motion to dismiss an appeal by Adrelynn Shattell Thomas for lack of jurisdiction. Thomas, the obligee parent, attempted to directly appeal a final administrative paternity and support order entered February 10, 2026. The court followed White v. Department of Revenue and concluded Florida law (section 409.2563 read with chapter 120) authorizes direct appellate review only to the obligor parent and the Department in these administrative support proceedings, not to an obligee parent. Because Thomas lacked statutory standing to invoke direct review, the appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Dawon’s motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration in a construction-payment dispute. The parties had a detailed January 2024 service agreement that included a broad, surviving arbitration clause. In August 2024 they signed a short one-page follow-up agreement about cost handling and scheduling that did not address dispute resolution and did not supplant the original contract. The appellate court held the second agreement did not supersede the first, so the original arbitration clause remained enforceable and dismissal and arbitration were required.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s temporary injunction that had blocked the Texas Department of State Health Services from treating manufactured delta-8 THC products as Schedule I controlled substances. The Department and its commissioner had amended Schedule I definitions after objecting to a federal rule; the Court held those amendments were within the commissioner’s broad, statutorily granted discretion and did not conflict unambiguously with the 2019 Texas Farm Bill. The Court also held the Administrative Procedure Act did not govern publication of schedule changes, and that sovereign immunity bars the vendors’ claims.

Justice Sullivan dissents from the Court’s interpretation of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 18.001. He would hold that when a defendant serves a controverting affidavit the statute’s hearsay exception for medical-expense affidavits is defeated as to the entire affidavit, not just the particular line items the counteraffidavit disputes. Because the defendant served a controverting affidavit here, Ortiz could not rely on her medical-affidavits alone and the trial court properly denied a new trial on damages. Sullivan argues the statute’s plain text refers to "affidavits," so its all-or-nothing approach must be applied even if it creates odd or inefficient results.

The Texas Supreme Court held that when a party uses the pretrial affidavit process in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 18.001 to prove medical expenses, only those specific items or charges that are actually controverted by a compliant counteraffidavit lose the statute’s evidentiary effect. Unchallenged portions of an initial affidavit remain competent evidence and may be submitted to the factfinder. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded because the trial court erred by excluding entire medical-cost affidavits and counteraffidavits even though only portions were controverted, which deprived the claimant of admissible evidence of certain medical expenses.

The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision that sufficient evidence supported a juvenile delinquency adjudication for rape. A 14-year-old (Paul) was adjudicated for one count of rape for engaging in anal intercourse with a 15-year-old resident (Charles) at a youth home. Witness testimony described Paul holding Charles by the waist and thrusting while Charles said he did not want to comply and tried to get Paul to stop. The court applied the same sufficiency standard used in adult criminal cases and concluded a rational factfinder could find Paul used force to compel submission.

The appellate court reviewed Rhonda Gail Tomlinson’s appeal from a Hillsborough County circuit court judgment involving Jeff Allen Tomlinson and related business entities. The Second District issued a per curiam decision affirming the lower court’s ruling. The opinion is brief and contains no published reasoning; the panel simply affirmed the judgment below and noted concurrence by the three judges. No further factual findings, legal analysis, or modification of the trial court’s decision are included in the opinion.

The District Court of Appeal, Second District, dismissed Denice Ranee Reavely’s appeal from a Hillsborough County Court decision. The filing shows the case was before a three-judge panel, and the court’s one-line per curiam disposition simply states “Dismissed.” No reasoning, factual background, or legal analysis appears in the published entry, and the opinion is marked subject to revision before official publication.

The Florida Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision in a case where Irma Cristal Perdomo appealed a judgment involving Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as trustee. The appeal was taken from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County and was decided without published opinion beyond the single-word disposition. The panel issued a per curiam order affirming the circuit court's judgment with three judges concurring. No extended reasoning or detailed facts were provided in the appellate entry.

The Florida Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's ruling in an appeal brought by Lary Scott Morris against the State of Florida. The appellate panel issued a brief per curiam decision—without published opinion—concluding that the trial court's decision was correct and required no change. All three judges concurred, and the opinion is subject to revision before official publication. No additional reasoning or factual background was provided in the court's short order.

The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court's summary denial of a postconviction motion by Angel Gabriel Mejia. Mejia argued that a single sentence in his pro se 3.850 motion raised an involuntary-plea claim based on counsel's alleged failure to advise him about a 25-year mandatory minimum. The appellate court held that the motion did not fairly present that distinct claim and, in any event, the plea colloquy and corrected plea form conclusively refuted the allegation because Mejia was expressly advised of the mandatory minimums and acknowledged understanding them in open court.

The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed Craig Edward Leeks' convictions and sentences for second-degree murder and improper exhibition of a firearm. Leeks argued the trial court erred by not entering a written competency order and by not conducting a full competency hearing. The appellate court found the trial judge made adequate oral findings of competency, relied on a prior psychological evaluation, repeatedly questioned Leeks during the proceedings, and observed no lapse in competency. Because Leeks did not raise the omission below and has not shown fundamental error, the failure to reduce the competency finding to a written order did not require reversal.

The Second District Court of Appeal reviewed Kyle Kemp's appeal from the Pinellas County Circuit Court under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2). After consideration, the panel issued a per curiam decision affirming the lower court's judgment. The opinion is concise, lists the judges who concurred, and notes it may be revised before official publication. No reasoning or factual discussion is included in the published entry beyond the affirmance.

The appellate court reviewed an appeal by Eagles Nest Development Co., Inc. and Helicopter Structural & Maintenance, Inc. from a Pasco County circuit-court decision. After considering the record and briefs, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision. The per curiam opinion gives no extended discussion of legal reasoning; the judgment of the trial court therefore stands as entered. All three judges concurred.

The Florida Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision in the criminal matter of Scott Warren Cullen v. State of Florida. The appeal challenged an order from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County, but the appellate court, in a per curiam decision, unanimously affirmed the judgment below. No extended opinion or separate written reasoning was provided in the published entry; the court's brief ruling concludes the appeal lacks merit and upholds the trial-court outcome.

The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in a dispute between BISK Education, Inc. (appellant) and FSOI, LLC (appellee). The appeal was taken from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County before Judge Helene L. Daniel. The appellate panel issued a per curiam decision on May 1, 2026, concluding that the lower court's ruling should stand. No extended reasoning or factual details are provided in the published entry beyond the affirmation and the judges' concurrence.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed Neely Petrie-Blanchard’s conviction for first-degree murder but reversed her mandatory life sentence and remanded for resentencing because the trial court failed to renew the offer of counsel before sentencing. Although Petrie-Blanchard validly waived counsel and proceeded pro se at trial after an adequate Faretta inquiry, the court did not re-offer counsel at the separate, critical sentencing stage. The panel held that failing to renew the offer of counsel at sentencing is fundamental error and requires resentencing with appointed counsel or an explicit waiver.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal granted Michael Anthony Foster, Jr.'s petition for a belated appeal. The court directed that this opinion be filed with the trial court and treated as the notice of appeal from the February 28, 2025 order that denied the defendant's motion for postconviction relief in Duval County Circuit Court case number 2023-CF-003421-A. The court acted under its original jurisdiction to permit Foster to proceed with an appeal despite the missed appellate deadline, citing the Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure that governs belated appeals.

The Fifth District granted Joseph Edward Jordan’s petition for certiorari, concluding the trial court wrongly allowed the State to conduct a mental-health examination for a Hurst resentencing despite the State’s failure to give written notice within 45 days of arraignment. The court held that Florida statute §782.04(1)(b) and rule 3.181 require notice within 45 days of arraignment, and that the phrase “timely written notice” in rule 3.202 must be read to mean the statutorily mandated 45-day deadline. Because the trial court’s order conflicted with the statute and rule and would cause irreparable harm, the petition was granted.

The Fifth District reversed and remanded a Seminole County dissolution case because the trial court summarily denied the former husband’s timely motion to vacate a magistrate’s recommended order solely for not providing all trial transcripts. The appellate court held that the rule requires submission of a record or notice of a partial record but also contemplates substantial compliance and a mandatory hearing on a timely motion to vacate. Because the court cancelled the hearing and denied the motion without assessing substantial compliance or allowing the hearing, the denial was reversible error and the case is sent back for further proceedings.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of J.J.A.’s motion to suppress but reversed the juvenile disposition order adjudicating him delinquent for possession of a firearm by a minor. The appellate court found the disposition order failed to state the statutory maximum penalty and did not award or specify predisposition credit for time served, as required by Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.115(d)(2). Because the commitment at issue is effectively determinate (it will end before the department’s authority expires), the court ordered the trial court to enter a corrected disposition specifying the maximum penalty and the amount of credit.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the county court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant Eric Babcock in a defamation suit brought by neighbor and HOA board member Gregory Lattimer. The appellate court held that disputed factual issues remain about whether Babcock reasonably relied on unnamed government sources when he told HOA members that Lattimer threatened to shoot him and was under investigation for a hate crime. Because credibility and verification issues create jury questions under the current summary-judgment standard, the court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial-court order awarding attorney’s fees to Meagan Garmon in a post-dissolution proceeding and also reversed the denial of Jason Garmon’s rehearing request. The appeals court held that the record lacked competent, substantial evidence demonstrating Former Wife’s need for fee awards. Because the trial court’s finding of need was unsupported, the appellate court reversed the fee award, relying on Florida precedent requiring competent evidence of need before awarding attorney’s fees in family-law matters.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's denial of Dearek Randy Williams's motion to withdraw a nolo contendere plea to trafficking in fentanyl. Williams argued his plea was involuntary because trial counsel misadvised him that he could later appeal and "be out," which induced him to accept a mandatory 15-year sentence. The appellate court held that affirmative misadvice of counsel can create a manifest injustice rendering a plea involuntary, cited controlling precedent, and remanded the case for further proceedings on Williams's withdrawal motion.

The Sixth District reversed and remanded a trial-court final judgment awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to DidierGroup, LLC because that fee judgment was based on an underlying final judgment that this Court had already reversed in a prior opinion. The panel held that when the foundation judgment is reversed or vacated, any dependent award of fees and costs must likewise be reversed. The court remanded without prejudice to allow either party to seek attorneys’ fees after the trial proceedings conclude consistent with the mandate.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s sentencing of Zachary Boyce. The court held that the 2023 amendment to RCW 9.94A.525, which generally prevents counting most juvenile felony adjudications in an offender score, does not apply retroactively because the legislature did not clearly express that intent. Under Washington law and the savings clause (RCW 10.01.040) and RCW 9.94A.345, defendants must be sentenced according to the law in effect when the offense was committed unless the legislature expressly provides otherwise. Because no clear retroactivity language appeared in the amendment, Boyce’s juvenile adjudications were properly counted.